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ABSTRACT 
 
Environmentally Related Water Trading, Transfers and  
Environmental Flows: Welfare, Water Demand and Flows. (May 2008) 
Man Seung Han, B.S., Korea University; 
M.A., Yonsei University 
Co-Chairs of Advisory Committee: Dr. Bruce A. McCarl 
      Dr. Richard T. Woodward 
 
This dissertation reports on economic studies of Texas Interbasin Water Transfers 
(IBT) as a way to lessen expected water shortages, Texas minimum freshwater inflows 
requirements (FWIB) to protect environmental flows and the general policy setup when 
generators of environmental commodities might be able to sell credits in multiple 
markets. The Texas-based studies address economic, hydrological and environmental 
impacts, focusing on welfare gain, water demand, environmental flows and 
complementary relationship of environmental commodities. 
Conduct of the two Texas studies required development of a Texas surface water 
model. The developed model incorporates: (a) uncertain weather patterns and supply of 
  iv 
water; (b) river flows in most of the Texas river basins - twenty-one basins excluding 
only the Rio Grande; (c) demand for water by agricultural, municipal and industrial/ 
mining water; (d) IBT possibilities; (e) evaporation losses; and (e) return flows across 
the modeled basins. 
In studying the interbasin water transfers, three IBT projects where chosen as 
economically justified relocating water largely for municipal and industrial/mining uses. 
These IBT projects had the effect of increasing water use and instream flows in the IBT 
destination basins, but decreasing those in the source basins. 
In studying the freshwater inflows the study revealed that the suggested inflow 
constraints were met on average and that the inflow levels for two basins had to be 
lowered for the constraints to be feasible. This suggests that the contemplated limits are 
too high and that either multiple basin or flow dependent limits need to be developed. 
The results also showed that under the average FWIB constraints and IBT 
implementation, welfare loss from the FWIB constraints was greatly reduced due to the 
IBT projects which were simultaneously implemented.  
In the study of multiple environmental commodity markets, the results indicate 
that generated credits should be sold in multiple markets only when market caps are set 
  v 
up close to socially efficient (so called first-best) caps: this implies that marginal benefit 
curves are very steep. However, restricting selling into just single market achieved the 
same net benefits as multiple markets did when market caps were set up at levels less 
than the first-best caps. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
  
Water is a commodity that is frequently discussed in the context of 
environmental trading from both a quantity and quality perspective. Water quantity 
trading refers to water markets and Interbasin Water Transfers (IBT) where water is 
conveyed from one set of users to another set of users with money exchanged (Boadu, 
2004). Water quality trading refers to the markets where the rights to discharge pollutants 
into water bodies are traded (Kieser & Associates, 2003). These problems are 
interrelated such that water quantity trading affects flows and pollutant levels in source 
and destination water bodies. Therefore, water quality can be at issue when water 
quantity trading occurs.  
This dissertation examines the water quantity issue in a trading context, focusing 
on welfare gain, water demand and environmental flows that affect water quality. 
Investigations will be conducted regarding  
 
This dissertation follows the style of American Journal of Agricultural Economics. 
  2 
• the economic, hydrological and environmental effects of implementing IBT 
projects, 
• the economic, hydrological and environmental effects of implementing the 
minimum requirements of freshwater inflows to bays and estuaries, 
• the design of policy in terms of appropriate design of market incentives when an 
action can jointly produce more than one potentially salable environmental good. 
The water quality issue will not be investigated here.. 
Motivation for the IBT research arises from water scarcity in western Texas 
coupled with relative abundance in eastern Texas. Based on this, IBT projects have been 
widely discussed as ways to lessen water shortage problems (TWDB, Water for Texas 
2002). In considering IBT projects, state law suggests that economic impacts and water 
quality changes should be examined.  
Another factor in such decisions involves the level of freshwater inflows to Texas 
estuaries. The Texas Parks and Wildlife Department (TPWD) and the Texas Water 
Development Board (TWDB) have jointly developed a set of standards deigned to 
maintain estuary health and productivity.  
  3 
The work is also motivated by interrelationships among multiple environmental 
commodities such as instream flows, freshwater inflows and wetland health when flow 
levels are altered. As the number of market-based environmental protection programs 
grows, so does the potential for interaction among those environmental commodities. As 
a result, there is a rising interest in the concept of “multiple markets”, the notion that 
generators of environmental credits might be able to sell credits in many markets. 
The objective for this research is to provide economic information for use in water 
policy formation addressing the scope and implications of economically justified IBT 
projects in Texas, the cost of Texas freshwater inflow constraints and trading scheme 
setup under multiple interrelated environmental markets. To conduct this research in the 
context of the IBT and FWIB decision making an empirical model will be setup and 
used. The multiple markets concern will be examined analytically and with a simple 
numerical model. 
The dissertation is organized around four somewhat independent essays with this 
unifying introduction and a unifying conclusion 
Chapter II presents an essay on the model structure developed for the IBT and 
freshwater inflow portions of this work, which quantifies the economic, hydrological and 
  4 
environmental impacts of surface water actions. 
Chapter III presents an essay on the analysis of the value and consequences of 
implementing IBT projects using the model from Chapter II.  
Chapter IV presents an essay on the economic and environmental effects of 
environmentally sustainable minimum requirements of freshwater inflows to bays and 
estuaries, which uses the model developed in Chapter II and extends the analysis in 
Chapter III. 
Chapter V presents an essay on the way that one might design policy to 
accommodate valuable environmental commodities that are jointly produced such cases 
as freshwater inflows, instream flows and wet lands when they can be traded in multiple 
markets.  
Finally, a summary and set of overall conclusions are presented in Chapter VI. 
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CHAPTER II 
MODELING FRAMEWORK FOR THE EVALUATION OF INTERBASIN 
WATER TRANSFER 
 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter presents material on development and structure of the empirical 
model that will be used to examine the impacts of Texas based IBT projects and 
freshwater inflow constraints. After a literature review of pieces relevant to this research, 
the chapter presents the analytical framework including material on the scope, precursors 
and characteristics of the model. Then, mathematical structure of the model and a 
description of the data sets used follows.  
 
2.1.1. Limitations of previous models 
The IBT analysis aspects of the available Texas water models developed to date do 
not allow one to fully evaluate the economic and environmental impacts of IBT 
simultaneously. Hydrologically based water models commonly deal with hydrologic and 
  6 
environmental issues focusing on quantity issues such as water supply and water flows 
but do not typically have economic dimensions (i.e. see the model by Wurbs, 2003). 
Models with economic considerations typically only cover restricted areas. For example, 
the models in WatkinsJr et al. (2000) and Gillig et al. (2001) focus on the Edwards 
Aquifer and the related Nueces, Frio and Guadalupe-Blanco river basins.  
 
2.1.2. Contribution of the research 
This research develops a modeling framework that integrates and permits 
evaluation of the economic effects as well as hydrological and environmental impacts of 
IBT in Texas simultaneously based on IBT cost estimates available.  
We incorporated uncertain weather patterns and thus measure the expected 
economic net benefit of using water as they vary across dry, normal and wet seasons. 
Changes in agricultural production activities and resulting water use changes due to IBT 
are also considered. 
The model considers the hydrological water balances caused by demand for and 
supply of water as well as evaporation losses, rainfalls and return flows at selected points 
across the modeled river basins. The model depicts environmental aspects of water flows, 
  7 
say, instream flows and freshwater inflows to bays and estuaries. These water quantity 
indicators reflect important factors that affect water quality. The model also has 
constraints that can control IBT construction in environmentally sensitive regions. 
This model is believed to be the first try to introduce environmental flow factors 
such as freshwater inflows in an economic and hydrological model.  
As for the covered regions and sectors, the model includes major agricultural, 
municipal, industrial and mining uses plus a miscellaneous other water use. This is 
covered in cities and counties over the vast Texas river basins except for the Rio Grande 
basins where it borders Mexico.  
The model will provide information that may allow state water agencies to analyze 
IBT proposals and to do analyses in support of statewide long run water management 
strategies. This is especially needed since state law requires agencies to weigh the 50 
year impacts of any suggested IBT.  
 
2.2. Analytical Framework 
This research will depict water availability and use in 21 Texas river basins in its 
scope: Colorado, Brazos-Colorado, Brazos, Brazos-San Jacinto, Canadian, Red, Sabine, 
  8 
Guadalupe, San Antonio, Sulphur, Cypress, Neches, Neches-Trinity, Trinity, Trinity-San 
Jacinto, San Jacinto, Colorado-Lavaca, Lavaca, Lavaca-Guadalupe, San Antonio-Nueces, 
Nueces. The Nueces-Rio Grande and Rio Grande river basins are excluded as of now.  
The optimal set of IBT projects is determined on the basis of maximizing the 
annualized expected net benefit of using agricultural, municipal, industrial and mining 
water plus assigned value of freshwater inflows with sets of constraints on agricultural 
land and water use, total water use by source and sector, demand curve convexity, 
freshwater inflows, hydrological water flows balance, and reservoir / IBT capacity, etc. 
 
2.2.1. Scope of the model 
Table II-1 shows 18 river basins in the model which covers 21 of the 23 Texas 
river basins defined by the Texas Water Development Board (TWDB, 2006a) (omitting 
Nueces-Rio Grande and Rio Grande, Figure II-1). Some basins are grouped together 
following practices in the Water Availability Model (WAM) and the underlying program 
Water Rights Analysis Package (WRAP) developed by R.A. Wurbs (Wurbs, 2003).  
The model contains 35 big municipal water use cities, 40 major industrial and 
mining water use counties, 62 major agricultural water use counties with 21 agricultural 
  9 
crops and 175 major reservoirs based on 660 monthly naturalized river flows data. The 
details of data are discussed in section 2.4. Details on Model Empirical Specification. 
The model is developed using General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS).  
 
Table II-1. River Basins Covered in the Model 
Basin name in the model Original basin name(s) 
Brazos  Brazos and Brazos-San Jacinto river basin 
Colorado  Colorado and Brazos-Colorado river basin 
Canadian Canadian river basin 
 Red Red river basin 
 Sabine Sabine river basin 
 Guadsan Guadalupe and San Antonio river basin 
 Sulphur Sulphur river basin 
 Cypress Cypress river basin 
 Neches Neches river basin 
 NechTrinity Neches-Trinity river basin 
 Trinity Trinity river basin 
 TrinitySanJac Trinity-San Jacinto river basin 
 SanJacinto San Jacinto river basin 
 ColLavaca Colorado-Lavaca river basin 
 Lavaca Lavaca river basin 
 LavaGuadl Lavaca-Guadalupe river basin 
 SanioNues San Antonio-Nueces river basin 
 Nueces Nueces river basin 
  10 
 
Figure II-1. 23 river basins in Texas  
 
2.2.2. Precursors to the model 
This research will be built upon three models.  
  11 
• First, the data that specified the Water Rights Analysis Package (WRAP) 
model used in the Senate Bill 1 planning process (Wurbs, 2005) will be used to provide 
the hydrologic data components such as naturalized flows. The WRAP model was 
developed by Wurbs which is used in the Texas regional water investigation process.  
• Second, the contribution of modeling by Gillig et al (2000) on Edwards 
Aquifer Groundwater and River System Simulation Model (EDSIMR) that maximizes 
expected net benefits of groundwater and surface water uses in the Edwards Aquifer 
region by municipal, industrial and agricultural sectors. The objective function, expected 
net benefit, is affected by the stochastic climate-related state of nature and climate 
probability distribution.  
• Last of all, even though it is not directly dealt with in this research, the 
model herein is developed keeping in mind its potential link with a water quality 
simulation which can be utilized in the Soil and Water Assessment Tool (SWAT). 
SWAT simulates the effects of management such as water transfer and water use 
changes on water, sediment and agricultural chemical yields in large complex and un-
gauged watersheds.  
  12 
2.2.3. Characteristics of the model: TEXRIVERSIM  
TEXRIVERSIM is a stochastic model that uses the data representative of rainfall 
and temperature conditions, with nine climate states of nature present in the model. 
TEXRIVERSIM is a two stage stochastic programming model with recourse. In the first 
stage the crop mix and IBT construction decisions are made independent of the state of 
nature. Subsequently in the second stage, water availability and yields are realized by the 
state of nature and adjustments are allowed in management with IBT transfers. The 
model depicts potential construction of 45 IBT projects: 8 IBT projects that move water 
from river-to-river IBT and 37 IBT projects that move water from a river to a 
specifically designated user. Water transfer volume by IBT is determined in the second 
stage given the state of nature (water availability) information but use requires that IBT-
related construction occur in the first stage. 
TEXRIVERSIM integrates three factors: (1) economic water use modeling in the 
form of: fixed-price agricultural production linear programming model that chooses dry 
land and irrigated crop acres; explicit downward sloping nonagricultural water use 
curves for municipal, industrial and mining uses; fixed price water demand curves for a 
number of small users up to a maximum quantity. (2) environmental and hydrological 
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factors: stochastic climate effects, evaporation, instream flows, return flows and 
freshwater inflows to bays and estuaries. (3) IBT factors including fixed and variable 
costs, locations for IBT facility development projects and their maximum capacity to 
deliver water. 
 
2.3. Description of the Model: TEXRIVERSIM 
2.3.1. Objective function 
The model maximizes an objective function that represents the annualized 
expected net benefit (ENB) of water use by the nonagricultural and agricultural sectors 
plus a value for freshwater inflows to bays and estuaries less the costs of IBT 
construction and operation. Conceptually it is as follows.    
Maximize Annual ENB1 =  
- Fixed costs of IBT construction  
+ Probability× [Net Benefits from city and county water use 
           + Net Benefits for crop from agricultural water use 
                                            
1
 The summation notation is needed to add all of net benefits and values of freshwater 
inflows, but this is just conceptual. 
 
  14 
     - Variable costs of IBT operation 
          + Value of freshwater inflows to bays and estuaries]  
Probability represents the statewide frequency of the state of nature.  
Nonagricultural city and county water use, other nonagricultural and freshwater inflows, 
and agricultural water use depend on the state of nature. Fixed and variable IBT costs are 
assumed to be independent of the state of nature but the volume of water transferred 
does depend on the state of nature. 
IBT related costs 
Water delivery costs consist of variable and fixed components. The fixed cost 
component gives the annualized cost if an IBT is built (ribtfixed cost, uibtfixed cost in 
the objective function below)2 . The integer variables (RIBTCON and UIBTCON) 
indicate whether or not an IBT is constructed. The variable cost component depends on 
the amount of water used and includes: (1) withdrawal costs for nonagricultural and 
agricultural water (nonagcost, agwatercost in the objective function) and (2) variable 
cost for operating water transfers (ribtcost, uibtcost).    
                                            
2
 The notation in the objective function is explained in the context here and other 
notations used in constraints are summarized in APPENDIX A. 
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The IBT-related facility construction variables are not dependent on the state of 
nature and are thus contained in the first stage of the model and their fixed costs are 
amortized over the project time span. Two types of IBTs are included in the model: User 
IBT (USERIBT) and River IBT (RIVERIBT). USERIBT is a “river-to-user” IBT that 
transfers water from a river to a particular diverter like a large city. Therefore, water 
from USERIBT is dedicated to a diverter. RIVERIBT is a “river-to-river” IBT that is 
transferred to a control point for use by diverters along that river. Water from RIVERIBT 
is added into the water flows of the destination river basin before it is diverted or used in 
any way.   
Municipal, industrial & mining water use benefits 
Benefits from using water in the nonagricultural sector are determined by the 
areas under the nonagricultural demand curves with constant elasticity based on the 
estimates by Bell and Griffin (2005) (MUNSTEP for municipal water use, INDSTEP for 
industrial and mining water use). These are included in the model as follows.  
First, the demand curve is illustrated in Figure II-2. This demand curve is 
constructed using the point expansion method based on the observed water price-
quantity point. We use the water quantity projected (QPRO) by each regional groups and 
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TWDB based on year 2010. The water price (PPRO) is year 2003 marginal price and 
annual price increase in year 2010 is not assumed.  
 
Second, we note that the upper left side of the curve approaches infinity in price 
yielding a very large area. This is undesirable because we really do not know about the 
choke price of water which is the maximum willingness to pay for a unit of water. 
Consequently, the curves are truncated at 2/10th the level of observed consumption levels 
(QMIN). The demand curve can generate a large objective function value especially when 
the demand curve is inelastic as the curve is asymptotic to the axis. Also optimal water 
uses are expected to occur somewhere close to the observed level of water use and its 
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Figure II-2. Water demand curve and climate-driven shift 
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future projection (QPRO). The objective function value must be carefully interpreted since 
it values areas under the demand curves, unlike, for example, Gross Regional Product 
(GRP) which is measured with a market price times quantity as its gross benefit.  
Third, a climate-driven demand shifting factor is introduced into the municipal 
demand curves to reflect the effect of climate on water demand. Figure II-2 shows a case 
where the effect of the climate-driven demand shifting factor (∆Qc) induces demand to 
increase, shifting the demand curve to the right. The shifting factor was developed by 
Griffin and Chang (1990) and more recently by Bell and Griffin (2005). It is defined in 
our analysis as the number of monthly days without rainfall multiplied by monthly 
average temperature (F) then divided by 1000 (Cvalue). The shift differs by the state of 
nature and is defined in the objective function as: 
Climate-driven municipal demand shifting factor = 
p
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The exponent term ( )pdmε/1−=  in this shifting factor causes large shifts when 
the price elasticity ( pdmε ) is inelastic. Municipal price elasticities range from -0.159 ~ -
0.359, and industrial price elasticity is -0.540 in our model. The corresponding municipal 
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exponent term falls on between 6.289 and 2.786. Price elasticity is defined as the % 
change in quantity given a % change in price and climate elasticity as the % change in 
quantity given a % change in climate. 
Fourth, this nonlinear benefit function is approximated in stepwise form using a 
separable programming which is a form of the first order Taylor series expansion 
(McCarl, FASOMGHG Modeling Framework, 2006). We use 52 demand steps that span 
observed water quantities used.  
Agricultural water use benefits 
Agricultural demand is developed using regional linear programming models 
defined by county drawing water from particular river basins subdivided into reaches. 
Agricultural users pursue irrigated and/or dryland crop production. Modeling of crop 
substitution and irrigation choice is permitted.  
Benefits from using water in the agricultural sector (AGWATERUSE) are 
represented by the net agricultural income derived from irrigated and dry land crop 
production (yield, CROPACRES). In that model climate shifts are incorporated by the 
state of nature. In particular, crop yields, irrigation water requirements, and water 
availability shift by state of nature. The cost of drawing water for agriculture 
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(AGWATERUSE) for the twelve agricultural regions in Texas was obtained from Texas 
Cooperative Extension. 
Value of freshwater inflows to bays and estuaries 
Freshwater inflows to bays and estuaries have value and thus we include a term 
for this in the objective function. To our best knowledge, it is the first try to introduce an 
environmental freshwater inflows factor in an economic and hydrological model.  
The variable ESCAPETOBAY catches aggregated annual flows out to bays and 
estuaries in every river basin, depending on the state of nature, weighted by an observed 
probability of that state of nature. We could not find appropriate values for freshwater 
inflows to major Texas bays and estuaries, although the values from some basin might be 
extended in some basin (Han, 2007). The values of freshwater inflows are not subject to 
a market and obtained from non-market valuation methodology. Also, it is another issue 
to apply the numbers unilaterally into the model although we may find them because 
many different methodologies and assumptions were adopted for each of the non-market 
valuation. Currently we assigned a net value of $1 per acre foot to the freshwater inflows.  
Algebraic depiction of the objective function 
Now let us present the equations algebraically. In representing and depicting the 
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model algebra we will use the actual GAMS commands. Some simplifications are made 
for readability, for example, eliminating tuples used to improve model speed. Variables 
are typed in capital letters and parameters in small letters. Each equation is followed by 
controlled sets in parenthesis and two dots, indicating an equation name. For example, 
the equation name AGLAND(countytouse).. is controlled by or a function of the set 
countytouse. For a definition of all symbols, see APPENDIX A.  
Mathematically3, the objective function can be written as follows4. 
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3
 This model is just conceptual. The actual mathematical and computational models are 
more complex because of technical tools to speed up the model. 
 
4
 Parameters and variables that are not defined will be defined in the relevant constraint 
sections. 
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2.3.2. Land and water demand constraints for agricultural sector  
We impose three constraints on the agricultural sector: available land, crop mix 
balance, and irrigated water use balance. 
Planting acres of land is absolutely constrained by land endowment. The available 
agricultural land constraint sets the limit of the land supply. 
The crop mix balance equation by crop constrains harvested acres by crop to a 
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historical mix of observed crop land which reflects rotation considerations and other 
factors following arguments in McCarl (1982) and Onal and McCarl (1989, 1991). 
The water use balance equation constrains irrigated water use to the amount 
available from diversions by location after the state of nature is known. 
Available agricultural land constraint 
The crop land use across the crop mix patterns employed cannot exceed the land 
available in current irrigated use (availagland). In this equation, the optimal proportions 
(CROPMIX) of crop mix are decided. At the first stage, farmers are assumed to decide 
on crop acres by a convex combination of historically observed crop mix patterns 
(mixdata) because they do not know about the weather pattern which would happen that 
year. This is controlled on a county basis (countytouse) across all irrigation possibilities 
(irrigstatus) and crop mix possibilities (availmixdata). The “activemix” denotes a 
multidimensional set controlled by countytouse, irrigational possibilities, and crop, 
which has a historical mix data. The multidimensional set is called a tuple hereinafter. 
The “countytouse” is a subset of a county to denote that the county actually uses 
acreages for agricultural production. 
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AGLAND(countytouse).. 
sum((irrigstatus,availmixdata), CROPMIX(countytouse,irrigstatus,availmixdata) 
*sum(activemix(countytouse,irrigstatus,crop), 
mixdata(countytouse,irrigstatus,crop,availmixdata ≤  availagland(countytouse);  
 
We allow for conversion of agricultural irrigated land to dry land but not the 
other way around due to the unlikelihood of expansions in agricultural surface water use 
in Texas. Then, the land being irrigated currently remains irrigated or goes dry.  
Crop mix balance by crop  
The crop mix constraint balances harvested acreage by crop and irrigation status 
(irrigated or dry land) against the acreage allowed by the crop mix possibilities. The 
constraint is defined for each state of nature and crop on an irrigated / dry crop land use 
basis.  
The harvest variable CROPACRES is dependent on the realized state of nature 
and is thus in the second model stage.  This is reflected in the CROPBALANCE 
equation once the state-independent CROPMIX variable is determined by the 
historically observed crop mix patterns at the first stage when the state of nature is 
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unknown. That is why harvested crop acres are restricted by the past crop mix patterns in 
the equation.  
 
CROPBALANCE(countytouse,irrigstatus,crop,state).. 
CROPACRES(countytouse,irrigstatus,crop,state) 
*cropdata(countytouse,irrigstatus,crop,"land","all","annual") 
≤  sum(availmixdata, CROPMIX(countytouse,irrigstatus,availmixdata)   
*mixdata(countytouse,irrigstatus,crop,availmixdata));  
 
Agricultural irrigated water use balance 
Agricultural irrigated water use (AGWATERUSE) is assumed to be linearly 
proportionate to crop acres. AGWATERUSE is determined by the state-of- nature 
dependent rate and the second stage production/harvest variable (CROPACRES) which 
is restricted by the first stage variable CROPMIX. The tuple isagther2 is a county in any 
control point of a river basin where agricultural farmers are engaged in their production 
activities. 
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AGWATERUSEBAL(countytouse,state,month).. 
sum(activemix(countytouse,"irrigated",crop),  
CROPACRES(countytouse,"irrigated",crop,state) 
*cropdata(countytouse,"irrigated",crop,"water",state,month)) 
= sum(isagther2(countytouse,riverbasins,riverplace),                                     
AGWATERUSE(countytouse,riverbasins,riverplace,state,month));  
 
2.3.3. Total water demand and competing demand constraints 
Water is usually demanded by many competing users. We categorized this 
competition of water uses as two types. One is demand by source, and the other by sector. 
Demand by source is comprised of two sources: existing source basins 
(DIVERSIONQ) and new source basins (USER IBT). The variable DIVERTERUSE 
designates total water diverted by a river location for each sector in a given state of 
nature and month. 
Demand by sector represents water demand among competing users by user class.  
The user classes modeled are agriculture including domestic and livestock users; 
municipal users; industrial and mining users; recreational and power electric users; and 
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an aggregate of all other users. The model contains constraints for all user types (called 
sectors) and that constraint balances total diversions of a sector with the sectoral water 
use variable. 
Total water for a user constraint 
In the model, users are defined by county and for a diverter in a county. Water 
can be diverted from multiple reaches in a river basin or from multiple basins within a 
limit constrained by maximum historical diversion. Water can also be transferred in via a 
user IBT. 
DIVERTERUSE is the model variable which gives water diverted in a river 
location for each sector, controlled also by each state of nature and month. It consists of 
two sources of demand: one source from water which flows from existing source basin, 
the other from IBTs outside the existing source basin.  
The variable DIVERSIONQ captures diverting water from the existing source 
basins. What the variable DIVERSIONQ is summed up in terms of river basins and 
county represents that water in a control point may come from multiple river reaches. 
The other source of water is USER IBT which is river-to-user. The USER IBT 
water flows from a source basin to a destination basin for the purpose of satisfying 
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specific water users directly by drawing the water without the transferred water being 
added to flows levels. Therefore, this water comes from outside that existing river basins 
based on an IBT contract. Water from River IBT flows river-to-river so that the 
transferred water is not directly drawn by diverters but added to flows levels. River IBT 
water is then regarded water from an existing source regardless of its original source, 
and its diversion is captured by the variable DIVERSIONQ. 
UInterBasinTran is a tuple that simply specifies each available USER IBT. It 
connects a river-to-user IBT project (interbasintranrivertouser) according to its suggested 
IBT scenarios defined by TWDB and regional planning groups (InterBasinTranOpt) 
from a source basin and place to a destination basin and place. The USER IBT is also 
controlled by the state of nature in a given month (USERINTBBASINTRANsce). Water 
from USER IBT could be originated from different source river basins. That is why 
USER IBT by sector is summed up by the tuple UInterBasinTran. 
The summation of USER IBT in terms of sector must equal the total USER IBT 
of all sectors as is shown in the UIBTBALANCE equation below. 
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QUANTITYDIVERSION(riverplace,sector,state,month).. 
sum(mappingall7(riverplace,sector),DIVERTERUSE(riverplace,sector,state,month)) 
=sum((riverbasins,county),DIVERSIONQ(riverbasins,riverplace,county,sector,state,month))  
+sum(UInterBasinTran(interbasintranrivertouser,InterBasinTranOpt,sourcebasin,
sourceplace,destbasin,riverplace),         
USERINTBBASINTRANsce(interbasintranrivertouser,InterBasinTranOpt, 
sourcebasin,sourceplace,destbasin,riverplace,sector,state,month)); 
UIBTBALANCE(UInterBasinTran(interbasintranrivertouser,InterBasinTranOpt,s
ourcebasin,sourceplace,destbasin,destplace),state,month).. 
sum(sector1,      
USERINTBBASINTRANsce(interbasintranrivertouser,InterBasinTranOpt,sourcebasin, 
sourceplace,destbasin,destplace,sector1,state,month)) 
= USERINTBBASINTRAN(interbasintranrivertouser,InterBasinTranOpt,sourcebasin, 
sourceplace,destbasin,destplace,state,month) ; 
 
Diversion identity: demand by sector 
Water is diverted by five major classes of water users (sectors) through the 
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variable DIVERTERUSE: agricultural including domestic and livestock, municipal, 
industrial and mining, recreational and electric power, and other. Nonagricultural water 
uses (nonag) include municipal, industrial and mining, recreational and electric power, 
any other uses.  
Municipal water use consists of major and minor city water use.  Major city use 
is represented by the stepwise climate-driven demand. Minor city use is represented by 
the constant price demand up to the observed quantity. 
Industrial water use is defined for counties with major industrial use which is 
represented with the stepwise demand. Minor industrial use is represented by the fixed 
price demand. 
Water uses for recreation and electric power and other uses are specified as fixed 
price so that it may not exceed the projected water use for that type as its upper bound. 
Annual water use from local basins in the equation DIVERSIONQMAX is limited by a 
permitted amount of diversion (upperdiversionQ) designated in each river place that is 
also called a control point5, county, and sector of a river. 
                                            
5
 The river place (or riverplace) will be used in chapter II as an element of a model 
variable just for the notational purpose of the model. It will be replaced with more 
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Municipal water use 
The MUNDIVERSIONID identity equation balances DIVERTERUSE for the 
municipal water use (“mun”) with the major city stepwise water use 
(MUNDIVERTERUSEs) and minor fixed price water use (MUNDIVERTERUSE).  
The convex stepwise variable (MUNDIVERTERUSEs) is used in the model and gives 
the proportion ( sqinc ) of water use at a step relative to the projected water 
use )ˆ(
,mdq which the water demand curve passes through as is illustrated in Figure II-3. 
The municitymand2 in the CITYDIVERSIONID equation represents the climate shifting 
factor that increases or decreases water demand depending on the climate conditions by 
the state of nature (y or state), and is defined as: 
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formal term, control point, from chapter III on, though the river place will be still used 
when it refers to an element of any model variable. 
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MUNDIVERSIONID(riverplace,state,month,“mun”).. 
DIVERTERUSE(riverplace,”mun”,state,month) 
= sum(mappingcity(riverplace,city),  
COLLECTCITY(city,riverplace,state,month)); 
CITYDIVERSIONID(city,state,month)..   
sum(steps,qinc(steps)*muncitydemand2(city,state,month) 
*MUNDIVERTERUSEs(city,state,month,steps))+ 
MUNDIVERTERUSE(city,state,month) 
- sum(mappingcity(riverplace,city),  
COLLECTCITY(city,riverplace,state,month)) = 0; 
 A     B    dmqˆ        C    
Figure II-3. Stepwise demand points along demand curve 
 
dmpˆ
 
Where A, B, C are examples of stepwise demand points 
A = )ˆ*1( dmqqinc   B & C = )ˆ*( dmqsqinc  
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Industrial water use 
The INDDIVERSIONID identity equation balances the DIVERTERUSE for 
industrial and mining water use (“ind”) with the county water use variable for major 
industrial counties where we have the stepwise water use (INDMINDIVERTERUSEs) 
and minor counties where we have the fixed price demand (INDMINDIVERTERUSE) 
up to the observed quantity. Industrial and mining demand is not assumed to fluctuate 
according to the state of nature.  
 
INDDIVERSIONID(riverplace,state,month,“ind”).. 
DIVERTERUSE(riverplace,”ind”,state,month) 
= sum(indminmapping(riverplace,county),  
COLLECTINDUSTRY(county,riverplace,state,month)); 
INDCOUNTYDIVERSION(county,state,month).. 
sum(steps, qinc(steps)*IndMinDemanddata(County,month,"quantity") 
*INDMINDIVERTERUSEs(county,state,month,steps))  
+INDMINDIVERTERUSE(county,state, month)       
-sum(indminmapping(riverplace,county), 
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COLLECTINDUSTRY(county,riverplace,state,month)) = 0; 
 
Agricultural water use 
The AGDIVERSIONID equation balances the DIVERTERUSE for agricultural, 
domestic and livestock water use (“ag”) with the agricultural water use variable 
(AGWATERUSE).  
 
AGDIVERSIONID(riverplace,state,month,“ag”).. 
DIVERTERUSE(riverplace,”ag”,state,month) 
= sum(isagther2(countytouse,riverbasins,riverplace), 
AGWATERUSE(countytouse,riverbasins,riverplace,state,month)); 
 
Recreational and other water uses 
The two constraints limit maximum water use for recreational (“rec”) and other 
(“other”) water use observed in a control point. Recreational water use is assumed to be 
non-consumptive. 
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RECDIVERSIONIDENTITY(riverplace,state,month,“rec”).. 
DIVERTERUSE(riverplace,”rec”,state,month) 
≤  newwateruse (riverplace,”rec”,state,month); 
OTHERDIVERSIONIDENTITY(riverplace,state,month,“other”).. 
DIVERTERUSE(riverplace,”other”,state,month) 
≤  newwateruse (riverplace,”other”,state,month); 
 
Limitation of water use 
Monthly fixed price city and county water uses are assumed to not exceed the 
monthly water demand (CityDemanddata, IndMinDemanddata). Monthly water demand 
is computed by projected 2010 water demand for each city or county multiplied by the 
fractional monthly share for the actual annual water use. 
The annual amount of water from existing source basins (DIVERSIONQ) is limited 
by a permitted diversion from the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ, 
2007). The parameter, upperdiversionQ, stands for the annual permitted diversion by 
TCEQ, which is controlled by river basin, river place, county and sector, the data of 
which are from the WRAP and WAM reports. 
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MUNDIVERTERUSELIMIT(city,state,month).. 
MUNDIVERTERUSE(city,state,month) 
≤  CityDemanddata(city,month,"quantity"); 
INDCOUNTYDIVERSIONMAX(county,state,month).. 
INDMINDIVERTERUSE(county,state, month) 
≤  IndMinDemanddata(County,month,"quantity"); 
DIVERSIONQMAX(mappingall6(riverbasins,riverplace,county,sector),state).. 
sum(month, DIVERSIONQ(riverbasins,riverplace,county,sector,state,month)) 
≤  upperdiversionQ(riverbasins,riverplace,county,sector); 
 
2.3.4. Demand curve convexity constraints 
When we estimate the demand curve based on the separable programming, 
convexity constraints were imposed on the stepwise demand function representations of 
the major cities and industrial counties. We assumed that water demand would be 
discontinuous step demand even in a municipal use because each city or county or 
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regional water district as a water use entity in the model would hold its water to 
distribute to its final users. These convex stepwise variables (MUNDIVERTERUSEs, 
INDMINDIVERTERUSEs) represent the amount of the predetermined proportion 
(qinc(steps)) of water use steps as defined relative to the projected use. This assumption 
implies that water use is rationally expected and realized within the 52 steps we set, 
ranging from 20% (0.2) to 300% (4.0) times the projected use. This is imposed by the 
constraints for municipal, and industrial and mining sectors as follows. 
 
MUNDIVERSIONCONVEX(city,state,month).. 
sum(steps, MUNDIVERTERUSEs(CITY,state,month,steps)) ≤  1; 
INDDIVERSIONCONVEX(county,state,month).. 
sum(steps, INDMINDIVERTERUSEs(county,state,month,steps)) ≤  1; 
 
2.3.5. Overall water flow constraints 
Flow balance constraints depict the flows of water in the river along with 
freshwater inflows to bays and estuaries. At each control point, total inflows must be 
balanced with total outflows by the state of nature and month.   
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Water flow balance: demand and supply 
Inflows and outflows of water less adjustments for use and transfers are 
controlled by river basin, river place, state of nature and month. Thus a demand and 
supply balance is specified at a river place (RP) within a river basin (R) in a given state 
and time period. It balances use with supply.  The basic forms of demand are flow out, 
diversion for agricultural and non agricultural use, storage until the next period (for 
reservoirs only), IBT transfer out and water flow out to bays and estuaries.  The basic 
sources of supply are flow in, storage holdover (for reservoirs only), new 
inflows/precipitation, and IBT transfer in and return flows. 
Demand terms 
• User IBT flow-out: Diversion of water by an USER IBT is an export of water to 
be used up in another location and diminishes water in this basin.  
[=USERINTBBASINTRAN(interbasintranrivertouser,InterBasinTranOpt, 
riverbasins, riverplace,destbasin,destplace,state,month)] 
• River IBT flow-out: Diversion of water by an RIVER IBT is an export of water to 
add to water flow in another location and diminishes water in this basin. 
[=RIVERINTBBASINTRAN(interbasintranrivertoriver,InterBasinTranOpt,river
basins,riverplace,destbasin,destplace,state,month)] 
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• Storage carry out: Demand in the form of water retained in storage to the next 
month diminishes the water that can flow out or be used in this month. This is 
only defined for regions with reservoirs  
[=STOREWITH(riverbasins,riverplace,state,month)] 
• Flow out: Water flows out to downstream nodes.  
[=FLOW(riverbasins,riverplace,downriver,state,month)] 
• Diversion: Water is diverted by the agricultural and nonagricultural sectors. 
[=DIVERSIONQ(riverbasins,riverplace,county,conssector,state,month)] 
• Water out: Water at the last node of a river flows out to bays and estuaries. 
[=OUTTOBAY(riverbasins,riverplace,state,month)] 
Supply terms 
• River IBT flow-in: Water transferred to this place by a RIVER IBT from another 
basin constitutes a supply of water here. 
[=RIVERINTBBASINTRAN(interbasintranrivertoriver,InterBasinTranOpt, 
sourcebasin,sourceplace,riverbasins,riverplace,state,month)] 
• Storage carry in: Water supply can come from water that was stored during the 
previous month and carried into this month considering evaporation loss 
(evaporationloss). The storage variable is only defined where there are reservoirs 
and is limited by capacity. 
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[=STOREADD(riverbasins,riverplace,state,month)]  
• Flow in: Water supply arises from inflows from upstream nodes on a river.  
[=FLOW(riverbasins,upriver,riverplace,state,month)] 
• Naturalized flows: Naturalized flows from precipitation constitute a source of 
supply. [=Inflow(riverbasins,riverplace,state,month)] 
• Return flows: Return flows from diverted water are another source of water 
supply. Return flows can also come from groundwater depending on a 
geographical situation but this is treated in naturalized flows. A constant 
percentage of upstream diversions is used. [=RFpercent(conssector)]. The term 
conssector stands for the consumptive sector. 
 
FLOWBALANCE(riverbasins,riverplace,state,month).. 
sum(mappingall6(riverbasins,riverplace,county,conssector), 
DIVERSIONQ(riverbasins,riverplace,county,conssector,state,month)) 
+sum(RInterBasinTran(interbasintranrivertoriver,InterBasinTranOpt,riverbasins,riverplace, 
destbasin,destplace),RIVERINTBBASINTRAN(interbasintranrivertoriver, 
InterBasinTranOpt,riverbasins,riverplace,destbasin,destplace,state,month)) 
+sum(UInterBasinTran(interbasintranrivertouser,InterBasinTranOpt,riverbasins, 
  40 
riverplace,destbasin,destplace),        
USERINTBBASINTRAN(interbasintranrivertouser,InterBasinTranOpt,riverbasins, 
riverplace,destbasin,destplace,state,month)) 
+sum(mriverflowlink(riverbasins,riverplace,downriver)$(not sameas(downriver,'out')), 
FLOW(riverbasins,riverplace,downriver,state,month)) 
+OUTTOBAY(riverbasins,riverplace,state,month) 
+sum(Reservoir(riverbasins,riverplace), 
-STOREADD(riverbasins,riverplace,state,month) 
*(1-evaporationloss(riverbasins,riverplace,state,month))  
+STOREWITH(riverbasins,riverplace,state,month)) 
≤  
sum(RInterBasinTran(interbasintranrivertoriver,InterBasinTranOpt,sourcebasin, 
sourceplace,riverbasins,riverplace),        
RIVERINTBBASINTRAN(interbasintranrivertoriver,InterBasinTranOpt, 
sourcebasin,sourceplace,riverbasins,riverplace,state,month)) 
+ Inflow(riverbasins,riverplace,state,month) 
+sum((conssector,mriverflowlink(riverbasins,upriver,riverplace)), 
  41 
RFpercent(conssector)*DIVERTERUSE(upriver,conssector,state,month)) 
+sum(mriverflowlink(riverbasins,upriver,riverplace), 
 FLOW(riverbasins,upriver,riverplace,state,month)); 
 
Nonconsumptive recreational sector 
The demand and supply balance for non-consumptive water use for recreational 
and electric power (“recreation” hereinafter) must be specially dealt with because 
recreational water is not used up unlike other consumptive water uses. 
We limited the recreational water use from existing source basins 
(DIVERSIONQ) not to exceed maximum flows of recreational water which is defined as 
average flows in the basin as defined in the following. 
Maximum flows of recreational water for a river basin, river place, state, and month = 
[Instream Flow out + Instream Flow in + Reservoir Flow out + Reservoir Flow in + 
Freshwater inflows to bays & estuaries + Naturalized flows increase (=inflow) ] /2   
Unlike other consumptive water uses being defined by demand (Flow out) and 
supply (Flow in) at each specific river place, recreational water use must be defined near 
a river place or at two river reaches which mean the area between three river places, i.e., 
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up and down the river place. That is why the maximum flows of recreational water is 
averaged out by the flow outs plus the flow ins divided by two. 
Interbasin water transfers for users (USER IBT) are not considered because they 
are dedicated to a specific user. 
 
NONCONSUSEMAX(riverbasins,riverplace,state,month).. 
sum(mappingall6(riverbasins,riverplace,county,nonconssector), 
DIVERSIONQ(riverbasins,riverplace,county,nonconssector,state,month)) 
≤  [sum(riverflowlink(riverbasins,riverplace,downriver), 
FLOW(riverbasins,riverplace,downriver,state,month)) 
+sum(riverflowlink(riverbasins,upriver,riverplace), 
FLOW(riverbasins,upriver,riverplace,state,month)) 
+sum(Reservoir(riverbasins,riverplace),STOREADD 
(riverbasins,riverplace,state,month) 
+STOREWITH (riverbasins,riverplace,state,month)) 
+OUTTOBAY(riverbasins,riverplace,state,month)  
+inflow(riverbasins,riverplace,state,month) ]/2; 
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2.3.6. Freshwater inflows: flows out to bays and estuaries 
The variable OUTTOBAY is the amount of water that escapes to a bay or an 
estuary after instream water reaches a final river place or control point of any river basin 
in any month, depending on the state of nature.  
Then, ESCAPETOBAY is defined as the annually expected amount of water which 
flows out to all bays and estuaries. It is computed by multiplying the variable 
OUTTOBAY times the corresponding probability of each state of nature.  
The escaped water to bays and estuaries can be constrained to be greater than a 
non-negative constant for the purpose of supplying environmental freshwater inflows 
which could be set by state agencies. This issue will be investigated in chapter IV. 
 
FLOWOUTTOBAY..  
ESCAPETOBAY 
=sum((onriver(riverbasins,riverplace),state,month),prob(state) 
*OUTTOBAY(riverbasins,riverplace,state,month));   
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2.3.7. Capacity constraints 
Monthly reservoir capacity 
Storage capacity of any reservoir in a river basin and river place is limited. The 
variable STOREADD is the water stock as supply stored from the previous month. 
STOREWITH is the water stock retained in a reservoir until the next month. Storage 
variables in a river place of a river basin and in any month and any state of nature are 
limited by a reservoir capacity. The reservoir capacity does not depend on the state of 
nature. 
Storage variables explain a net water storage level of a reservoir for each month, 
i.e., difference between the water level in an ending month and the one in a beginning 
month. We forced an overall balance of water storage between withdrawals and additions 
to be met through the balance equation probabilistically weighted according to the state 
of nature. The storage variables are subject to capacity of a reservoir.  
 
STOREcapacity1(reservoir(riverbasins,riverplace),state,month).. 
STOREADD(riverbasins,riverplace,state,month) 
≤  reservoircapacity(riverbasins,riverplace,month); 
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STOREcapacity2(reservoir(riverbasins,riverplace),state,month).. 
STOREWITH(riverbasins,riverplace,state,month) 
≤  reservoircapacity(riverbasins,riverplace,month); 
 
STOREBALANCE(riverbasins,riverplace).. 
sum(state,prob(state)* sum(month,-STOREADD(riverbasins,riverplace,state,month) 
             +STOREWITH(riverbasins,riverplace,state,month))) = 0;      
                       
Annual RIBT and UIBT capacity 
The amount of water transferred by IBT is limited to the capacity at which it is 
constructed. The IBT construction variables (RIVERINTBBASINTRANConstruction, 
USERINTBBASINTRANConstruction ) are binary choice variables. If an IBT is built, 
then the IBT construction variable have a value of 1 and the capacity constraint for the 
IBT allows use up to the annual capacity for water transferred (InterBasinTranCapacity). 
Transferred water uses are given by the variables RIVERINTBBASINTRAN and 
USERINTBBASINTRAN. Fixed costs for IBT projects appear in the objective function. 
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RIVERINTBBASINTRANConstraint(RInterBasinTran(interbasintranrivertoriver, 
InterBasinTranOpt,sourcebasin,sourceplace,destbasin,destplace),state).. 
sum(month, RIVERINTBBASINTRAN(interbasintranrivertoriver,InterBasinTranOpt, 
sourcebasin,sourceplace, destbasin,destplace,state,month)) 
≤  
InterBasinTranCapacity(interbasintranrivertoriver,InterBasinTranOpt, 
sourcebasin,sourceplace,destbasin,destplace) 
      *RIVERINTBBASINTRANConstruction(interbasintranrivertoriver,InterBasinTranOpt); 
 
USERINTBBASINTRANConstraint(UInterBasinTran(interbasintranrivertouser, 
InterBasinTranOpt,sourcebasin,sourceplace,destbasin,destplace),state).. 
sum(month, USERINTBBASINTRAN(interbasintranrivertouser,InterBasinTranOpt, 
sourcebasin,sourceplace,destbasin,destplace,state,month)) 
≤ InterBasinTranCapacity(interbasintranrivertouser,InterBasinTranOpt, 
sourcebasin,sourceplace,destbasin,destplace)   
*USERINTBBASINTRANConstruction(interbasintranrivertouser,InterBasinTranOpt); 
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2.3.8. Configuration constraint 
This constraint limits the total number of IBTs (= n ) that will be considered by a 
decision maker exogenously. A state agency can face a budget limitation for various IBT 
projects across Texas so that it may want to choose the projects which are economically 
efficient depending on its budget constraint. Thus, the RIVER IBT and USER IBT 
construction variables that have values of zero or one are summed up in terms of all IBT 
projects, say, IBT(interbasintranrivertoriver, InterBasinTranOpt) in the constraint.  
But any specific number of IBTs is actually not found by the regulatory state 
agency, TWDB, so that we included all IBTs proposed as long as there are relevant cost 
data available. An arbitrary number (=100) was used for the number n, considering that 
there are total 99 proposed IBTs in the 2002 Texas water plan. This constraint is not 
binding and redundant in this model. However, this constraint could be important by any 
regional planning group in a region especially when it has some financial restriction or 
any other reason such as environmental concerns. The constraint has the form:  
 
IBTConfigurationConstraint.. 
sum(IBT(interbasintranrivertoriver,InterBasinTranOpt), 
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RIVERINTBBASINTRANConstruction(interbasintranrivertoriver, 
InterBasinTranOpt)) + sum(IBT(interbasintranrivertouser,InterBasinTranOpt), 
USERINTBBASINTRANConstruction(interbasintranrivertouser, 
InterBasinTranOpt)) ≤  n 
 
2.4. Details on Model Empirical Specification 
The above objective function and constraints involve data for parameters 
corresponding to all variables. Data needed for them are grouped into five sections: 
hydrological data, crop data, IBT cost data, water demand data and state of nature data. 
 
2.4.1. Hydrological data 
The hydrological data including naturalized flows, historical water use, permitted 
diversion and reservoirs and associated tuples are mainly obtained from WRAP and 
WAM (Water Availability Modeling) reports for each river basin from the Texas 
Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) and TNRCC (2001a, 2001b).  
River location (River place) 
A primary control point in the WAM and WRAP reports is named as a “river 
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place” or “river location” in the TEXRIVERSIM model. River location is one of the 
most important units in this model and all the calculations are made with reference to the 
river location. It is also used to define reaches, reach members, and river flow linking. To 
specify the location of a particular river place to a river basin, a river basin extension is 
added to the original primary control point ID. For example, in A10000col, A10000 is 
the primary control point ID from WAM and “col” is the basin extension since A10000 
is located in the Colorado and Brazos-Colorado river basin.  
Diverters 
A secondary control point in WRAP is named as a “diverter” in the 
TEXRIVERSIM model. A diverter is the actual place that water users divert some 
amount of water for particular type of use. A secondary control point ID in WRAP is not 
unique across all river basins, so a diverter is coded as the original secondary control 
point ID followed by a river basin extension. For example: the diverter A10010_col in 
TEXRIVERSIM indicates that A10010 is a secondary control point ID from WRAP and 
“col” is the basin extension for the Colorado river basin. All of the diverters spread 
across the twenty one river basins.  
Diverter is one of the most fundamental units in the model as well as river 
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location, and most of hydrological data such as historical water use and permitted 
diversion are based on it.  
Reaches and river flow linking 
TEXRIVERSIM divides rivers into reaches. The area between two river 
locations is defined as a reach. Diverters located in that reach are considered reach 
members of the down stream river location. A river location contains many reach 
members.  
A tuple builds a link between a diverter and down stream river location, which 
enables us to aggregate data at a river location. For example, when diverters A10010_col, 
A10020_col and A10030_col are reach members of a river location A10000col, 
historical water use for these three diverters can be summed up and assigned to 
A10000_col. 
Modeling the river basins involves representing the rivers with a series of river 
locations and connecting them in sequence according to the river flows. The set 
“riverflowlinking” includes the river flow linking for all the modeled river basins. This 
tuple is critical to provide the link between river locations in a river basin, which allows 
us to mode water flow sequence and supply-demand balance at a particular point. 
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Sometimes, water can flow from more than one upstream river locations to one down 
stream river location.  
WRAP output 1CPT can provide the actual water flow sequence for diverters and 
river locations in a particular river basin. For example, a WRAP output 1CPT may give a 
result as following: 
colAcolAcolAcolA
colAcolAcolAcolA
colAcolAcolAcolAcolA
20000_20040_2002040000
and,30000_3005020000_20030
_2001010000_10030_10020_10010
→→→
→→→
→→→→→
  
We know that A10000col, A20000col, A30000col and A40000col are river 
locations and the rest are diverters in the Colorado River basin. Therefore, A10010_col, 
A10020_col, A10030_col are classified as reach members of the river location 
A10000col.  A20010_col, A20020_col, A20030_col and A20040_col are reach 
members of A20000col. However, there is no reach member for A40000col.  
In one estuary, waters flow from A10000col to A20000col then to A30000col, 
and in the other estuary water flows from A40000col to A20000col. Therefore, the river 
flow linking in the model will be A10000col.A20000col, A20000col.A30000col and 
A40000col.A20000col, where the river location before the dot is the upstream river 
location while the river location after the dot is the downstream river location.  
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Sector-diverter mapping 
In the WAM reports and WRAP output, water usage is classified into eight 
sectors: agricultural, industrial, mining, municipal, recreational, power, domestic and 
livestock, and other (Table II-2). It is critical to separate water usage into different 
sectors because they have different values and costs. Municipal and industrial water 
usually have higher value than agriculture water.  
However, the percentage of return flows data is not available for mining, 
domestic and livestock, and other, we made the following assumptions: mining is 
assumed to have the same percentage of return flows as industry, so these two sectors, 
mining and industry, are aggregated into “ind”; it is reasonable to assume power and 
recreation sectors have 100% of return flows since they are not actually used up, so they 
are grouped into “rec”; domestic and livestock is regrouped into “ag”. Therefore, the 
final sectors in the model have five categories: agricultural, industrial and mining, 
municipal, recreational, and other sector. The detailed description of the sectors is shown 
in the table. Sets or data relating to sectors are also regrouped based on these five 
categories. 
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Table II-2. Sectors of Water Use Classified in the Model 
Sector in GAMS Classified water use 
ag agricultural, domestic and livestock water use 
ind Industrial and mining water use 
rec recreational, hydro power water use 
mun municipal water use 
other other type of water use 
 
The tuple sector-diverter mapping was directly extracted from the WRAP output. 
It represents what specific diverters supply water for a particular type of use. For 
example, a tuple may be shown as this: F30130_col.mun, F30130_col.ag, 
F30130_col.ind, and F30140_col.ag. This indicates that the diverter F30130_col supplies 
water for municipal, agricultural and industrial and mining type of use, while only 
agricultural water users are diverting water from F30140_col.  
County-diverter-mapping 
The tuple county-diverter mapping provides a link between each diverter and its 
physical county location. It can be used to aggregate water use in a county by summing 
up water use for each diverter in that county.  
This tuple was generated by combining the WAM and WRAP output. The WRAP 
output can provide information about water right and diverter, while WAM contains 
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information for water right and county. Therefore, we can connect the diverter and the 
county together if they have the same water right.  
The above tuples including reaches, river flow linking, sector-diverter mapping, 
county-diverter-mapping are used to generate some tuples like mappingall6, isagthere, 
and indminmapping used in the constraints. The tuple isagthere ties an agricultural 
county and its location basin together. River basin, river place, county and sector are 
linked together in mappingall6. In Indminmapping tuple, a major industrial county is 
linked with its river basin.   
Naturalized flows and inflows 
Naturalized stream flows represent water stock that would have occurred in the 
absence of water users, water management facilities and practices. Naturalized flows are 
generated by WRAP. The data set consists of the monthly naturalized flows data for each 
river location from 1934 to 1989 or from 1940 to 1998 which depend on the availability 
of WRAP input for each river basin. The naturalized flows data are used to calculate the 
net inflows for that reach which is needed for the water flow balance constraint.  
Net inflow is one source of water supply. If there is no upstream river location 
connected to a river location, then naturalized flows at this river location will be treated 
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as net inflows at that river location. If there is more than one upstream river locations 
connected to a river location, then the net flow at this river location will be the 
summation of naturalized flows from all of its upstream river locations minus its own 
naturalized flow at the location. For example, if the river flow linking is 
A10000_col.A20000_col, A20000_col.A30000_col and A40000_col.A20000_col, 
naturalized flows at A10000_col and A40000_col will be considered net inflows at 
A10000_col and A40000_col respectively since no upstream river location exists. By 
adding the naturalized flows at river locations A10000_col and A40000_col then 
subtracting the naturalized flow from A20000_col, we can get the net inflows at 
A20000_col.  
Water use 
The WRAP data are also used to generate the monthly historical water use for 
each diverter. The year range for water use generated is different across each river basin.  
A diverter is usually associated with more than one type of water use (sector). 
The WRAP output provides total water use but do not split the total use by sector. But, 
when we try to identify the major industrial and municipal counties and set a limit for 
water that can be diverted for recreational or other use, we require the water use by 
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sector. In such cases, the permitted diversion from the WAM reports is used to obtain the 
split ratios. For example A10000_col is associated with agricultural and industrial usage 
and WRAP provides that the actual water use at A10000_col is 2000 ac-ft. Then, we go 
to the WAM report and find out that at A10000_col the total permitted diversion is 
10,000 ac-ft of which 6,000 ac-ft was permitted for agriculture and 4,000 ac-ft for 
industrial use. So, 6/10 is permitted for agriculture and 4/10 for industrial use. Then, we 
assign that (6/10*2000) as actual agricultural usage and (4/10*2000) as industrial usage 
at A10000_col. 
Permitted diversion 
TCEQ issues permits to water right holders and specifies the maximum amount 
of water that can be diverted. Permitted diversions in each river basin are imposed to a 
diverter and use type (sector). These permitted diversions serve as an upper bound that 
diverters can actually divert.  
The WAM report contains the information on water rights, control points and the 
permitted diversions by sector. The WRAP output also generates the permitted 
diversions. Most of the time we used permitted diversion as listed by the WRAP output. 
However, in the Lavaca and Sulfur river basins the permitted diversions are extracted 
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from the WAM report. The reason is that in the WRAP output no major municipal 
diverters supply water to the major cities like Corpus Christi in the Sulfur River basin 
and Texacana in the Lavaca River basin, but a few diverters are available to supply water 
to these cities in the WAM report. This treatment also applies to the type-of-diverter 
mapping and county-diverter mapping.  
In another case of the San Jacinto River basin, the permitted diversions for most 
diverters are from WRAP while the data are from the WAM report for some diverters. 
This is also because of the inconsistency between two outputs. The permitted industrial 
diversion for Harris county (The city of Houston is located in this county) from the 
WAM report is very close to the actual industrial water demand while the WRAP output 
shows that the permitted industrial diversion for Harris county is 100 times smaller than 
its actual industrial demand. 
Reservoirs 
Each river basin contains reservoirs. 175 major reservoirs each with capacity 
more than 5000 ac-ft are covered in the model. A reservoir is treated as both a diverter 
and a river location. For example, A30060 stands for reservoir Lake J.B. Thomas in the 
Colorado riverbasin, the corresponding river location and diverter will be A30060col and 
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A30060_col. The reservoir ID will be shown in the data sets called “riverflowlinking", 
"naturalized flow", "wateruse" and so on.  
The model has monthly storage capacity constraints for the major reservoirs, and 
the monthly storage capacity is obtained from the Texas Water Development Board 
(TWDB, 2005) and the following web site: 
http://www.twdb.state.tx.us/publications/reports/waterconditions/twc_pdf_archives/.  
Evaporation data 
Evaporation of water from the reservoirs takes away a part of the available 
supply for diversion. Hence, this information is included in the model. The monthly 
evaporation and storage data for the identified major reservoirs are from WRAP.  
The evaporation loss is computed as a percentage of water evaporated as water 
stored for each reservoir. The evaporation loss falling out of the range 0 to 1 is adjusted 
or eliminated. 
Return flow assumptions 
Once water is diverted for use, some percentage of water will return back to the 
river after certain period of time. Some sectors such as recreation and electric power 
have high return flows since there is no consumptive use. The return flow rate is 
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obtained from the EDSIMR model whose values are tabulated in Table II-3. It is 
assumed that the return flow rate depends only on the sector and water diverted from one 
river location will return to the next river location to simplify the model process. No 
time delay is considered in the model.     
 
Table II-3. Return Flow Percentages by Sector 
Sector ag ind mun rec other 
Return flow percent (%) 6.37 33.58 54.52 100 33.58 
Notes: ag/ind/mun/rec/denote agricultural/industrial & mining/municipal/recreational 
sector, respectively. 
 
2.4.2. Crop data 
Crop mix data 
TEXRIVERSIM intensively models the agricultural water use and crop 
management choice, so crop data are needed for the objective function as well as for the 
agricultural land and water demand constraints. Crop data consists of crop mix data, crop 
budget data and irrigated land available in Texas. Crop mix data contain the harvested 
acres for each crop through different management (irrigated or dry land choice) for each 
county from 1970 to 2003. 21 crops covered in the model are listed in Table II-4. 
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Table II-4. Crops Covered in the Model 
Crops Description (units) 
Barley Barley all 
Corng Corn for grain 
Corns Corn for silage (tons) 
CottonP Pima cotton (lb) 
CottonU Cotton upland 
Alfalfa2 Hay Alfalfa dry 
Hay Hay other than Sorghum hay (ton) 
HayOth Hay other dry 
Oats Grazing oats (days) 
Peanuts Spanish peanuts (cwt) 
Rice Rice (cwt) 
PeanutsR Runner peanuts(ton) 
Sorghum grain sorghum (cwt) 
Soybeans (bu) 
Sugarbeets Sugar beets 
Sugarcane (tons) 
sunflower (cwt) 
SunflowerO Sunflower seed for oil use 
SunflowerNo Sunflower seed for non oil use 
Wheat Wheat all 
Winwht Winter wheat (bu) 
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The data are from USDA county level statistics as developed by NASS (United 
States Department of Agriculture, 2004).  
Crop mix data serve as coefficients for the variable CROPMIX in agricultural 
land constraints and crop mix balance constraints, which provide the possible crop mix 
strategies. 
Crop budgets  
Crop budget data contains crop yield, price, cost and water needed for each crop. 
Crop yield, price and cost estimated are collected from Texas Cooperative Extension 
data on the website (http://agecoext.tamu.edu/).  
There are 12 agricultural districts in Texas and the crop budgets are generally 
prepared for these 12 districts by crop based on irrigation status. It is assumed that the 
price, operating cost, water price and irrigated yield for a crop in counties within a 
district are the same. Water needed for each crop is obtained through Blaney-Criddle 
formula (National Engineering Handbook, chapter 2).  
Following the same procedure in EDSIMR model, the dry land yield for a crop is 
assumed to be proportional to irrigated yield based on how much percentage of 
precipitation against the water requirements for the crop is available. Yield units vary 
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based on each crop.  
Available agricultural land 
Available agricultural land is defined as acreage of irrigated land available in 
Texas, which was from NASS and saved as a parameter “availagland.” It serves as an 
upper limit of the optimal crop land use.  
 
2.4.3. IBT cost estimates and IBT projects 
Interbasin water transfer is the key component and major focus in the 
TEXRIVERSIM model. IBT related data include the project name and corresponding 
fixed and variable cost, capacity as well as the source location and destination location, 
which were extracted from Texas Water Plan 2002, 2006 and regional water planning 
group reports (http://www.twdb.state.tx.us/RWPG/main-docs/2006RWPindex.asp).  
Actually 99 IBT projects appear in the 2002 Texas Water Plan, but some IBT 
information was not available. Finally, 45 proposed IBT projects are introduced in the 
model as follows in Table II-5 briefly with those project titles, IBT type, source and 
destination basins, fixed and variable costs.  
The costs information is obtained from 2006 Regional Water Plans by each of 
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regional water planning groups. Costs are based on the second quarter 2002 dollars but 
some cost data such as material costs are adjusted to account for price increases in the 
2006 Regional Water Plans. The fixed costs (FC) consist of total annualized capital costs 
amortized for 30 years with 6% interest rate plus 20% of annual operation and 
management (O&M) costs. The regional groups permitted a 20% allowance for 
construction contingencies for all O&M calculations. The variable costs (VC) are 
comprised of: raw water costs plus electricity costs plus 80% of O&M costs divided by 
the acre-foot of maximum annual IBT water available.  
Two types of IBTs are included in the model. An IBT associated with more than 
one water diverter is treated as River IBT (RIBT), where transferred water is not directly 
dedicated to a user but rather is placed in the instream flow of the destination basin 
which is used by any downstream diverter.  
An IBT where the water is dedicated to only one diverter is treated as User IBT 
(UIBT) in which transferred water is assumed to be dedicated only to that diverter. The 
source and destination river locations are mapped according to their physical places. The 
model contains 8 River IBTs and 37 User IBTs. 
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Table II-5. IBT Projects Covered in the Model 
45 IBT projects Type Source Destination FC ($) VC ($) 
AlanHenry_BrzToCol RIBT Brazos Colorado 17,946,000 130.60 
Bedias_TriToSan        Trinity  San Jacinto 5,975,025 135.30 
ETWT_SabNecToTri       Sabine   Trinity    23,414,010 15.63 
Marvin_SulToTrin       Sulphur  Trinity    155,343,800 115.19 
Marvin_SulToTrin       Sulphur  Trinity    160,141,600 97.47 
Toledo_SabToTrin       Sabine   Trinity    136,065,600 128.90 
Toledo_SabToTrin       Sabine   Trinity    215,079,800 143.24 
Toledo_SabToTrin       Sabine   Trinity    173,213,000 151.44 
Luce Bayou_TriToSan       UIBT Trinity  San Jacinto 11,173,010 9.27 
BoisdArc_RedToTrin     Red      Trinity    29,606,800 41.82 
Columbia_NecToTrin     Neches   Trinity    16,544,120 80.58 
Fastrill_NecToTrin     Neches   Trinity    42,248,200 79.25 
Garwood_ColToNus       Colorado  Nueces     5,606,400 399.93 
Garwood_ColToNus       Colorado  Nueces     471,833 399.93 
Garwood_ColToNus       Colorado  Nueces     3,624,232 399.93 
JoePool_TrinToBrz      Trinity  Brazos     6,285,380 285.89 
LCRABRA_ColToBrz       Colorado  Brazos     1,478,400 338.31 
LCRABRA_ColToBrz       Colorado  Brazos     8,133,600 332.11 
LCRABRA_ColToBrz       Colorado  Brazos     811,400 338.67 
LCRASAWS_ColToGdsn     Colorado  Guadsan    153,433,000 302.85 
LCRASAWS_ColToGdsn     Colorado  Guadsan    9,598,600 611.13 
Livingston_TriToSan    Trinity  San Jacinto 15,810,857 226.11 
Palestine_NecToTrin    Neches   Trinity    30,993,600 73.66 
Parkhouse_SulToTrin    Sulphur  Trinity    27,786,800 77.82 
Parkhouse_SulToTrin    Sulphur  Trinity    26,932,200 69.48 
Parkhouse_SulToTrin    Sulphur  Trinity    35,541,600 77.06 
Patman_SulToTrin       Sulphur  Trinity    35,284,600 203.33 
Patman_SulToTrin       Sulphur  Trinity    42,465,000 110.03 
Patman_SulToTrin       Sulphur  Trinity    68,226,000 110.52 
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Table II-5. Continued 
45 IBT projects Type Source Destination FC ($) VC ($) 
Patman_SulToTrin       Sulphur  Trinity    141,128,600 180.24 
Patman_SulToTrin       Sulphur  Trinity    32,025,600 233.41 
Patman_SulToTrin       Sulphur  Trinity    61,349,000 120.48 
Patman_SulToTrin       Sulphur  Trinity    77,222,200 165.75 
Patman_SulToTrin       Sulphur  Trinity    32,025,600 233.41 
Pines_CypToTrin        Cypress  Trinity    25,708,200 201.47 
Pines_CypToTrin        Cypress  Trinity    35,002,200 242.96 
Pines_CypToTrin  Cypress  Trinity 19,227,000 188.77 
RalphHall_SulToTrin    Sulphur  Trinity    15,651,200 75.25 
Rayburn_NecToTrin      Neches   Trinity    97,276,800 179.09 
Rayburn_NecToTrin      Neches   Trinity    105,459,400 211.03 
Rayburn_NecToTrin      Neches   Trinity    97,276,800 179.09 
Texoma_RedToTrin       Red      Trinity    15,023,400 55.77 
Texoma_RedToTrin       Red      Trinity    43,752,600 222.35 
Texoma_RedToTrin       Red      Trinity    13,616,200 75.80 
Texoma_RedToTrin       Red      Trinity    49,935,400 231.00 
Notes: IBT/FC/VC denote Interbasin Water transfers/fixed costs/variable costs. And 
RIBT/UIBT stand for River IBT/User IBT. 
 
Some IBTs have the same source place and more than one destination place. In 
these cases, the same IBT ID is adopted but options are used to differentiate them. For 
example, Patman_SulToTrin transfers water from the same source to eight different 
destination places with different capacity and cost structure. They are treated as options.  
In some cases, water are transferred from the same source place but shared by 
different locations along the pipeline. For example, in Marvin_SulToTrin, three 
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destination places, B2410Atri, B2456Atri and B3809Atri, share the transferred water, so 
do the costs. In this case, only one IBT ID and one option are used to represent this 
project. Some IBTs are composed by two parts with different source basins but the same 
destination basin. For example, in ETWT_SabNecToTri, water is transferred from both 
the Sabine and Neches River basins to the Trinity River basin. In this case, only one IBT 
ID is used to refer to this project.  
A riverplace of exporting and importing IBT water is critical. The assignment of 
IBT in this model is limited because of limited information available from each regional 
river authority and TWDB. However, we believe we used as much as information 
available we could. As for a reservoir or city, its corresponding riverplace can be exactly 
identified by the reservoir ID or city-mapping tuple. When it is a county or a place, one 
riverplace in that county is chosen. 
 
2.4.4. Water demand data 
The projected water use for the cities and industrial counties that were 
represented as water diverters was drawn from the “2006 Regional Water Plan” from the 
Texas Water Development Board (TWDB, 2006b) which is found at its website. 
  67 
(http://www.twdb.state.tx.us/data/popwaterdemand/2003Projections/DemandProjections.asp) 
Based on those data, 35 major cities were included in the model. The 
classification of major cities is based on the year 2010 projected total water use for city 
and their actual 2003 prices. These cities were chosen based on the criteria that they have 
annual water use greater than 2000 acre feet or water prices over $1000/acre feet or 
water values (price*quantity) over $300,000.  
Dallas, Houston, Fort Worth, and San Antonio are the four largest water 
demanding cities based on quantity. These four cities constitute 71.4% of the projected 
35 city total water use and 65.1% of the total water value ($601 million/ $923 million).  
A large potential water shortage is being faced by San Antonio due to Edwards 
Aquifer developments and it is assumed that part of the shortage may be supplied by 
transferred surface water. Woodson and Blanco have the smallest levels of demand but 
their water prices are among those highest with their prices over $2,000/acre foot (twice 
as much as the arithmetic average price of $1,049/acre foot). San Antonio and Austin are 
the two cities which have the cheapest water prices (below $290/acre foot).  
Forty major industrial water counties are also included. They have their water use 
greater than 3,000 acre feet from surface water or water prices higher than $1,000/acre 
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foot or water values over $1 million. Brazoria, Harris and Harrison counties are the three 
largest industrial water demanding counties. These three counties account for 64.9% of 
projected 40 county total industrial water use and 66.2% of the total water value ($713 
million/$1,078 million).  
Washington and Freestone counties are among those with highest prices but have 
small water use. Victoria and Robertson counties have the cheapest water prices (about 
$570/acre foot).  
Municipal water prices for major cities and industrial and mining water prices for 
major counties are year 2003 prices that can be obtained from the survey over 2,000 
communities in Texas by Bell and Griffin (2005).  
We introduced the so called marginal price concept in our model, rather than 
using average price concept which has been used in other analyses so far. That is to say, 
municipal prices are the first block prices, and industrial and mining water prices are the 
last block prices, being based upon the best fit of data which are available from cities or 
counties.  
Variable costs such as treatment and operating costs for each city or county are 
assumed to be 50% of the water prices which are based on the block pricing system. 
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There was no way to identity the proportion of the variable cost in the water price.  
Municipal price elasticities vary across months. But industrial and mining 
elasticity and climate elasticity are assumed to be the same across months (-0.540, 
0.630122 respectively) by Gillig et al (2000), and Bell and Griffin (2005).  
The municipal monthly share used to split the annual water use projection is 
obtained from the Griffin and Chang’s study (1990) on historical water use. The 
industrial monthly share was extracted from WAM reports for each river basin. It is 
assumed that each county or city has the same monthly share.  
Table II-6 summarizes the information on municipal water price and quantity, 
and Table II-7 on industrial price and quantity. 
 
Table II-6. Major Cities’ Water Use in 2010 and Price in 2003 
City Quantity (acre feet) 
Price 
($/acre foot) 
Price*Quantity 
(dollar) 
Abilene  22,891 566.98 12,978,739 
Austin  154,173 280.23 43,203,900 
Beaumont  27,040 1,841.06 49,782,262 
Blanco 303 2,052.86 622,017 
Bonham 2,735 977.55 2,673,599 
Center 1,633 1,189.36 1,942,225 
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Table II-6. Continued 
City Quantity (acre feet) 
Price 
($/acre foot) 
Price*Quantity 
(dollar) 
Coleman 1,285 1,189.36 1,528,328 
Corpus Christi  61,953 765.75 47,440,510 
Dallas  389,548 420.35 163,746,502 
Denison  5,489 1,303.41 7,154,417 
Denton  29,561 847.21 25,044,375 
Fort Worth  149,596 772.27 115,528,503 
Gonzales 1,545 700.58 1,082,396 
Graham 1,528 1,867.13 2,852,975 
Greenville  5,555 1,687.91 9,376,340 
Houston  389,082 668.00 259,906,776 
Longview  10,671 628.89 6,710,885 
Marlin 2,660 977.55 2,600,283 
Marshall  3,257 1,163.29 3,788,836 
Nacogdoches  7,625 870.02 6,633,903 
Paris  6,252 1,437.00 8,984,124 
San Angelo  20,800 329.11 6,845,488 
San Antonio  216,946 688.20 62,068,251 
Stamford  645 928.68 598,999 
Sweetwater 3,013 1,723.75 5,193,659 
Teague 536 1,202.39 644,481 
Temple  21,033 876.54 18,436,266 
Terrell 3,575 847.21 3,028,776 
Texarkana  6,472 1,163.29 7,528,813 
Thorndale 193 1,075.31 207,535 
Tyler  25,886 736.42 19,062,968 
Waco  24,876 788.56 19,616,219 
Weatherford 5,209 1,045.98 5,448,510 
Wichita  346 892.83 308,919 
Woodson 283 2,606.81 737,727 
Average 45,834 1,048.85 48,073,138 
City Total 1,604,195  923,308,503 
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Table II-7. Major Industrial Counties’ Water Use in 2010 and Price in 2003 
County Quantity (acre feet) 
Price 
($/acre foot) 
Price*Quantity 
(dollar) 
Angelina          30,284 1,111.20 33,651,581 
Bastrop           5,125 1,156.80 5,928,600 
Bell              1,135 896.10 1,017,074 
Bexar             29,533 896.10 26,464,521 
Bowie             2,329 801.60 1,866,926 
Brazoria          264,343 1,208.90 319,564,253 
Calhoun           49,816 1,221.90 60,870,170 
Coke              488 1,166.50 569,252 
Dallas            37,025 1,000.40 37,039,810 
Fannin            85 1,195.90 101,652 
Fayette           247 752.70 185,917 
Fort Bend          9,873 694.10 6,852,849 
Freestone         116 1,309.90 151,948 
Harris            397,279 703.80 279,604,960 
Harrison          85,244 1,336.00 113,885,984 
Henderson         401 1,029.70 412,910 
Hill              185 1,107.90 204,962 
Hood              187 1,098.10 205,345 
Hutchinson        24,057 671.30 16,149,464 
Jasper            64,271 615.90 39,584,509 
Lamar             5,596 1,332.70 7,457,789 
Live Oak           5,840 586.50 3,425,160 
Marion            176 977.60 172,058 
McLennan          3,942 1,160.00 4,572,720 
Montgomery  2,525 619.10 1,563,228 
Newton            710 1,059.00 751,890 
Nueces            47,982 863.50 41,432,457 
Palo Pinto         31 1,169.80 36,264 
Polk              648 1,446.80 937,526 
Robertson         10,385 570.20 5,921,527 
Rusk              1,622 964.50 1,564,419 
Smith             4,552 964.50 4,390,404 
Somervell         310 1,098.10 340,411 
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Table II-7. Continued 
County Quantity (acre feet) 
Price 
($/acre foot) 
Price*Quantity 
(dollar) 
Tarrant           17,691 1,274.10 22,540,103 
Titus             10,710 1,433.70 15,354,927 
Tom Green          2,299 1,166.50 2,681,784 
Victoria          32,670 570.20 18,628,434 
Washington        599 1,365.30 817,815 
Wilson            243 713.60 173,405 
Wood              420 1,189.40 499,548 
Average 28,774 1,012.50 29,133,957 
Total 1,150,974  1,077,574,554 
 
Table II-8. Municipal Monthly Elasticity 
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
-0.168 -0.164 -0.209 -0.268 -0.291 -0.335 -0.327 -0.359 -0.313 -0.2 -0.206 -0.159 
 
Table II-8 shows municipal price elasticities. Municipal water demand depends 
on temperature and precipitation. If the temperature is high and/or the precipitation is 
low, then one would expect higher demand for water. Thus, fluctuation in temperature 
and precipitation is accommodated in the objective function by including the Griffin and 
Bell climate-driven demand shifting factor. It has the form: 
Climate-driven municipal demand shifting factor = 
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Cvalue ( cˆ ) is the composite climate index used to shift the municipal demand 
curves according to the formula. It is the number of days in a month with precipitation 
less than or equal to 0 inches as frequency of precipitation multiplied by the temperature 
and divided by 1000. Under this formulation when the Cvalue in a particular month is 
higher than the average Cvalue, the demand curve will shift to the right side. 
To specify this shifter, monthly average temperature and precipitation data for 
identified major cities for the period 1950-2004 were collected from National Climatic 
Data Center (NCDC). The units for temperature and precipitation are degree Fahrenheit 
and inch respectively. For certain major cities some of the needed data are missing for a 
subset of the years or months. For example, precipitation data in Paris were missing 
from 1958 to 1961, so data from the nearest city Denton are used to fill the period from 
1958 to 1961. In case the data for one month are missing, the average value from the 
same months in the previous and the next year is used. There are also some climate data 
that are not available for certain cities. For example there are no monthly temperature 
data for the whole period in Sweetwater and Terrell, so that the monthly temperatures 
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from the closest weather station, Abilene in the case of Sweetwater and Kaufman for 
Terrell, are used.  
 
2.4.5. State of nature 
Climate not only affects water demand, but also influences water supply. Nine 
states of nature are considered in the model based on the historical river flows and 
climate data for 50 years from 1949 to 1998 (Table II-9). To develop these data the 
inflow between control points from 21 river basins are summed up by year and sorted 
from low to high. Years with similar inflows were then grouped into one state. All of the 
yearly data such as water use, temperature, precipitation, crop data, naturalized flows, 
and evaporation are aggregated according to the state of nature classification. For 
example, the evaporation loss percentages in year 1956, 1963 and 1954 are averaged and 
assigned to the very dry state (HDry). 
The state of nature constitutes the stochastic part of the model. Future event such 
as water demand, temperature and precipitation are subject to uncertainty and we assume 
that the future event will have the same probability distribution as the past event. The 
state of nature allows us to analyze how dry or wet conditions affect water use, net 
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benefit and the need for IBT. Incorporating the state of nature into the model is an 
important contribution.  
 
Table II-9. State of Nature (SON) 
SON Explanation Years Probability 
HDry Very dry 1956,1963,1954 0.06 
MDry Medium dry 1964,1951,1988,1978,1955  0.10 
Dry Dry 1998,1996,1952,1967,1972,1962,1971 0.14 
Dnormal Dry-normal 1984,1965,1980,1970 0.08 
Normal Normal 1977,1976,1966,1959,1997,1953,1983,1982, 
1981,1958,1949,1960,1969,1986,1985  
0.30 
Wnormal Normal-wet 1989,1975,1950,1994 0.08 
Wet Wet 1995,1961,1987,1974,1993,1990,1968 0.14 
MWet Medium wet 1979,1991 0.04 
HWet Very wet 1992,1973,1957 0.06 
 
2.5. Conclusion  
This chapter developed a modeling framework that integrates and evaluates the 
economic, hydrological and environmental effects of Interbasin Water Transfers (IBT) in 
Texas. It depicts water use in 21 Texas river basins covering 35 big municipal water use 
cities, 40 major industrial and mining counties, 62 agricultural counties, and 175 major 
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reservoirs. It is based on monthly naturalized river flows data for 55 years, numerous 
control points and related data sets. Twenty-one agricultural crops are introduced for the 
analysis of agricultural activities after IBT projects. 
The model maximizes the objective function that represents the annualized 
expected net benefit of water uses by the nonagricultural and agricultural sectors and the 
assigned freshwater inflows value. The constraints consist of agricultural land and water 
use, total water use by source and sector, demand curve convexity, freshwater inflows, 
hydrological water flows balance, reservoir and IBT capacity, etc. 
The model is a two stage stochastic programming with recourse. In the first stage, 
the crop mix and IBT construction are decided independent of the state of nature. 
Subsequently in the second stage, water availability and yields are realized by the state 
of nature, and adjustments are allowed in management. 
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CHAPTER III 
ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL EVALUATION OF INTERBASIN 
WATER TRANSFERS IN TEXAS 
 
State law or policy guidance suggests that the state must weigh the economic 
impacts and water quality changes when considering a possible IBT project as well as a 
number of other requirements (Texas Water Code 11.085, (K), (F)). From economic 
viewpoint, IBT is meaningful when total benefits arising with the IBT in place exceed its 
total costs, that is to say, net benefits are greater than zero. Net benefits are affected by: 
changes in economic activities in the source basin and the destination basin; 
hydrological and environmental implications such as alterations in recreational uses and 
fish and wildlife habitat effects. 
This chapter reports the results of the simulated model developed in Chapter III to 
evaluate economic, hydrological and environmental impacts of IBT projects which also 
affect water quality changes. 
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3.1. Model Experimentation 
Once TEXRIVERSIM was constructed, three scenarios were run through the 
model. First, a baseline scenario was run without IBT projects. Second, an IBT scenario 
without any restriction on the construction of Interbasin Water Transfers (IBT) was run 
with all 45 IBT projects included in the model.  
Third, an environmental restriction scenario was run. This scenario eliminates 
IBT projects that are of medium-high or high environmental concerns, as categorized by 
each regional planning group and the Texas Water Development Board (TWDB). Twelve 
projects out of 45 IBT projects were so classified. These twelve eliminated IBT projects 
are listed as follows in Table III-1. 
 
3.1.1. Assumptions for simulation 
It is critical to connect the appropriate IBT delivery point in the source basin and 
IBT diversion point in the destination basin. However, our data from TWDB and 
regional water planning groups do not specify the exact diversion and delivery points 
based on the WAM/WRAP-specific control points. Moreover, most water users from 
IBT projects are designated as regional water districts (e.g. Tarrant Regional Water 
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District is designated as a possible owner), instead of specific final users.  
Therefore, we connected the IBT diversion and delivery points to the control 
points closest to any city or county where an IBT project is planned. When there are 
more control points which belong to the city or county of an IBT project, we treated 
them as different IBT projects, accommodating all of them. 
 
Table III-1. Environmentally Sensitive Interbasin Water Transfers (IBT) 
Project 
(IBT project in model) Region 
Source 
basin 
Destination 
basin IBT Type 
Marvin Nichols Reservoir 
(Marvin_SulToTrin) C Sulphur Trinity 1 River IBT 
George Parkhouse Lake 
(Parkhouse_SulToTrin) C Sulphur Trinity 3 User IBTs 
Lake Ralph Hall 
(RalphHall_SulToTrin) C Sulphur Trinity 1 User IBT 
Lower Bois d'Are Creek 
(BoisdArc_RedToTrin) C Red Trinity 1 User IBT 
Lake Columbia 
(Columbia_NecToTrin) C Neches Trinity 1 User IBT 
Lake Fastrill 
(Fastrill_NecToTrin) C Neches Trinity 1 User IBT 
Lake Livingston 
(Livingston_TriToSan) H Trinity San Jacinto 1 User IBT 
Bedias Reservoir 
(Bedias_TriToSan) H Trinity San Jacinto 1 River IBT 
East Texas Water Transfer 
(ETWT_SabNecToTri) H Sabine Trinity 1 River IBT 
LCRA-SAWS 
(LCRASAWS_ColToGdsn) L Colorado 
Guadalupe-
San Antonio 1 User IBT 
 
The second assumption is that San Antonio will be a destination despite the fact 
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that it does not currently use much surface water. It is assumed that annually 50% of the 
projected municipal water use in San Antonio would come from the groundwater 
(108,473 acre feet), after considering the Edward Aquifer pumping limit and reflecting 
the possibility of reducing dependency on the groundwater. Houston and Harris County 
are also assumed to depend on the groundwater, say, 35% of the projected water uses 
(136,179 and 139,048 acre feet respectively). The groundwater portions are given as 
parameters in the model. 
Lastly, it is assumed that the annually expected total water use of city and county 
is given by the projected annual water use of city and county. It will be unrealistic that 
water use could increase way beyond the projected water use just because IBT water is 
available as much as it can be and it contributes to increasing net benefit. 
 
3.2. Simulation Results 
The two scenarios allowing IBT projects did not show differences in the IBT 
projects chosen, the expected (average) values of net benefits and water uses in each 
sector. The constraints not to build those environmentally-sensitive IBT projects are not 
binding to the objective function on average. The opportunity costs of the non-optimal 
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IBT projects are provided. 
Two sub-scenarios will be analyzed: with-IBT scenario under the environmental 
restriction and without-IBT scenario as a baseline scenario. The results will be reported 
based on the annualized expected values6 weighted by the probabilities of the states of 
nature if there is no specific term in tables or texts to differentiate them from monthly or 
each state-of-nature based values.  
 
3.2.1. Definition of water demand and water use  
Water demand is a schedule of water uses. Water use is a specific point among 
the schedule or on a water demand curve that represents the schedule. In our model, a 
municipal water demand shifts due to the climate-driven water demand shifting factor, 
moving every level of water uses on a water demand curve. The term water use will be 
used in most numerical analysis section because a specific point of water use on a 
demand curve will be analyzed. 
                                            
6
 Costs are based on the second quarter 2002 dollars but some cost data such as material 
costs are adjusted to account for price increases in the 2006 Regional Water Plans. Total 
annualized capital costs that consist of the IBT fixed costs are amortized for 30 years 
with 6% interest rate. 
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3.2.2. Optimal IBTs, IBT gain (cost) and water right issues 
Optimal IBTs chosen and IBT gain 
Three User IBT projects were selected for construction, which supply water to 
three big cities such as Houston in Region H (Luce Bayou Channel project), Fort Worth 
in Region C (Cypress Basin Supplies project) and San Antonio in Region L (LCRA-
SAWS Water Project).  
Luce Bayou Channel Project (LB IBT) in Region H: This User IBT originates 
from Lake Livingston in the Trinity River basin and sends water to Lake Houston in the 
San Jacinto River basin to supply water to north and northwest areas of Houston in 
Harris County. The IBT water is dedicated to the industrial and mining sector. 
This IBT has the second largest capacity volume of water transferred of all the 45 
modeled IBTs (maximum 540,000 acre feet in year 2020), being smaller than only the 
Marvin Nichols Reservoir IBT projects (maximum 612,300 acre feet). It also has the 
least variable cost per acre foot among the suggested IBT projects (variable cost $9.27 
per acre-foot).  
The second largest volume of transferred water and the least IBT variable cost 
contribute to the total net benefit gain. Annually, 169,260 acre-foot of water is 
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transferred on average. 
LCRA-SAWS Water Project (LS IBT) by Region L: Water is transferred from 
Bay City on the Lower Colorado River and is sent to the City of San Antonio of Bexar 
County on the Guadalupe River basin. Although this IBT project looks very expensive 
when we look at the cost side (variable cost: $302.85 per acre-foot, fixed cost: $153 
million), apparently its expected net benefit justifies the project. Annually, 98,574 acre-
foot of water is transferred on average. 
Cypress Basin Supplies Project (CB IBT) in Region C: This runs from Lake 
O’ the Pines in the Cypress River basin to the Trinity River basin where its possible7 
owner would be Tarrant Regional Water District with supplies dedicated to the Fort 
Worth municipality. This user IBT costs $188.77 per acre-foot for its variable costs and 
$19 million for fixed costs. Annual average water transferred is 39,469 acre feet out of 
87,900 acre feet of the maximum IBT water available. 
Regarding the LS and CB IBT project, San Antonio and Forth Worth are two 
cities where the climate-driven water demand shifting factor coefficients are the first and 
                                            
7
 2005 water plan of the Region C has it that Tarrant Regional Water District is a 
“possible” owner. 
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second largest (12.43 and 12.26) among major cities in the model as was and will be 
discussed in detail. This means that per-acre-foot of water use will most contribute to 
increasing the total benefit from water transferred to these two cities among others, via 
the shifting factor coefficients especially in dry years. Two cities increased the total net 
benefit by 77 million dollars (San Antonio $61 million, Forth Worth $16 million). 
Each of the three IBT projects (LB IBT, LS IBT and CB IBT) realizes the 
average IBT gains of $750, $616 and $397 per an acre-foot of annual IBT water 
transferred, respectively. These are all summarized in Table III-2. 
 
Table III-2. Summary of Optimal Interbasin Water Transfers Chosen 
Project 
(Region) 
Source - 
Destination (big city) 
IBT var. 
cost 
($ / af) 
IBT fixed 
cost 
($1000) 
Annual IBT 
transferred 
(af) 
Max. IBT 
(af/ year) 
IBT gains 
($ million) 
LB IBT 
(H) 
Trinity - San Jancinto 
(Houston) 9.27 11,173 169,260 540,000 126.98 
LS IBT 
(L) 
Colorado – Guadalupe  
(San Antonio) 302.85 153,433 98,574 150,000 60.70 
CB IBT 
(C) 
Cypress – Trinity 
(Fort Worth) 188.77 19,227 39,469 87,900 15.68 
Notes: LB/LS/CB denote Luce Bayou/ Lower Colorado - San Antonio/Cypress Basin.
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IBT opportunity costs for non-optimal IBT projects 
Table III-3 summarizes the IBT opportunity costs for 32 IBT projects which are 
not chosen in an optimal state, so called non-optimal IBT projects. The opportunity cost 
of the non-optimal IBT project is derived from the total net benefit loss that accrues by 
the change of the objective function values when one of the non-optimal IBT projects is 
forcibly constrained to be constructed without any other environmentally sensitive IBT 
constraints.  
An objective of this analysis is to show how much each of the non-optimal IBT 
projects costs if it were chosen and constructed for any reason. Irrespective of any one of 
the constraints of these non-optimal IBT projects, three optimal IBT projects (LB, LS, 
CB IBT) have been chosen consistently along with the non-optimal one that must be 
forcibly constrained.  
Table III-3 shows that IBT projects in Region C are very costly in terms of the 
IBT opportunity cost as in Toledo Bend Reservoir and Marvin Nichols Reservoir 
projects. However, Garwood projects in Region N (Coastal Bend) and LCRA-BRA 
projects in Region G starting from the Colorado River basin are among those cheapest.  
 
  86 
Table III-3. IBT Opportunity Costs for Non-optimal IBTs (unit: million dollars)  
Three Optimal IBTs NB*(=A) IBT 
costs 
Non-optimal IBTs (cont) NB*(=B) IBT 
costs 
LB, LS, CB IBT 200,722.88  0.00  Pines_CypToTrin_Opt1 200,697.17  -25.71  
Non-optimal IBTs (30) NB*(=B) (B-A) Pines_CypToTrin_Opt2 200,687.87  -35.01  
AlanHenry_BrzToCol_Opt1 200,704.93  -17.95  Rayburn_NecToTrin_Opt1 200,625.60  -97.28  
Marvin_SulToTrin_Opt1  200,567.53  -155.35  Rayburn_NecToTrin_Opt2 200,617.42  -105.46  
Toledo_SabToTrin_Opt1  200,586.81  -136.07  Rayburn_NecToTrin_Opt3 200,625.60  -97.28  
Toledo_SabToTrin_Opt2 200,507.80  -215.08  Texoma_RedToTrin_Opt1 200,707.85  -15.03  
Toledo_SabToTrin_Opt3 200,549.66  -173.22  Texoma_RedToTrin_Opt2 200,679.12  -43.76  
Garwood_ColToNus_Opt1 200,717.27  -5.61  Texoma_RedToTrin_Opt3 200,709.26  -13.62  
Garwood_ColToNus_Opt2 200,722.40  -0.48  Texoma_RedToTrin_Opt4 200,672.94  -49.94  
Garwood_ColToNus_Opt3 200,719.25  -3.63  Environmentally sensitive IBTs (12)  
JoePool_TrinToBrz_Opt1 200,716.59  -6.29  Bedias_TriToSan_Opt1 200,716.90  -5.98  
LCRABRA_ColToBrz_Opt1 200,721.40  -1.48  ETWT_SabNecToTri_Opt1 200,699.46  -23.42  
LCRABRA_ColToBrz_Opt2 200,714.74  -8.14  Marvin_SulToTrin_Opt2 200,562.73  -160.15  
LCRABRA_ColToBrz_Opt3 200,722.06  -0.82  BoisdArc_RedToTrin_Opt1 200,693.27  -29.61  
Palestine_NecToTrin_Opt1 200,691.88  -31.00  Columbia_NecToTrin_Opt1 200,706.33  -16.55  
Patman_SulToTrin_Opt1 200,687.59  -35.29  Fastrill_NecToTrin_Opt1 200,680.63  -42.25  
Patman_SulToTrin_Opt2 200,680.41  -42.47  LCRASAWS_ColToGdsn_Opt2 200,713.28  -9.60  
Patman_SulToTrin_Opt3 200,654.65  -68.23  Livingston_TriToSan_Opt1 200,707.07  -15.81  
Patman_SulToTrin_Opt4 200,581.75  -141.13  Parkhouse_SulToTrin_Opt1 200,695.09  -27.79  
Patman_SulToTrin_Opt5 200,690.85  -32.03  Parkhouse_SulToTrin_Opt2 200,695.94  -26.94  
Patman_SulToTrin_Opt6 200,661.53  -61.35  Parkhouse_SulToTrin_Opt3 200,687.33  -35.55  
Patman_SulToTrin_Opt7 200,645.65  -77.23  RalphHall_SulToTrin_Opt1 200,707.23  -15.65  
Patman_SulToTrin_Opt8 200,690.85  -32.03     
Notes: NB and IBT denotes the Net Benefit and Interbasin Water Transfers. 
 
Water right issues and IBT markets 
Anybody who wants to use surface water in Texas must get permission from the 
Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) unless the water uses are such 
exempt uses as domestic and livestock use, wildlife management, emergency use and 
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other specified uses (TCEQ, May 2007). For instance, when the domestic and livestock 
sector in the agricultural sector uses water to water range livestock, meet household need 
or irrigate a yard or home garden, water use permit is not required.  
It is also absolutely needed to get permission to use IBT water from another river 
basin. According to Senate Bill 1, the right of the IBT water from one to another basin is 
regarded a junior water right to permits in the destination basin regardless of its source 
basin priority date of the permit on the source water. Therefore, the junior right holder 
must be aware of domestic and livestock sector users and senior right holders especially 
downstream of that junior right holder in a basin. This absolutely constrains effective 
IBT water right trading in the market. 
We assumed in this analysis that the junior water right status of IBT water is not 
considered. In other words, we just looked at the pure economic and environmental 
aspect of IBT projects rather than its institutional aspect.  
 
3.2.3. Gains from IBTs: Net benefit changes  
The gain from IBT construction is the difference between the expected (average) 
annual net benefit with IBT projects and without them. The terminology IBT gain will 
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be used to mean the expected annual gain from IBT projects if it is not noted otherwise. 
The IBT gain from three optimal IBT projects reaches $203 million (Table III-4).  
The industrial and mining sectoral IBT gain ($127 million) comes from LB IBT 
(169,260 acre feet from Trinity to San Jacinto) whereas the municipal sectoral IBT gain 
($76 million) is achieved due to LS IBT ($61 million for 98,574 acre feet from Colorado 
to Guadsan) and CB IBT ($16 million for 39,469 acre feet from Cypress to Trinity).  
The net benefit value must be carefully interpreted since its benefit is measured 
with an area under a water demand curve. The value is different from, for example, 
Gross Regional Product (GRP) which is measured with a market price times quantity as 
its benefit. The net benefit value consists of a producer surplus and consumer surplus 
whereas GRP only measures the producer surplus. 
 
Table III-4. Net Benefits on Annual Average (unit: million dollars)  
Sector without IBT with IBT IBT gain % change 
ag 4.16 4.16 0.00 0.00 
ind 3,149.23 3,276.21 126.98 4.03 
city 197,318.46 197,394.84 76.38 0.04 
FWI 47.83 47.66 -0.18 -0.37 
Total 200,519.69 200,722.88 203.19 0.10 
Notes: FWI/IBT denote freshwater inflows/Interbasin Water Transfers. ag/ind/city/FWI 
denote agricultural/industrial & mining/municipal/freshwater inflow sector. 
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We also introduced a climate-driven water demand shifting factor to the 
municipal water demand curve which will increase or decrease the scale of net benefit. 
The climate-driven water demand shifting factors range from 9.9 to 16.3 depending on a 
city and state of nature (Table III-5).  
 
Table III-5. Climate-driven Municipal Demand Shifting Factor Coefficient (annual) 
SON Austin Corpus  Christi Dallas 
Forth  
Worth Houston 
San  
Antonio 
HDry 16.32 14.93 15.05 14.95 15.65 16.09 
MDry 13.63 12.52 13.22 12.92 12.61 13.88 
Dry 13.71 13.79 13.30 13.43 14.00 15.31 
Dnormal 12.30 12.08 13.45 13.37 12.90 12.59 
Normal 10.95 10.76 11.96 11.91 11.39 11.06 
Wnormal 12.59 13.63 12.38 12.50 12.19 11.53 
Wet 11.74 11.58 10.40 10.89 11.09 11.93 
MWet 9.94 10.33 10.72 10.93 10.03 10.64 
HWet 10.21 11.01 10.23 9.82 10.88 9.92 
Average 12.19 12.06 12.24 12.26 12.19 12.43 
Notes: SON denotes states of nature from heavily dry (HDry) to heavily wet (HWet). 
 
This means that the municipal water use contributes to the total net benefit 
annually 10 to 16 times as much as the industrial water use which does not have the 
shifting factor contributes to the net benefit per a unit of water use. Some cities such as 
Beaumont and Center record 18.4 and 18 respectively in a very dry season (HDry). The 
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shifting factor coefficients are especially high in dry seasons (HDry, MDry, Dry) which 
are greater than 13 in major cities. The average coefficient is greatest in the City of San 
Antonio. Forth Worth, Dallas and Houston are next in order of the magnitude of the 
coefficient. 
There is no change in the agricultural sectoral IBT gain because IBT water is not 
dedicated to agricultural purpose and the sector did not change its planting and 
harvesting decisions from irrigated lands to dry lands, overall. The optimal crop acres for 
all irrigated crops do not change after IBT is implemented. Along the six river basins 
where there are agricultural activities, post-IBT net benefits do not change. The 
agricultural production activity in the Guadsan River basin contributes to 51.2% of the 
whole agricultural sector net benefit (Table III-6).  
The industrial and mining sectoral IBT gain accounts for 62.5% of the total IBT 
gain. The gain comes from the industrial and mining purpose User IBT, Luce Bayou 
Channel Project, from the Trinity to the San Jacinto River basin. The San Jacinto River 
basin where Houston and Harris County will consume the IBT water contributes to the 
net gain, and net benefits of other river basins do not change. The Brazos, Guadsan, 
Sabine and San Jacinto River basins are major players in the industrial/mining sector. 
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Four river basins account for about 84% of the industrial/mining sectoral net benefit. 
Municipal water users account for 37.5% of the total IBT gain from the IBT 
construction. The contribution of the municipal IBT water destination basin San Antonio 
is greater than that of Forth Worth, reflecting the magnitude of the IBT water transferred 
(98,574 vs. 39,469 acre feet) and the climate-driven water demand shifting factor 
coefficients (12.43 vs. 12.26 on average). Note that Houston municipality does not 
contribute to the municipal IBT gain since Luce Bayou IBT is just for the industrial and 
mining purpose.  
The four cities, San Antonio, Fort Worth, Dallas and Houston, explain 68.3% of 
the city total net benefits before and after IBT. The municipal contribution to the IBT 
gain was especially high in dry years (HDry, MDry, Dry), pushing up the demand curve 
due to the climate-driven demand shifting factor. 
Freshwater inflows to bays and estuaries (FWI) decrease by 0.18 million acre 
feet as a result of IBT construction. It will be inevitable that transferring water for use 
results in reducing freshwater inflows and/or water flows in the source basins. Note that 
the FWI value in the objective function is assigned $1.  
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Table III-6. Net Benefits by Sector and River Basins (unit: million dollars) 
Sector River City/County without IBT with IBT IBT gain % change 
City Guadsan San Antonio 29,954.41 30,015.11 60.70 0.20 
 Trinity Forth Worth 22,640.88 22,656.56 15.68 0.07 
 Trinity Dallas 32,147.09 32,147.09 0.00 0.00 
 San Jacinto  Houston 50,098.05 50,098.05 0.00 0.00 
 Four cities  134,840.44 134,916.82 76.38 0.06 
 City total  197,318.46 197,394.84 76.38 0.04 
Ind Brazos   921.44 921.44 0.00 0.00 
 Colorado   45.67 45.67 0.00 0.00 
 Canadian  23.80 23.80 0.00 0.00 
 Red  27.78 27.78 0.00 0.00 
 Sabine  496.07 496.07 0.00 0.00 
 Guadsan  540.51 540.51 0.00 0.00 
 Cypress   45.82 45.82 0.00 0.00 
 Neches   243.74 243.74 0.00 0.00 
 Trinity  114.49 114.49 0.00 0.00 
 San Jacinto  Harris County 689.90 816.89 126.98 18.41 
 Ind total  3,149.23 3,276.21 126.98 4.03 
Ag Brazos   0.49 0.49 0.00 0.00 
 Colorado   0.59 0.59 0.00 -0.02 
 Canadian  0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 
 Red  0.05 0.05 0.00 0.00 
 Guadsan  2.13 2.13 0.00 0.00 
 Nueces   0.89 0.89 0.00 0.00 
 Ag total  4.16 4.16 0.00 0.00 
FWI Total  47.83 47.66 -0.18 -0.37 
Total   200,519.69 200,722.88 203.19 0.10 
Notes: FWI/IBT denote freshwater inflows/Interbasin Water Transfers. 
 
3.2.4. Effects on agricultural production 
We allowed for conversion of agricultural irrigated lands to dry lands but not the 
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other way around. This is to reflect relatively high opportunity cost of agricultural water 
use with respect to the productivity of irrigated lands. It could be more economical to 
cease irrigation and get compensated for the forgone agricultural water use by selling the 
diversion right. Thus, the land being irrigated currently remains irrigated or goes dry. 
This constraint would work when water for IBT is very limited and IBT water markets 
are well developed enough to buy or sell water rights without institutional barriers. 
The harvested crop acres for all irrigated crops do not decrease in the with-IBT 
scenario. The resulting net benefits without- and with-IBT scenarios remain the same. 
This is because IBT water is not dedicated to agricultural purpose at all and agricultural 
water use is not limited in the model as is commonly observed in the real world even 
though its opportunity cost is so high. Actually in reality, when the domestic and 
livestock sector in the agricultural industry uses water to feed livestock, meet household 
need, or irrigate a yard or home garden, water use permit is not required (TCEQ, May 
2007). Agricultural water use does not change in each state of nature as is seen in the 
section of Effects on water use. 
However, if we take a look at individual river basins and counties, there are 
minor changes in the crop acres (Table III-7). Four counties that grow winter wheat in 
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the Canadian River basin adjusted their crop acres inside the basin, nullifying the net 
effect of net benefit changes in the basin. In the Brazos River basin, Fisher County 
adjusted acres for cotton upland and winter wheat, and this crop acre changes in Brazos 
are exactly compensated by changes of Nolan County in the same basin.  
 
 Table III-7. Changes of Crop Acres (unit: acre) 
River County Crop without IBT with IBT change 
Canadian Roberts winter wheat 14.90 18.21 3.31 
 Hansford winter wheat 29.38 28.42 -0.95 
 Hutchinson  winter wheat 31.81 28.50 -3.31 
 Dallam winter wheat 20.86 21.82 0.95 
 Canadian total 96.95 96.95 0.00 
Brazos Fisher cotton upland 1.10 1.00 -0.11 
 Fisher winter wheat 12.01 12.67 0.65 
 Nolan cotton upland 0.64 0.75 0.11 
 Nolan winter wheat 78.39 77.73 -0.65 
 Brazos total 92.14 92.14 0.00 
Whole basins / all crops 12,825.11 12,825.11 0.00 
Notes: IBT denotes Interbasin Water Transfers. 
 
Therefore, any change for water use and net benefit would not arise in a basin as 
long as the agricultural soil and watering conditions are assumed to be the same for the 
same crops inside a basin. Changes of crop acres in these two basins do not affect the 
agricultural IBT gain and no other basins change in terms of agricultural net benefits. 
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3.2.5. Quantity of transferred IBT water  
In total, 307,303 acre-feet of water are transferred via three optimal IBT projects 
and explain the changes of water use in the whole basins (Table III-8). 
Overall, peak time for water transfer via the IBT projects is during the summer 
season from May through August, transferring 44.6% of annual IBT water.  
In the Luce Bayou Channel Project (LB IBT) which runs from the Trinity to the 
San Jacinto River basin for the industrial and mining sector, the model shows that 31.3% 
(169,260 acre feet) of the IBT water is transferred on average out of the annual 
maximum 540,000 acre-foot of the IBT water. Water is transferred most in March 
through May and July through September.  
In case of the LCRA-SAWS Water Project (LS IBT) from the Lower Colorado to 
the Guadalupe River basin, 65.7% (98,574 acre feet) of the IBT surface water is 
transferred out of the annual maximum capacity of 150,000 acre feet. The IBT water into 
San Antonio and Bexar County of the Guadalupe River basin is mainly transferred from 
May through September, and rather evenly or stably distributed among months than the 
other IBT projects, LB and CB IBT. This is probably due to the fact that the region is a 
resort area so that water should be needed stably in each month for the municipal use of 
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this rapidly growing travel-oriented place.  
The Cypress Basin Supplies Project (CB IBT) from the Cypress to the Trinity 
River basin transfers 44.9% (39,469 acre feet) of water out of annual maximum capacity 
of 87,900 acre feet. The IBT water transferred is highly variable across the states of 
nature and months.  
 
Table III-8. Average Monthly IBT Water Transferred (unit: acre feet)  
  Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Total 
LB IBT 7,164  7,600  17,766  15,245  16,273  10,556  25,457  23,739  15,580  10,237  10,448  9,195  169,260  
LS IBT 7,604  6,054  6,858  7,982  8,581  9,024  12,037  11,222  8,970  6,947  6,391  6,905  98,574  
CB IBT 1,445  4,042  3,841  2,593  2,526  809  5,769  10,947  4,375  891  330  1,901  39,469  
Total 16,212  17,695  28,466  25,820  27,379  20,390  43,263  45,908  28,925  18,075  17,169  18,001  307,303  
Note: IBT denotes Interbasin Water Transfers. LB/LS/CB denote Luce Bayou/ Lower 
Colorado - San Antonio/Cypress Basin 
 
3.2.6. Effects on water use 
Water use by sector and state of nature 
Water use changes are largest in the dry seasons (HDry, MDry, Dry and 
Dnormal) as is expected (Table III-9).  
Overall, agricultural water use does not change in the with-IBT scenario because 
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crop acres were not altered from irrigated to dry lands. Agricultural water use explains 
just a small portion of total water use (9-10%). Agricultural demand is not restricted in 
the model so that agricultural users are allowed to use water as much as they want 
regardless of the IBT projects. And all River and User IBT projects suggested by each 
regional group and TWDB are designed to supply municipal and industrial/mining water, 
not agricultural water as are the cases of three optimal IBT projects. Minor crop acre 
changes in the Brazos and Canadian river basins were exactly offset inside each basin so 
that there were no net effects as were already discussed. 
Industrial water use increases by 169,260 acre feet on average due to the Luce 
Bayou IBT. Municipal water use accounts for more than half of the total water use. The 
other two IBTs (LCRA-SAWS Water Project and Cypress Basin Supplies Project) 
increase municipal water use by 138,101 acre feet on average.  
 
Table III-9. Aggregate Water Use by Sector and State of Nature (unit: acre feet) 
without IBT 
SON HDry MDry Dry Dnormal Normal  Wnormal Wet MWet HWet average 
ag 248,497  243,818  247,188  235,018  281,652  231,834  276,532  228,319  265,192  259,501  
ind  791,740  789,661  789,321  793,185  789,006  794,082  789,830  794,375  793,449  790,617  
city 1,541,632  1,463,900  1,461,714  1,459,787  1,410,681  1,441,855  1,391,044  1,352,855  1,365,887  1,429,677  
total 2,581,869  2,497,378  2,498,224  2,487,990  2,481,339  2,467,771  2,457,407  2,375,549  2,424,528  2,479,794  
  98 
Table III-9. Continued 
with IBT 
ag 248,497  243,818  247,188  235,018  281,652  231,834  276,532  228,319  265,192  259,501  
ind  962,830  961,504  959,466  958,333  959,098  958,530  958,266  964,877  963,342  959,877  
mun 1,719,769  1,612,965  1,615,238  1,606,634  1,543,642  1,553,243  1,526,587  1,474,028  1,476,595  1,567,778  
total 2,931,096  2,818,287  2,821,893  2,799,986  2,784,392  2,743,607  2,761,385  2,667,225  2,705,130  2,787,155  
changes in water use due to IBT (with-without IBT) 
ag 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  
ind  171,089  171,843  170,145  165,148  170,092  164,448  168,436  170,503  169,893  169,260  
city 178,137  149,065  153,524  146,848  132,961  111,388  135,543  121,174  110,709  138,101  
total 349,227  320,909  323,669  311,996  303,053  275,836  303,979  291,677  280,602  307,361  
Notes: IBT/SON denotes Interbasin Water Transfers/climate states of nature from 
heavily dry (HDry) to heavily wet (HWet). ag/ind/city stand for agricultural/industrial & 
mining/municipal sector respectively. 
 
Water use in the river basins 
Water use increases in the Brazos, Colorado, Guadsan, Trinity and San Jacinto 
River basins, while it decreases in the Lavaca River basin if the changes less than 
± 0.1% are ignored (Table III-10). Water use in the Guadsan and San Jacinto River basin 
increases clearly as the amount of IBT water is imported to these destination basins. 
Water use in the destination basin Trinity also increases as water is imported into the 
Fort Worth municipality from the Cypress River basin. Water use in the IBT source basin 
Cypress does not change. 
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Table III-10. Water Use by Major Rivers (unit: acre feet) 
River without IBT with IBT changes % change 
Brazos  380,866 389,210 8,344 2.19 
Colorado (S) 294,159 295,489 1,329 0.45 
Canadian 9,015 9,015 0 0.00 
Red 23,327 23,329 2 0.01 
Sabine 98,349 98,362 14 0.01 
Guadsan (D) 195,223 293,855 98,632 50.52 
Sulphur  8,794 8,792 -2 -0.02 
Cypress (S) 15,496 15,496 0 0.00 
Neches  150,080 149,989 -91 -0.06 
Trinity (S, D) 169,578 209,125 39,546 23.32 
SanJacinto (D) 253,016 413,971 160,955 63.61 
Lavaca 64,994 63,626 -1,368 -2.10 
SanioNues 232 232 0 0.00 
Nueces  35,557 35,557 0 0.00 
Total 1,698,687 2,006,048 307,361 18.09 
Notes: IBT/S/D denote Interbasin Water Transfers/IBT Source/Destination basins.  
 
It is very interesting to find out that there are offsetting forces of water uses 
between some river basins as Table III-11 shows: industrial and mining water use 
between the Neches and Trinity River basin; municipal water use between the Sabine 
and Neches River basin; agricultural water use between the Colorado and Lavaca River 
basin; municipal water use between the Brazos, Colorado and San Jacinto River basin. 
The basin-wide net effect of water uses just reverts back to water use changes in the 
three destination basins, Guadsan, Trinity and San Jacinto after all those water uses are 
  100 
offset with each other.  
The offsetting forces of water uses in Neches-Trinity and Sabine-Neches have 
small magnitudes. However, it would be very characteristic to see that the IBT source 
basin Colorado increases its agricultural water use and the IBT-neutral basin Lavaca, 
where IBT water is not exported or imported, decreases the exactly same amount of its 
agricultural water use. Net increase of municipal water uses in Brazos and Colorado 
exactly matches decrease in San Jacinto. We have already seen that agricultural crop 
acres did not go through any major change that affects the basin-wide water use and net 
benefits.  
Agricultural and municipal water uses are offset in the neighboring basins of 
Colorado, Lavaca, Brazos and San Jacinto. Agricultural water users in Colorado County 
and Wharton County have three water sources to draw their water over the Colorado and 
Lavaca River basin. After IBT, these two counties switch water from Lavaca (GS1000, 
WGS800) to Colorado (K20000).  
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Table III-11. Water Use Changes by Sector and River (unit: acre feet) 
    Brazos  Colo- 
rado Sabine 
Guad- 
san 
Neches Trinity San  Jacinto Lavaca 
ag without IBT 40,293 114,560 0 55,302 0 0 0 7,286 
  with IBT 40,293 115,928 0 55,302 0 0 0 5,918 
  Changes 0 1,368 0 0 0 0 0 -1,368 
ind  without IBT 180,130 13,531 81,776 130,633 102,679 23,464 91,496 0 
  with IBT 180,130 13,531 81,776 130,633 102,602 23,542 260,756 0 
  Changes 0 0 0 0 -77 77 169,260 0 
city without IBT 160,443 166,068 16,572 9,288 47,401 146,114 161,520 57,708 
  with IBT 168,787 166,029 16,586 107,920 47,387 185,583 153,215 57,708 
  Changes 8,344 -39 14 98,632 -14 39,469 -8,305 0 
total without IBT 380,866 294,159 98,349 195,223 150,080 169,578 253,016 64,994 
  with IBT 389,210 295,489 98,362 293,855 149,989 209,125 413,971 63,626 
  Changes 8,344 1,329 14 98,632 -91 39,546 160,955 -1,368 
Notes: IBT denotes Interbasin Water transfers. ag/ind/city denote agricultural/industrial 
& mining/municipal sector respectively. 
 
This is a unique nature of water use pattern in the area. The part of the reasons 
would be that the agricultural users of these counties are located in the neighborhood of 
the control point (K10000) of the Lower Colorado River basin where the IBT water 
starts to go out of the basin.  
Municipal water users also substitute water between the Brazos, Colorado and 
San Jacinto River basin. Table III-12 shows this relationship. 
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Table III-12. Water Use Changes in Some Basins (unit: acre feet) 
Sector County River basin Control point without IBT with IBT Changes 
Colorado Colorado  K20000 46,326 31,621 -14,706 
Wharton Colorado  K20000 38,262 54,335 16,074 
  Sub-total 84,588 85,956 1,368 
Colorado Lavaca GS1000 74 68 -6 
Wharton Lavaca GS1000 3,159 2,233 -926 
Colorado Lavaca WGS800 831 856 25 
Wharton Lavaca WGS800 3,221 2,760 -461 
ag 
  Sub-total 7,286 5,918 -1,368 
Fort Bend Brazos BRRO72 91,383 99,688 8,305 
 Sub-total 91,383 99,688 8,305 
Montgomery San Jacinto A4963A 26,853 21,008 -5,845 
Harris San Jacinto A4964A 134,667 132,208 -2,460 
city 
  Sub-total 161,520  153,215 -8,305 
Notes: IBT denotes Interbasin Water transfers. ag/city denote agricultural/municipal 
sector respectively. 
 
It seems that there is a correlation of water use pattern in some geographical 
boundaries: one is Colorado-Lavaca- Brazos-San Jacinto that has a strong relationship 
based on water use changes; the other is Sabine-Neches-Trinity that has rather a weak 
relationship.  
The IBT-neutral Lavaca and Brazos River basins are adjacent river basins which 
are located inside the IBT exporting and importing basins: exporting Colorado and 
importing Guadsan in the south-western side, net exporting Trinity and importing San 
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Jacinto up in the north-eastern side. Lavaca is especially located in the down side near 
Gulf coast where more complex water routes are interacting. This geographical aspect 
could affect the water use pattern.  
Water use by major cities  
Water from User IBT projects goes to Fort Worth in the Trinity River basin and 
San Antonio in the Guadsan River basin (Table III-13). Imported water in the San 
Jacinto River basin is dedicated to the industrial and mining sector of Houston and 
Harris County. In the case of San Antonio, municipal water use is comprised of 
groundwater (108,473 acre feet) and surface water (106,073 acre feet), including IBT 
water. Increases in municipal water use of San Antonio and Fort Worth are accounted for 
by their imported IBT water. Houston and Dallas municipalities are not affected.  
 
Table III-13. Water Use by Major Cities (unit: acre feet)  
 
Dallas  Forth Worth Houston  San Antonio  City total  
without IBT 389,548 110,127 252,903 7,441 1,429,677 
with IBT 389,548 149,596 252,903 106,073 1,567,778 
changes 0 39,469 0 98,632 138,101 
Notes: Groundwater uses in San Antonio (=108,473 acre feet) and Houston (=136,179 
acre feet) are not included. IBT denotes Interbasin Water Transfers. 
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Flows to bays and estuaries 
The model variable ESCAPETOBAY is total freshwater inflows to all bays and 
estuaries (FWI). Such flows are desirable as they keep the bays environmentally healthy, 
recreationally enjoyable and productive in marine resources according to the definition 
of freshwater inflows (Loeffler, 2006).  
The FWI value is assigned $1 per an acre foot in our model. The FWI values are 
not subject to a market, thus not easily obtained. Furthermore, it is another issue to apply 
the values unilaterally into the model although we may find them because many different 
methodologies and assumptions are adopted for each of the non-market valuation (Han, 
2007). It will be a future research task to develop a model to obtain and incorporate 
those values in this model. But it is believed to be the first try to introduce an 
environmental freshwater inflows factor in an economic and hydrological model, and 
this will be investigated in the next chapter.  
We will take a look at the inflows changes in six major estuaries of seven river 
basins located in the Gulf of Mexico: Mission-Aransas Estuary in San Antonio-Nueces 
River (SanioNues), Guadalupe Estuary (Guadsan), Lavaca-Colorado Estuary 
(ColLavaca), Nueces Estuary (Nueces), Trinity-San Jacinto Estuary (Trinity, San 
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Jacinto), Sabine-Neches Estuary (Neches River). These are the economically and 
ecologically targeted areas by the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department (TPWD) and the 
Texas Water Development Board (TWDB). 
 The IBT causes increase of water flowing into the estuaries of the destination 
basins. The Guadsan and San Jacinto River basin show distinct increases in FWI. FWI of 
the Trinity River basin is severely reduced as water is transferred out (Table III-14). 
 
Table III-14. Freshwater Inflows to Seven Major Estuaries (unit: acre feet) 
Estuaries without IBT with IBT changes % change 
Guadsan (D) 1,903,993 1,957,821 53,828 2.83 
Neches  5,519,204 5,519,262 57 0.00 
Trinity (S, D) 6,020,715 5,873,003 -147,712 -2.45 
San Jacinto (D) 1,937,978 1,998,595 60,617 3.13 
ColLavaca 78,104 78,104 0 0.00 
SanioNues 565,403 565,403 0 0.00 
Nueces  504,298 504,298 0 0.00 
Total 16,529,695 16,496,486 -33,209 -0.20 
Notes: IBT denotes Interbasin Water Transfers. S/D denote IBT source/destination basin. 
 
We find a relationship among water transferred, return flows and FWI in Table 
III-15. For example in the Guadsan River basin, IBT water transferred into the basin is 
98,574 acre feet and its returned flows back in the basin is 54,216 acre feet when we 
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apply the municipal return flow rate (0.55; 98,574 acre feet*0.55=54,216 acre feet). Its 
final FWI in the simulation program reaches 53,828 acre-foot of water which is close to 
the amount of returned water computed with the return flow rate, which we call the 
expected FWI. Its error is 0.72%.  
In the case of the Trinity River basin, net remaining water in the basin after IBT 
water is transferred in and out is negative 147,552 acre feet (-169,260 acre feet 
transferred out + 21,708 acre feet returned from water transferred in). The error between 
the expected and final FWI is -0.11% in the Trinity River basin.  
However, the expected and final FWI in the San Jacinto River basin shows rather 
big difference (-5.06%) unlike the other two basins. This will be related to the fact that 
municipal water use diminishes by 8,305 acre feet in the San Jacinto River basin after 
IBT. This decreased amount is not accounted for in the expected FWI. But the decreased 
water use should have contributed to increasing the final FWI in the basin.  
There was not much change of water use and flows till water flows out of the 
basin as form of FWI ever since water is transferred into is used and returns back to the 
basin. 
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Table III-15. Water Transferred, Return Flows and FWI (unit: acre feet) 
Expected  
FWI (D) IBT 
project Source Destination 
Return 
flow rate 
(A) 
IBT water 
in dest. 
basin (B) 
Returned 
water 
(A*B=C) Final  FWI (E) 
Difference 
(D-E) * 
57,548 LB IBT Trinity San Jacinto 0.34  (ind) 
169,260 
(=X) 57,548 60,617 
-3,069 
(-5.06%) 
54,216 
LS IBT Colorado Guadsan 0.55  (mun) 98,574 54,216 53,828 
388 
(0.72%) 
-147,552 
 (=Y-X) CB IBT Cypress Trinity 0.55  (mun) 39,469 
21,708 
   (=Y) 
-147,712 
160 
(-0.11%) 
Total    307,303  133,472 -35,788 
-33,267 
-2,521 
(7.04%) 
Notes: The percentage rates in parentheses stand for difference rates (%) of the expected 
freshwater inflows (FWI) from the final FWI, say, (Expected FWI - Final FWI)/Final 
FWI. LB/LS/CB IBT denote Luce Bayou/ Lower Colorado - San Antonio/Cypress Basin 
Interbasin Water Transfers. 
 
3.2.7. Effects on flows of water  
Table III-16 shows the monthly flows of major river basins. For this flows 
computation, we took a weighted average flows of each control point of a river basin in 
each month, which is weighted with probabilities depending on the states of nature. For 
example, there are 77 control points in the Brazos River basin. We obtained the 77 
weighted average flows of Brazos in each month. Then, we computed the arithmetic 
average flows of Brazos in each month by adding the 77 monthly weighted average 
flows of Brazos and dividing the summed number by 77. The flow levels computed are 
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those monthly arithmetic average flows across the control points of each river basin. We 
wanted to look at overall average impacts of water flows in the source and destination 
basins when water is transferred from “somewhere” of a basin to “somewhere” of 
another, rather than in a specific IBT in- and out- point. This is because identification of 
the exact IBT points was difficult. The Colorado and Cypress are exporting basins, and 
the Guadsan and San Jacinto are importing basins. Trinity is a net exporting basin. 
 
Table III-16. Monthly Flows of Water (unit: thousand acre feet)  
without 
IBT 
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Total 
Brazos  88 55 34 42 82 54 16 10 16 38 16 45 496 
Colorado  71 32 18 24 48 37 14 13 23 85 11 24 400 
Canadian 1 1 1 1 8 11 14 12 5 3 2 17 75 
Red 57 21 47 24 86 48 51 14 53 25 27 17 469 
Sabine 59 313 104 78 119 64 27 10 51 29 180 160 1,194 
Guadsan 22 20 17 23 47 38 16 12 25 21 17 16 273 
Sulphur  35 48 50 54 69 33 14 4 10 23 38 50 427 
Cypress  35 15 20 24 22 10 8 6 3 5 21 28 197 
Neches  168 66 66 65 69 37 16 6 10 18 32 294 848 
Trinity 89 168 55 79 108 49 15 5 9 22 123 85 807 
SanJacinto 37 30 23 29 30 29 7 5 11 26 17 34 278 
Lavaca 15 17 9 17 25 24 4 2 17 15 11 11 168 
Nueces  5 6 5 6 13 18 8 10 17 18 7 4 117 
Total 681 791 449 465 727 450 211 109 251 327 501 786 5,750 
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Table III-16. Continued 
with IBT Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Total 
Brazos  69 66 35 42 87 50 16 9 16 35 18 52 496 
Colorado  21 82 18 20 47 35 17 11 24 85 10 31 400 
Canadian 1 1 1 2 7 9 10 11 8 4 2 18 75 
Red 46 27 54 39 70 56 30 14 54 41 23 16 469 
Sabine 65 77 130 141 134 70 20 10 47 110 348 41 1,194 
Guadsan 22 19 17 23 47 39 18 13 26 22 18 16 278 
Sulphur  34 48 51 54 69 33 14 4 11 23 38 49 427 
Cypress  30 14 16 27 18 10 7 5 9 7 11 35 189 
Neches  164 142 66 65 73 33 14 8 13 47 94 128 848 
Trinity 95 76 46 69 120 50 9 5 7 20 113 183 793 
SanJacinto 35 31 23 31 30 25 7 5 11 27 23 32 280 
Lavaca 15 17 9 17 26 24 4 2 17 15 11 11 168 
Nueces  5 6 5 6 13 18 8 10 17 18 7 4 117 
Total 603 605 472 535 740 450 173 106 262 455 716 615 5,735 
% change  Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Total 
Brazos  -21.47 20.39 3.82 -1.95 5.34 -6.91 3.16 -13.41 2.62 -6.31 17.1 14.5 -0.02 
Colorado  -69.89 153.07 3.11 -17.11 -1.9 -4.76 17.94 -15.02 3.92 0.13 -14.98 26.38 -0.01 
Canadian 5.1 -26.8 68.82 183.48 -12.46 -17.56 -28.14 -3.51 66.38 57.79 4.7 4.55 0 
Red -18.36 28.95 14.64 65.24 -18.21 15.2 -42.07 2.04 2.29 63.47 -15.77 -7.53 0 
Sabine 11.25 -75.41 24.76 80.32 12.33 9.72 -25.8 -2.39 -7.1 281.12 93.54 -74.39 0 
Guadsan  1.37 -2.05 1.83 0.15 -0.28 1.26 10.13 5.57 2.86 1.56 3.91 0.4 1.71 
Sulphur  -1.88 0.93 1.34 -0.95 0.49 -1.33 -0.87 0.38 5.44 1.66 -0.09 -1.29 0 
Cypress  -12.92 -7.82 -23.34 14.92 -16.21 4.37 -12.69 -21.87 153.42 48.73 -45.95 24.54 -3.67 
Neches  -2.5 114.25 0.44 0.45 5.95 -11.82 -12.58 26.79 34.05 159.01 194.72 -56.36 0 
Trinity  6.41 -54.89 -16.35 -13.06 10.21 3.03 -41.2 0.7 -20.56 -7.44 -7.84 116.03 -1.79 
SanJacinto -5.62 4.44 0.34 7.43 -1.04 -14 -2.25 4.1 -2.83 3.54 35.53 -7.59 0.45 
Lavaca 0 0 -0.05 0.58 2.76 0.69 -13.93 9 0 0 0 0 0.33 
Nueces  0 0 -0.04 -0.33 -0.08 0.21 -0.33 -0.01 0 0 0.34 0 0 
Total -11.39 -23.56 5.04 15.04 1.9 -0.01 -17.99 -2.15 3.99 39.1 42.89 -21.68 -0.26 
Notes: IBT denotes Interbasin Water Transfers. 
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After IBT, annual water flows decrease by 0.26% on average.8 The largest 
portion (44.56%) of annual IBT water is transferred in summer from May to August. 
During the same period, flows decrease (-1.78%) and occupy the least portion (25.64%) 
of annual flows (Table III-17). Flows tend to decrease when water is more transferred.  
Water flows in all source basins decrease. The Cypress and Trinity River basins 
decrease flows by 3.67% and 1.79%. The other source basin Colorado also decreases its 
flows by 0.01% after IBT, and one reason would be that the LCRA-SAW IBT begins 
from the Lower Colorado region so that its impact to flows will not be significant.  
As for water flows in the destination basins, the Guadsan River basin shows 
increased flows (1.71%). IBT water transferred to San Antonio is designed to be 
reserved in the reservoir (control point CP31 in the Guadsan River basin) which does not 
have an upward control point but several downward control points. The flows of the San 
Jacinto River basin also increase by 0.45%. 
 
 
                                            
8
 [(Annual total water flows with IBT – Annual total water flows without IBT)/ Annual 
total water flows without IBT]*100 
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Among the IBT-neutral basins, flows in Brazos decrease (-0.02%) but flows in 
Lavaca increases (0.33%). These are the basins where their water use increased / 
decreased respectively. Other rivers show no significant changes of flows compared to 
their flows without IBT.  
 
Table III-17. IBT Water Transferred and Water Flows 
IBT water and flows Jan-Apr May-Aug Sep-Dec Annual 
IBT water transferred (acre feet) 88,193 136,940 82,170 307,303 
Composition (%) 28.7 44.56 26.74 100.00 
without IBT (acre feet) 2,386,448 1,497,258 1,866,104 5,749,810 
with IBT (acre feet) 2,215,182 1,470,619 2,048,801 5,734,602 
% change -7.18 -1.78 9.79 -0.26 
Water flows 
Composition (with IBT,%) 38.63 25.64 35.73 100.00 
Notes: IBT denotes Interbasin Water Transfers. 
 
3.2.8. Relationship among water use, flows and freshwater inflows 
IBT relocates water and increase economic efficiency, contributing to increase of 
net benefit, say, IBT gain. We find the tendency that water use increases and water flows 
decrease in the IBT source and neutral basins. But they all increase in the destination 
basins. This is summarized in Table III-18. 
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Table III-18. Summary: Changes of Water Use, Inflows/Flows (unit: % changes) 
Source/ 
Destination River basins 
Water use 
(After IBT) 
FWI 
    (7 basins) 
Water 
flows 
Source Cypress  0 --- -3.67 
Source Colorado  0.45 --- -0.01 
Net source Trinity 23.32 -2.45 -1.79 
Destination Guadsan 35.55 2.83 1.71 
Destination San Jacinto  63.61 3.13 0.45 
IBT-neutral Brazos  2.19 --- -0.02 
IBT-neutral Lavaca -2.10 --- 0.33 
Total All rivers 18.09 -0.20 -0.26 
Total amount (acre feet) 307,361 -33,209 -15,208 
Note: Increasing rate (%) = (increased water with IBT / water amount without IBT)*100. 
Water amount is based on average after applying probabilities depending on the states of 
nature. IBT/FWI denotes Interbasin Water Transfers/freshwater inflows. 
 
Water use in the source basin Colorado increases in the agricultural sector, which 
is exactly offset by decrease of the sector in the Lavaca River basin. The Trinity River 
basin also increases its water use triggered by the water transferred into the basin. But 
water use in the Cypress River basin remains the same. One of the possible reasons 
would be that the Cypress River basin surrounded by the Sulphur and Sabine River basin 
is isolated from any other IBT source/destination basins, so that there might be no 
offsetting use changes. Water flows of all source basins decrease as are expected.  
In IBT-neutral basins, municipal water use in the Brazos River basin increases 
and its increase is offset by decrease of use in the San Jacinto River basin. And flows in 
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Brazos decrease as its water use increases. Water use in the Lavaca River basin decreases 
while water use increases by the same amount in the Colorado River basin, and water 
flows increase in Lavaca. 
In the destination basins, water use in the all three destination basins has 
increased. Water flows and freshwater inflows also increase in the Guadsan and San 
Jacinto River basin. As water is transferred in to the basins, water use increases and 
water returns back to flows which eventually flow out to bays and estuaries.  
Across all basins after IBT projects are implemented, total water use increases by 
18.09% (307,361 acre feet), but flows decrease by 0.26% (15,208 acre feet) and 
freshwater inflows in seven river basins decrease by 0.20% (33,209 acre feet). 
 
3.3. Conclusion 
This Chapter III investigates the implication of IBT implementation using the 
model developed in Chapter II. Three scenarios of the without- and with-IBT were 
analyzed: the first one is the baseline scenario without IBT projects; the second one is 
the IBT scenario without any restriction on IBT construction; the third one is the 
environmental restriction scenario which excludes twelve environmentally sensitive IBT 
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projects categorized by TWDB and regional planning groups. 
Three User IBT projects are selected: Luce Bayou Channel Project by Region H 
(Trinity to San Jacinto River basin); Cypress Basin Supplies Project by Region C 
(Cypress to Trinity River basin); LCRA-SAWS Water Project by Region L (Colorado to 
Guadsan River basin). Three big cities are related to these User IBT projects: Houston in 
Region H, Fort Worth in Region C and San Antonio in Region L. Water is mostly 
transferred during the summer season from May to August generally in all three IBT 
projects.  
IBT gains of the three optimal IBT projects and IBT costs for the non-optimal 
projects are provided. The annualized IBT gain from IBT projects amounts to $203 
million. We introduced the climate-driven water demand shifting factor to the municipal 
water demand to capture the economic effect of an uncertain climate factor.  
Agricultural users are unaffected by the IBT projects overall across Texas 
irrespective of minor changes, not altering crop mix, planting and harvesting decisions 
nor switching from irrigated to dry land production. This is because IBT water is not 
dedicated to agricultural purpose at all and agricultural water demand is not limited in 
the model.  
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Industrial and mining water users contribute 62.5% ($127 million) of the IBT 
gain due to Luce Bayou Channel Project. Municipal water users capture 37.5% ($76 
million) of the IBT gain from LCRA-SAWS Water Project and Cypress Basin Supplies 
Project respectively for the San Antonio and Forth Worth municipalities. The 
contribution of the municipal water use could be explained by its climate-driven water 
demand shifting factor, especially in dry seasons (HDry, MDry, Dry) when the climate-
driven demand shifting factor coefficients are very high.  
The aggregate of freshwater inflows to economically and ecologically important 
seven estuaries in the Gulf of Mexico decreases by 0.20%. However, the IBT destination 
basin San Jancinto and Guadsan emit freshwater inflows after the IBT projects. The 
definitions of environmental water flows such as instream flows and freshwater inflows 
are still being discussed in Texas Congress and state agencies. However, it is believed to 
be the first endeavor to introduce an environmental freshwater inflows factor in an 
economic and hydrological model.  
In summary, our finding is that implementing the IBT projects increases water 
use in the destination basins and generates substantial IBT gains. IBT generally reduces 
freshwater inflows and water flows in the IBT source and neutral basins. In the 
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destination basins, however, water use and water flows/freshwater inflows all increase. 
The overall impact in all basins is that water use increases but flows and freshwater 
inflows decrease. The relationship between water use and flows is also found seasonal. 
The largest portion of annual IBT water is transferred in summer from May to August. 
During the same period flows decrease and occupy the least portion of annual flows.  
In the IBT-neutral but IBT-adjacent basins, increasing water use and decreasing 
water flows are also observed and some interaction exists between these basins. The 
Brazos-San Jacinto-Colorado-Lavaca river basins are geographically interrelated where 
IBT influences each of the basins directly and indirectly. The ultimate basin-wide net 
effect of water uses reverts back to changes in water uses of the three destination basins, 
Guadsan, Trinity and San Jacinto after changes in water uses are offset with each other in 
the other neighboring basins.  
There are some limitations in our analysis. One is that the groundwater 
component is not introduced in our model, although it is partially considered in San 
Antonio, Houston and Harris County where they heavily count on the groundwater. Our 
modeling and analysis are based upon the surface water. This will restrict comprehensive 
understanding on water use, flows/inflows, necessities of IBT and their resulting changes 
  117 
in social welfare.  
Another is that more accurate information on IBT water in- and out-points in 
each basin must be identified to measure quantitative economic impacts of IBT. 
Qualitatively, more field based analysis should be carried out to see positive and 
negative impacts in each of agricultural, municipal, and industrial and mining sectors 
and their consequences to net benefits. The junior water rights status of water transferred 
needs to be incorporated in the future research.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF FRESHWATER 
INFLOWS TO TEXAS BAYS AND ESTUARIES 
 
4.1. Introduction  
In 1985, Texas passed legislation directing the Texas Commission on 
Environmental Quality (TCEQ) to consider the effect of granting a water right to 
instream uses and inflows to bays and estuaries. Instream use includes water that 
supports recreation, fish and wildlife habitat and water quality. Presently, TCEQ uses 
default values for calculating instream maintenance flows for perennial streams based on 
the 7Q2 value or the monthly median flows, whichever is higher.  
The 7Q2, the seven-day, two-year low flow, is defined as the lowest average flow 
for seven consecutive days which is expected to recur every two years based on 
historical daily flow data. But 7Q2 is not generally accepted as an appropriate tool for 
regulating instream flows because it does not allow for a buffer of safety between waste 
assimilation and degradation. 
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The monthly median flows are defined as: the water flow level that is 40% of the 
average median flow from October to February; the water flow level that is 60% of the 
average median flow from March to September. This is called the modified Lyon’s 
Method (Lyons, 1979; Loeffler, 2004). It results in two seasonal flow levels and each 
one should be met in every month during each of the two periods. This method has not 
been tested rigorously in the field and may not be acceptable for all of Texas basins. It 
also fails to address seasonal and monthly changes in flows.  
For these reasons, the instream flow studies which have been done by state water 
agencies so far are not comprehensive so that instream flow restrictions are conducted on 
a case-by-case basis, independent of basin-wide water uses. The instream flow 
restrictions are difficult to apply for several over-appropriated basins. Moreover, the vast 
majority of water rights were granted before 1985, and most surface water rights were 
issued without any environmental flow restrictions (Bradsby, 1994). 
Closely related to the instream flows studies, the Texas Parks and Wildlife 
Department (TPWD) and the Texas Water Development Board (TWDB) have jointly 
developed recommendations for freshwater inflows to bays and estuaries which will 
maintain the health and productivity of Texas estuaries. Legislatively mandated studies 
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to determine beneficial inflows necessary to conserve health and productivity of Texas 
major estuaries have been completed although some are being updated. (Loeffler, 2006). 
However, the instream flows and bay/estuary inflow restrictions have been 
discussed and evaluated so far without any consideration for their economic implications. 
Regarding this, the State of Texas Joint Committee on the Study Commission on Water 
for Environmental Flows suggests: “Further evaluation of existing and alternative 
regulatory and market-based approaches should be explored to provide for a more 
comprehensive and effective environmental flow program that addresses both river and 
estuarine needs for the state.” (The State of Texas Congress, 2004) 
This study attempts to look at the economic, hydrological and environmental 
implications of the recommended water levels on the Freshwater Inflows to Bays and 
Estuaries (FWIB recommendations) under a market-based approach, using the Interbasin 
Water transfers (IBT) model, TEXRIVERSIM developed in Chapter II. We attempted to 
investigate the acceptable levels of Texas instream flows and freshwater inflows but 
these two targets were too extensive to deal with in a single modeling setting.  
The FWIB recommendations by TPWD and TWDB were already too strict to be 
satisfied in every terminal control point of the FWIB-recommended river basins. Our 
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simulation results showed that just five out of seven river basins met the FWIB 
recommendations on average, but not in every state of nature, even when instream flows 
were not restricted at all. Only three FWIB recommendations were fully met when the 
FWIB recommendations were constrained in each state of nature. When we examined 
the instream flows restrictions simultaneously based on the monthly median flows, we 
found that it was very difficult to find the minimum instream flow levels that balance the 
hydrological flow balance equation. That is why we decided to resolve the FWIB 
recommendations first.  
The goal of the TEXRIVERSIM model structure is to maximize the annualized 
expected net benefit of water use under the constraints of the FWIB recommendations, 
IBT implementation, environmentally sensitive IBT restrictions, along with other 
constraints discussed in Chapter II and III.  
This will be the first academic and professionally evaluated study of the 
economic and environmental impacts of implementing the FWIB recommendations as 
well as IBT in Texas. The study results will constitute a test of the feasibility of Texas 
basin-wide water use and environmental flow management. 
 
  122 
4.1.1. Definition of freshwater inflows to bays and estuaries 
Beneficial inflows are defined as the minimum inflows necessary to provide a 
“salinity, nutrient and sediment loading regime adequate to maintain an ecologically 
sound environment in the receiving bay and estuary system that is necessary for the 
maintenance and productivity of economically important and ecologically characteristic 
sport or commercial fish and shellfish species and estuarine life upon which such fish 
and shellfish are dependent.” (Loeffler, 2006) Seven target species are considered: Blue 
crab, Eastern oyster, Red drum, Black drum, Spotted sea-trout, Brown shrimp and White 
shrimp. 
Based on this definition and target species, TPWD and TWDB developed the 
TxEMP optimization model which is an optimization model to obtain a range of inflow 
levels for estuarine health and productivity. The FWIB recommendations were generated 
using a statistical relationship between harvest or catch per unit effort and inflows. 
Finally, TPWD and TWDB obtained the minimum requirement levels of freshwater 
inflows two of which are called MinQ and MaxH. MinQ is a set of the minimum inflows 
that maintain 80% of the average historic harvest and all other physical constraints such 
as salinity, nutrient and sediment needs. MaxH is a set of the inflows necessary to sustain 
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the historic fisheries harvest as evaluated against existing fisheries data, which can meet 
the legislative definition of beneficial inflows. We will use the FWIB recommendations 
based on the MinQ definition in this analysis, which are less restrictive than the MaxH 
definition.  
 
4.2. Recommended MinQ Freshwater Inflows: The FWIB Recommendations 
We will treat inflows for six estuaries over seven river basins: Mission-Aransas 
Estuary that is fed by the San Antonio-Nueces River basin (SanioNues), Guadalupe 
Estuary (as fed by the Guadsan River basin), Lavaca-Colorado Estuary (ColLavaca), 
Nueces Estuary (Nueces), Trinity-San Jacinto Estuary (Trinity, San Jacinto), and Sabine-
Neches Estuary (Neches). These areas have the predefined FWIB MinQ levels 
recommended by TPWD and TWDB except for Lavaca-Colorado Estuary in which 
MinQ-salinity (MinQ-sal)9 is applied. The inflows are also recommended for estuaries 
fed by the Rio Grande River basin but are not treated here due to its omission in the 
TEXRIVERSIM model. We also should note that the FWIB recommendations have not 
                                            
9
 MinQ-salinity is based on maintaining estuary salinity level, not related to achieving 
fisheries harvest level. MinQ is not designated in the ColLavaca River basin. 
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been enforced to date. 
The FWIB recommendations are imposed on a monthly basis at the last control 
points of the major river basins where water flows out to bays and estuaries. The FWIB 
recommendations for freshwater inflows (MinQ) are summarized in Table IV-1. 
Annually, Neches Estuary has the highest FWIB levels and Mission-Aransas estuary in 
the SanioNues River basin has the lowest FWIB levels.  
 
Table IV-1. Recommended Freshwater Inflows (MinQ) to Estuaries (unit: acre feet) 
Estuaries Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul 
ColLavaca    79,600 84,700 141,200 175,400 274,100 266,100 129,700 
Guadsan       111,200 124,200 52,420 52,420 186,050 135,980 60,860 
SanioNues     2,940 5,010 2,980 2,890 4,020 3,330 1,480 
Nueces        2,230 2,780 4,410 5,180 32,140 19,990 6,980 
TrinitySanJac 150,500 216,700 363,900 352,600 679,700 448,100 232,700 
Neches        624,000 770,590 853,700 882,300 691,900 478,700 424,470 
 Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Annual 
ColLavaca     65,500 123,300 120,200 80,100 77,600 1,617,500 
Guadsan       60,850 52,420 52,420 73,830 66,200 1,028,850 
SanioNues     1,990 6,250 3,650 3,760 2,780 41,080 
Nueces        9,750 11,040 8,690 7,780 4,670 115,640 
TrinitySanJac 154,000 330,200 251,900 351,500 626,800 4,158,600 
Neches        361,810 574,600 537,900 237,510 574,020 7,011,500 
Source: Longley, W.L., ed. 1994, http://www.tpwd.state.tx.us/ 
Notes: MinQ-sal is applied instead of MinQ in the ColLavaca River basin. 
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4.3. Adding Freshwater Inflow Constraints to TEXRIVERSIM 
We will augment and use the model TEXRIVERSIM, developed in Chapter II 
and applied in Chapter III, to evaluate the economic, hydrological and environmental 
effects of the FWIB recommendations along with the IBT implementation. To depict the 
FWIB recommendations in the model, we added constraints. Freshwater inflows are 
captured with the variable ESCAPETOBAY and OUTTOBAY. The variable 
OUTTOBAY is defined for each river basin, the last river place (control point), state of 
nature, and month. Then, ESCAPETOBAY is the expected annual summation of 
OUTTOBAY for all of the last control points for the major river basins.  
The FWIB recommendations and the FWIB constraints will be interchangeably 
used throughout the analysis, though the former emphasizes the recommended water 
levels while the latter focuses on the constrained equations.  
We applied two types of the FWIB constraints. The first constraint is stricter and 
needs to be satisfied in every state of nature. The constraints will be called the FWIB 
State of Nature constraints (FWIB-SON constraints), in the form of: 
mRBmsRPRB MinQOUTTOBAY ,,,, ≥  where RB = river basin, RP = river place (control 
point), s = state of nature, m = month.  
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The corresponding GAMS code for the FWIB-SON constraints is: 
FWIB-SON (riverbasins, mriverplace, state, month).. 
OUTTOBAY (riverbasins, mriverplace, state, month)  
≥
 MinQ (riverbasins, month); 
The second type of the FWIB constraints is the FWIB Average constraints (FWIB-
Avg constraints) in the form of: 
mRB
s
msRPRBs MinQOUTTOBAYprob ,,,, ≥×∑  where prob = probability.  
The corresponding GAMS code for the FWIB-Avg constraints can be written as: 
FWIB-Avg (riverbasins, mriverplace, month).. 
Sum(state, prob(state)*OUTTOBAY(riverbasins, mriverplace, state, month) 
≥  MinQ (riverbasins, month);10  
The FWIB-Avg constraints are defined for each riverbasin, riverplace and month 
while the variable OUTTOBAY is also a function of the state of nature as well as each 
riverbasin, riverplace and month. The FWIB-Avg constraints are weighted by the 
probabilities of the states of nature to give some flexibility to accommodate more cases 
of the FWIB recommendations.  
                                            
10
 The exact GAMS code for the inequality notation “ ≥ ” is “=g=”. And “mriverplace” 
denotes a riverplace where an effective data set in the riverplace is available. The 
riverplace where a data set is not available is defined as “eriverplace” and was removed 
from the river flow linkage. 
 
  127 
The river basins in which the FWIB recommendations are set by the state 
agencies are originally six but seven basins will be constrained in the model. We set the 
FWIB recommendations on the last control point. But both of the control points in the 
FWIB-targeted TrintiySanJac River basin did not have the relevant data set available and 
were removed from the river flow linkage. As a result, there are no control points 
applicable for the FWIB recommendations in the TrinitySanJac River basin. To apply the 
FWIB recommendations, we separated the TrinitySanJac River basin into two river 
basins and set the recommendations in each basin. We divided the recommendations 
between the two basins based on the percentages of optimal freshwater inflow levels of 
the Trinity and San Jacinto River basins with no IBT, which were determined in Chapter 
III. That is to say, of the monthly FWIB recommendations in the TrinitySanJac River 
basin, 25% was applied to the San Jacinto River basin and the remaining 75% was 
allotted to the Trinity River basin. 
 
4.4. Decomposition of Welfare Gain: Total Gain, IBT Gain, FWIB Gain 
Total gain in net benefit is defined as the difference between the net benefit (NB) 
taking into account the FWIB recommendations and IBT and NB without taking into 
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account them. For clear notational purposes, the total gain is defined as: total gain = NB 
with FWIB and with IBT11–NB without FWIB and without IBT. We ran four scenarios 
as follows and obtained four types of net benefits: NB without FWIB and without IBT; 
NB without FWIB and with IBT; NB with FWIB and without IBT; NB with FWIB and 
with IBT. 
To trace the net effect of the FWIB recommendations and IBT implementation, we 
separated the total gain into two types of gain: IBT gain and FWIB gain.  
IBT gain is the gain from just the IBT implementation given the without- or with- 
FWIB recommendations. We will focus on the IBT gain under the given with-FWIB 
recommendations to see the IBT cost saving effect when the FWIB recommendations are 
being exercised. In Chapter III, we have seen that IBT tends to increase water use and 
net benefit.  
On the other hand, FWIB gain is the gain arising only from the FWIB 
recommendations given the without- or with- IBT implementation. And the FWIB gain 
under the given without-IBT implementations will be primarily used to obtain the pure 
                                            
11
 When “FWIB” is solely used without any other explanation, FWIB represents “the 
FWIB recommendations”. Likewise, “IBT” represents “the IBT implementation”. 
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FWIB gain without the impact of the IBT implementation. In the case of net benefits and 
water use, the FWIB gain is actually expressed as the FWIB “loss” because the FWIB 
recommendations will restrict water use and tend to decrease the net benefit. But the 
FWIB gain in terms of instream flows/freshwater inflows is expressed as the FWIB 
“gain” that protects and increases flows/inflows.  
The FWIB gain can be defined to cover both the “gain” (positive gain) and “loss” 
(negative gain). But for the purposes of this model, we will use the FWIB loss in terms 
of net benefits and water use while the FWIB gain will be defined in terms of flows and 
inflows. By the same token, the IBT gain will be used in terms of net benefit and water 
use while the IBT loss will be used in terms of flows and inflows as in Chapter II and III.  
From the definitions, we see their conflicting nature between FWIB and IBT. If the 
IBT gain is positive but the FWIB gain is negative (FWIB loss), the total gain depends 
on which dominates between the IBT gain and the FWIB loss. 
It would be convenient to formally define the notation of the FWIB gain or loss to 
avoid confusion for different consequences of the FWIB constraints: FWIB-NB is the 
change in Net Benefits due to the FWIB recommendations, FWIB-U is the change in 
water Use, FWIB-F is the change in water Flows, and FWIB-I is the change in 
  130 
freshwater Inflows to bays and estuaries. IBT gain or loss is similarly defined as IBT-NB, 
IBT-U, IBT-F and IBT-I. The notations will be defined again in each section of the 
chapter to improve readability. 
 
4.5. Results  
We analyzed the two scenarios of simulation: one with the FWIB-SON (state of 
nature) constraints and the other with the FWIB-Avg (average) constraints.  
First of all, the FWIB constraints were imposed to be satisfied for each and 
every state of nature (FWIB-SON). However, the FWIB-SON constraints could not 
satisfy the recommendations in the four basins, SanioNues, Trinity, ColLavaca and 
Neches, only satisfying the recommendations fully in the three basins, Guadsan, Nueces 
and San Jacinto. The recommendations for the basins ColLavaca and Neches were 
hardly satisfied almost in every state of nature in every month whereas the basins 
SanioNues and Trinity could meet them on average but not in some states of nature, 
depending on the month.  
Since the model TEXRIVERSIM found that the freshwater inflow 
recommendations could not be satisfied, we modified the constraints in order to consider 
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an option that is both feasible and to reflect the policy objectives of TPWD and TWDB. 
We applied the FWIB-Avg constraints instead of the FWIB-SON constraints.  
There are three reasons why this alternative constraint specification was adopted. 
First, the FWIB-SON constraints are simply impossible when the average constraints 
cannot be satisfied. Satisfaction of the average constraints is a required but not a 
sufficient condition for the satisfaction of the FWIB-SON constraints. The 
recommendations for the average constraints must be met first. 
Secondly, when there are large variations of inflow levels dependent on each 
state of nature, it is more difficult to meet the recommendations in some states of nature, 
and accordingly the recommended inflow levels under the FWIB-SON constraints 
should be lowered to satisfy the inflow levels in every state of nature than those needed 
under the FWIB-Avg constraints. The FWIB-Avg constraints can be more realistic if the 
policy mix of alternative approaches described below could achieve the policy goal and 
cost less, not needing to lower the recommended inflow levels further below the average 
level.  
Finally, even if the FWIB-SON constraints were possible, it will be costly to set 
the recommended inflow levels in each and every state of nature when the state is not 
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realized but exists probabilistically. There should be opportunity costs and searching 
costs that cannot be ignored in order to find the comprehensive inflow level table. These 
costs will further increase when inflow levels for each state must be readjusted, even 
under a small change of modeling assumptions such as groundwater demand portion. 
When the FWIB-Avg constraints are adopted, the FWIB recommendations could 
be met in five basins including SanioNues and Trinity, but still only partially in 
ColLavaca and Neches. To make the model feasible, we had to lower the minimum 
requirements of freshwater inflow levels in ColLavaca and Neches down to 1.5% and 
80% of the originally suggested levels. In the case of the Trinity River basin, it 
seemingly satisfied only 3% of the FWIB recommendations12 at one of the final control 
points of the basin where the FWIB constraints are applied.13 But when the two final 
                                            
12
 We tried 3% and 3.5% but not numbers that fall on between these two numbers. The 
FWIB recommendations were met at 3% but not at 3.5% in Trinity. Likewise in 
ColLavaca, the recommendations were met at 1.5% but not at 2%. And in Neches, 80% 
but not 85% could be satisfied. 
 
13
 Originally, there is the final river place in the Trinity River basin: 8TRGB. But this 
was removed because of unavailability of the data set. Then there are two river places in 
the basin where water flows out to the estuary: B4279A and B4279C. The FWIB 
recommendations are applied to each of these two river places.  
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control points were integrated and managed as one control point, Trinity met almost 
100% of the FWIB recommendations on average but not in every month. 
Nevertheless, the model TEXRIVERSIM found that it was not possible to satisfy 
100% of all the FWIB recommendations simultaneously in both of the FWIB-SON and 
the FWIB-Avg constraints. To check the model feasibility, we added an artificial variable 
that is called ARTFLOWBALANCE in the flow balance equation and in the objective 
function. The artificial variable in the objective function has a very big negative 
coefficient. When the model cannot satisfy the flow balance equations due to the strict 
FWIB recommendations, the artificial variable would have a strictly positive value and 
allow the constraint to be satisfied. And the strictly positive value causes a very big 
negative objective function value to signal that the model is “infeasible.” The amount of 
the artificial variable accounts for the approximate water level that needs to be 
compensated artificially to satisfy the FWIB recommendations. The policy options that 
enable the recommendations satisfied will be investigated in the freshwater inflows 
section that will follow. 
From here forward, we will report and analyze the FWIB results based on the 
FWIB-Avg constraints: the FWIB recommendations in the five river basins including the 
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SanioNues and Trinity River basin, after the minimum requirements of the FWIB 
recommendations in the ColLavaca River basin was lowered down to 1.5% of the 
originally suggested FWIB recommendations, and down to 80% of the original FWIB 
recommendations in the Neches River basin. The results will be based on the annualized 
expected values if there is no specific term in tables or texts to differentiate them from 
monthly or each state-of-nature based value. 
 
4.5.1. Optimal IBT projects chosen 
With the introduction of the FWIB recommendations and IBT implementation, 
the same three IBT projects were chosen as in Chapter III when there were no FWIB 
recommendations: Luce Bayou Channel Project (LB IBT); LCRA-SAWS Water Project 
(LS IBT); Cypress Basin Supplies Project (CB IBT). These will be discussed in the 
section of Quantity of transferred water via IBTs. 
LB IBT must have been selected by its low IBT costs, big size (annual maximum 
of 540,000 acre feet) and resulting contribution to the industrial and mining sectoral net 
benefit. The FWIB constraints also did not affect the choice of two municipal IBT 
projects. This implies that the IBT gain of these three projects in terms of the net benefit 
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(IBT-NB) are the greatest among all IBT projects and surpass the FWIB loss in net 
benefit (FWIB-NB) most.  
 
4.5.2. Overall and distributional economic gains from FWIB and IBT 
Overall, imposition of the FWIB recommendations will result in water use 
reductions which ultimately costs money. The FWIB induced loss in net benefits is the 
change (decrease) in net benefits due to the FWIB recommendations, and will be 
denoted as FWIB-NB. FWIB-NB, the opportunity cost estimate of the FWIB 
recommendations is denoted by the difference between the net benefit which was 
obtained due to the FWIB recommendations and the net benefit which could have been 
obtained without the FWIB recommendations. The total gain in net benefit is increased 
value in net benefit as a result of mutual reaction between IBT gain in net benefits (IBT-
NB) and FWIB loss in net benefits (FWIB-NB). Table IV-2 summarizes the net benefits 
and FWIB-NB according to the different FWIB constraint scenarios in the without- and 
with- IBT scenario. 
When there are no FWIB constraints, the total gain in net benefit is $203 million. 
This is the baseline scenario.  
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  After the FWIB-SON constraints are applied, the constraints restrict 100% of 
three river basins in every state of nature, leaving four unsatisfied basins unrestricted. 
The total gain in net benefit from the FWIB recommendations and the IBT 
implementation is $199 million ($203-$4 = $288-$89). We will now focus on IBT-NB 
with the FWIB recommendations ($288 million) and FWIB-NB without the IBT 
implementation ($-89 million).  
The case of the FWIB-Avg constraints is that the FWIB recommendations of the 
five river basins are met on average after lowering the minimum requirements of the 
ColLavaca River basin to 1.5% and those of the Neches River basin to 80% of the 
current recommendations. The total loss of $8 million in net benefit was generated, 
which consists of FWIB-NB without the IBT implementation ($-211 million) and IBT-
NB with the FWIB recommendations ($203 million). This total loss comes primarily 
from FWIB-NB in the Neches River basin where 80% of the FWIB recommendations 
were barely satisfied after a series of simulation. 
It is characteristically realized that the FWIB-Avg constraints, weighted by the 
probability of each state of nature, exhibit the same IBT-NBs in total and each sectoral 
net benefit in both of the without- and with- FWIB scenarios (Table IV-2).  
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Unlike the FWIB-Avg constraints, the net benefit of the FWIB-SON constraints 
without IBT is reduced more than that with IBT. FWIB-NB due to the FWIB-SON 
constraints is $89 million without IBT and $4 million with IBT. In other words, FWIB-
NB to the Guadsan, Nueces and San Jacinto River basins is greatly reduced to just $4 
million due to IBT, from FWIB-NB of $89 million when IBT is not available. We see 
that IBT greatly relieves the FWIB loss, FWIB-NB, by $85 million when the FWIB-
SON constraints are adopted. 
 
Table IV-2. Annual Net Benefit (NB) under the FWIB Constraint Scenarios 
Satisfied % of each river basin to the FWIB  NB (unit: $ million)  FWIB 
Constraint 
scenarios Guad-
san 
Nueces San Jacinto 
Sanio- 
Nues Trinity Neches 
Col-
Lavaca 
without 
IBT 
with 
IBT 
IBT-
NB 
No (=A) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 200,520 200,723 203 
FWIB - 
SON (=B) 100 100 100 0 0 0 0 200,431 200,719 288 
FWIB - 
Avg (=C) 100 100 100 100 100 80 1.5 200,309 200,512 203 
FWIB-NB 
(=B-A)        -89 -4 85 
FWIB-NB 
(=C-A)        -211 -211 0 
Notes: FWIB/IBT denotes freshwater inflows constraints/Interbasin Water transfers. 
SON/Avg represent state of nature/average. 
 
Gains by sector  
FWIB-NB, which is obtained from the difference between NB with the FWIB 
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recommendations and NB without the FWIB recommendations, recorded $178.64 
million in the industrial and mining sector and $32.63 in the municipal sector. The 
magnitude of these FWIB-NBs is the same in the without- and with- IBT scenarios 
(Table IV-3). Each sectoral IBT-NB also does not change. 
The contribution of IBT in net benefits is greatest in the industrial and mining 
sector ($126.98 million). This is attributed by LB IBT. But FWIB-NB dominates IBT-
NB in the industrial and mining sector whereas the IBT-NB dominates FWIB-NB in the 
municipal and freshwater inflows (FWI) sectors. Due to the industrial and mining sector, 
FWIB-NB dominates IBT-NB overall, leading to the total loss of $8 million with the 
introduction of the FWIB recommendations and the IBT implementation. Agricultural 
net benefit remains the same.  
Finally, FWI in the whole basins decreases by 0.09 million acre feet as IBT-NB (-
0.18 million acre feet) dominates FWIB-NB (0.09 million acre feet). This will be 
discussed later in the Freshwater inflows section.14 
 
                                            
14
 The value of freshwater inflows is assigned $1 per an acre foot of water. 
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Table IV-3. NB under the FWIB-Avg by Sector (unit: million dollars) 
NB without FWIB NB with FWIB 
  
  without IBT with IBT IBT-NB without IBT with IBT IBT-NB 
FWIB  
-NB 
ag 4.16 4.16 0.00 4.16 4.16 0.00 0.00 
ind  3,149.23 3,276.21 126.98 2,970.59 3,097.57 126.98 -178.64 
city 197,318.46 197,394.84 76.38 197,285.83 197,362.21 76.38 -32.63 
FWI 47.83 47.66 -0.18 47.92 47.75 -0.18 0.09 
Total 200,519.69 200,722.88 203.19 200,308.51 200,511.70 203.19 -211.18 
Notes: FWIB-Avg/IBT denotes freshwater inflows constraints/Interbasin Water transfers. 
ag/ind/city/FWI stand for agricultural/industrial & mining/municipal/freshwater inflow.  
 
Gains by basin 
After the FWIB constraints, the IBT implementation affects the industrial and 
mining net benefit of the San Jacinto River basin to increase by $127 million as IBT-NB 
(Table IV-4). But the industrial/mining sectoral net benefit from the Neches River basin 
with the FWIB constraints decreases sharply by $179 million, as FWIB-NB, from 
$243.7415 to $65.10 million in both of the without- and with- IBT scenario. In Neches, 
80% of the FWIB recommendations were strenuously met, which would restrict water 
use. The agricultural sector does not show differences. In the municipal sector, IBT-NB 
from Guadsan and Trinity dominates FWIB-NB. There is no FWIB-NB in four 
municipalities. Water uses for these cities are not affected by the FWIB constraints.  
                                            
15
 This amount comes from Chapter III, not from this table. 
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Table IV-4. NB under the FWIB-Avg by River Basin (unit: million dollars)  
sector rivers city / county  without IBT with IBT IBT-NB 
ag Brazos    0.49 0.49 0.00 
  Colorado    0.59 0.59 0.00 
  Canadian   0.02 0.02 0.00 
  Red   0.05 0.05 0.00 
  Guadsan   2.13 2.13 0.00 
  Nueces    0.89 0.89 0.00 
  ag total   4.16 4.16 0.00 
ind  Brazos    921.44 921.44 0.00 
  Colorado    45.67 45.67 0.00 
  Canadian   23.80 23.80 0.00 
  Red   27.78 27.78 0.00 
  Sabine   496.07 496.07 0.00 
  Guadsan   540.51 540.51 0.00 
  Cypress    45.82 45.82 0.00 
  Neches    65.10 65.10 0.00 
  Trinity   114.49 114.49 0.00 
  San Jacinto  Harris County  689.90 816.89 126.98 
  ind total   2,970.59 3,097.57 126.98 
city Guadsan San Antonio  29,954.41 30,015.11 60.70 
  Trinity Fort Worth  22,640.88 22,656.56 15.68 
  Trinity Dallas  32,147.09 32,147.09 0.00 
  San Jacinto  Houston  50,098.05 50,098.05 0.00 
  four cities   134,840.44 134,916.82 76.38 
  city total   197,285.83 197,362.21 76.38 
FWI     47.92 47.75 -0.18 
Total     200,308.51 200,511.70 203.19 
Notes: NB/ FWIB-Avg/IBT denote net benefit/freshwater inflows constraint/interbasin 
transfers. ag/ind/city/FWI denote agricultural/industrial & mining/municipal/freshwater 
inflow sector respectively. 
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4.5.3. Effects on agricultural production 
Agricultural production activities went through minor crop acre changes in two 
river basins, Canadian and Brazos, with the FWIB constraints, but those changes were 
offset between counties inside each of the basins (Table IV-5). The FWIB constraints and 
IBT did not affect the agricultural crop acres by basin, and agricultural water use did not 
change in any state of nature. This was already suggested when agricultural net benefits 
remained the same at the level of $4.16 million regardless of the FWIB 
recommendations and IBT implementations. In the agricultural sector, there were no 
costs of imposing the FWIB constraints and no gains from the IBT implementation. 
However, in the agricultural sector, we find it is characteristic that the Colorado 
and Lavaca River basins did not change their crop acres but water use increased in 
Colorado and decreased in Lavaca by the same amount, so that there was no net change 
in water use by the agricultural sector. Colorado is an IBT-source basin, and Lavaca is an 
IBT-neutral but IBT-adjacent basin. These two basins are not directly affected by the 
FWIB recommendations individually, though ColLavaca (Colorado-Lavaca) is the 
FWIB- recommended basin. These issues will be discussed in the water use and flows 
section.  
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Table IV-5. Crop Acres under the FWIB-Avg for Irrigated Crops (unit: acre) 
without FWIB with FWIB 
River County Crop without  
IBT 
with  
IBT 
IBT  
gain 
without  
IBT 
with  
IBT 
IBT 
gain 
Canadian Roberts winter  
wheat 14.9 18.21 3.31 26.41 37.70 11.29 
  Hansford winter  
wheat 29.38 28.42 -0.95 29.38 29.38 0 
  Hutchinson winter  
wheat 31.81 28.5 -3.31 20.30 9.01 -11.29 
  Dallam winter  
wheat 20.86 21.82 0.95 20.86 20.86 0 
  sub-total 96.95 96.95 0 96.95 96.95 0 
Brazos  Fisher cotton  
upland 1.1 1 -0.11 1.10 1.74 0.64 
  Fisher winter  
wheat 12.01 12.67 0.65 12.39 13.05 0.66 
  Nolan cotton  
upland 0.64 0.75 0.11 0.64 0.00 -0.64 
  Nolan winter  
wheat 78.39 77.73 -0.65 78.01 77.35 -0.66 
  sub-total 92.14 92.14 0 92.14 92.14 0 
All basins / all crops 12,825 12,825 0 12,825 12,825 0 
Notes: FWIB-Avg/IBT denote freshwater inflows constraint/interbasin transfers 
 
4.5.4. Quantity of transferred water via IBTs 
Three IBT projects were chosen: Luce Bayou Channel Project (LB IBT); LCRA-
SAWS Water Project (LS IBT); Cypress Basin Supplies Project (CB IBT). These 
projects were also chosen before the FWIB constraints were introduced. Between the 
with- and without- FWIB constraints, annual water transferred from IBT projects does 
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not change on average but changes on a monthly and seasonal basis (Table IV-6).  
Seasonal peak time for total water transferred via the IBT projects without the 
FWIB constraints was the summer season from May to August. 45.6% of water was 
transferred in summer. More water was transferred after the FWIB recommendations 
than before the FWIB recommendations (Table IV-7). IBT Water also increases during 
the months of September to December but decreases during the months of January to 
April, being contributed mainly by increase in November and decrease in February.  
 
Table IV-6. IBT Water Transferred by Month (unit: acre feet) 
without 
FWIB Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec annual 
LB IBT 7,164 7,600 17,766 15,245 16,273 10,556 25,457 23,739 15,580 10,237 10,448 9,195 169,260 
LS IBT 7,604 6,054 6,858 7,982 8,581 9,024 12,037 11,222 8,970 6,947 6,391 6,905 98,574 
CB IBT 1,445 4,042 3,841 2,593 2,526 809 5,769 10,947 4,375 891 330 1,901 39,469 
Total (A) 16,212 17,695 28,466 25,820 27,379 20,390 43,263 45,908 28,925 18,075 17,169 18,001 307,303 
with 
FWIB                           
LB IBT 5,557 3,953 19,942 18,113 17,093 9,307 24,743 24,600 16,769 5,910 17,436 5,838 169,260 
LS IBT 7,522 6,012 6,858 8,106 8,581 9,024 12,037 11,222 8,970 6,947 6,391 6,905 98,574 
CB IBT 2,637 724 1,656 1,712 4,339 623 7,996 10,572 1,938 2,455 1,162 3,656 39,469 
Total (B) 15,716 10,689 28,457 27,930 30,013 18,955 44,775 46,393 27,677 15,312 24,988 16,398 307,303 
B-A -496 -7,006 -9 2,110 2,634 -1,435 1,512 485 -1,248 -2,763 7,819 -1,603 0 
Notes: FWIB/IBT denote freshwater inflows constraint/interbasin transfers. LB/LS/CB 
denote Luce Bayou/ Lower Colorado - San Antonio/Cypress Basin. 
 
  144 
Table IV-7. Seasonal IBT Water Transferred under the FWIB-Avg (unit: acre feet)  
without FWIB Jan-Apr May-Aug Sep-Dec Annual 
IBT water transferred (acre feet) 88,193 136,940 82,170 307,303 
% of IBT water in each period 28.70 44.56 26.74 100 
with FWIB     
IBT water transferred (acre feet) 82,792 140,136 84,375 307,303 
% of IBT water in each period 26.94 45.60 27.46 100 
Notes: FWIB-Avg/IBT denote freshwater inflows constraint/interbasin transfers. 
 
4.5.5. Effects on water use 
Use by sector 
The FWIB loss in water use is the change (decrease) in water use due to the 
FWIB recommendations, denoted as FWIB-U.  
Overall increase in water use results from IBT especially in the dry states of 
nature, HDry, MDry, Dry and Dnormal (Table IV-8, Table IV-9). We know that under the 
FWIB recommendations much water was transferred during the summer months from 
May to August. IBT-U dominated FWIB-U so that water use increased in every sector 
except for the agricultural sector where no changes were realized for IBT-U and FWIB-
U. 
FWIB-Us between the without- and with- IBT scenario are the same. IBT-Us are 
  145 
also the same between the without- and with- FWIB scenario. We confirm this through 
the average water use by sector. The FWIB constraints reduce water use in the industrial 
and mining and municipal sectors.  
 
Table IV-8. Water Use under the FWIB-Avg (unit: acre feet) 
 without FWIB with FWIB FWIB-U 
without IBT    
ag 259,501 259,501 0 
ind 790,617 700,188 -90,428 
city 1,429,677 1,417,960 -11,717 
total 2,479,794 2,377,649 -102,145 
with IBT    
ag 259,501 259,501 0 
ind 959,877 869,448 -90,428 
city 1,567,778 1,556,061 -11,717 
total 2,787,155 2,685,010 -102,145 
IBT-U (=with-without IBT)   
ag 0 0 0 
ind 169,260 169,260 0 
city 138,101 138,101 0 
total 307,361 307,361 0 
Notes: FWIB-Avg/IBT denote freshwater inflows constraint/interbasin transfers. IBT-
U/FWIB-U denote IBT gain in use/FWIB loss in use. 
 
Table IV-9. Water Use under the FWIB-Avg by Sector (unit: acre feet) 
without IBT 
SON HDry MDry Dry Dnormal Normal Wnormal Wet MWet HWet average 
ag 248,497  243,818  247,188  235,018  281,652  231,834  276,532  228,319  265,192  259,501  
ind 701,081  699,859  699,821  700,075  699,425  704,445  699,821  700,863  699,402  700,188  
city 1,527,974  1,451,476  1,449,784  1,447,679  1,399,002  1,430,432  1,380,124  1,342,483  1,354,968  1,417,960  
total 2,477,552  2,395,152  2,396,793  2,382,772  2,380,080  2,366,712  2,356,477  2,271,666  2,319,562  2,377,649  
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Table IV-9. Continued 
with IBT 
SON HDry MDry Dry Dnormal Normal Wnormal Wet MWet HWet average 
ag 248,497  243,818  247,188  235,018  281,652  231,834  276,532  228,319  265,192  259,501  
ind 873,046  870,179  867,837  869,396  867,837  872,528  867,837  876,362  871,562  869,448  
city 1,706,111  1,600,541  1,603,308  1,594,527  1,531,963  1,541,820  1,515,667  1,463,657  1,465,677  1,556,061  
total 2,827,654  2,714,537  2,718,333  2,698,941  2,681,453  2,646,183  2,660,037  2,568,339  2,602,431  2,685,010  
with-without IBT 
SON HDry MDry Dry Dnormal Normal Wnormal Wet MWet HWet average 
ag 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  
ind 171,965  170,320  168,017  169,321  168,412  168,082  168,017  175,499  172,160  169,260  
city 178,137  149,065  153,524  146,848  132,961  111,388  135,543  121,174  110,709  138,101  
total 350,103  319,385  321,541  316,169  301,373  279,471  303,560  296,673  282,869  307,361  
Notes: FWIB-Avg/IBT denote freshwater inflows constraint/interbasin transfers. SON 
denotes states of nature from heavily dry (HDry) to heavily wet (HWet). ag/ind/city 
stand for agricultural/industrial & mining/municipal sector respectively. 
 
Table IV-10 shows how much water use has increased/decreased in each sector 
and state of nature in both of the FWIB-Avg and FWIB-SON constraints. The absolute 
magnitude of the changes in water use cannot be compared between the two FWIB 
constraint scenarios because their constraint conditions are different: the FWIB-Avg 
constraints are satisfied in the five river basins along with two partially satisfied basins; 
but the FWIB-SON constraints are only fully met in the three basins, lifting the 
minimum requirements of the FWIB recommendations in four unsatisfied basins. 
When the FWIB-Avg constraints are applied, changes in water use in each state 
of nature are not deviating far from the average of the changes (see the last column of 
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Table IV-10) in both the without- and with- IBT scenario. Also, the average of the 
changes in water use by sector is the same in the without- and with- IBT scenario.  
However, compared to the FWIB-Avg constraints, when the FWIB-SON 
constraints are applied, the changes in water use in each state of nature are deviating 
further away from the average of those changes in both the without- and with- IBT 
scenario. The deviations from the average of those changes are higher in the without-IBT 
scenario than in the with-IBT scenario. The average of the changes in water use shows 
that the FWIB-U effect disappears distinctly in the industrial/mining and municipal 
sectors when IBT is implemented with the FWIB-SON constraints. The average of the 
changes in water use in these two sectors is zero. IBT shows the FWIB loss relieving 
effect in the FWIB-SON scenario. 
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Table IV-10. Water Use Changes: FWIB-Avg vs. FWIB-SON (unit: acre feet)  
Under the FWIB-Avg constraints: water use with FWIB – water use without FWIB 
without IBT 
SON HDry MDry Dry Dnormal Normal  Wnormal Wet MWet HWet average 
ag 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ind  -90,659 -89,802 -89,500 -93,110 -89,581 -89,637 -90,009 -93,512 -94,047 -90,429 
city -13,658 -12,424 -11,930 -12,108 -11,679 -11,423 -10,920 -10,372 -10,919 -11,717 
total -104,317 -102,226 -101,431 -105,218 -101,259 -101,059 -100,930 -103,883 -104,966 -102,145 
with IBT 
ag 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ind  -89,784 -91,325 -91,629 -88,937 -91,261 -86,002 -90,429 -88,515 -91,780 -90,429 
mun -13,658 -12,424 -11,930 -12,107 -11,679 -11,423 -10,920 -10,371 -10,918 -11,717 
total -103,442 -103,750 -103,560 -101,045 -102,939 -97,424 -101,348 -98,886 -102,699 -102,145 
Under the FWIB-SON constraints: water use with FWIB – water use without FWIB 
without IBT 
SON HDry MDry Dry Dnormal Normal  Wnormal Wet MWet HWet average 
ag -56,352 -55,291 -55,594 -49,551 -45,944 -48,385 -45,979 -45,948 -45,961 -49,344 
ind  -88,317 -27,909 -16,365 -12,057 7,409 -9,117 8,913 10,884 7,526 -7,718 
city 3,014 -359 -38 -1,005 47 -133 -876 158 844 -3 
total -141,655 -83,558 -71,998 -62,613 -38,488 -57,635 -37,942 -34,906 -37,591 -57,064 
with IBT 
ag -56,352 -55,291 -55,036 -49,374 -45,944 -46,253 -45,979 -45,948 -45,961 -49,082 
ind  -5,270 -3,848 -1,750 4,600 -72 4,390 1,181 -1,346 2,281 0 
mun 10,412 4,989 3,066 1,702 -3,508 2,399 -4,080 -2,923 -2,337 0 
total -51,211 -54,150 -53,720 -43,072 -49,524 -39,465 -48,877 -50,218 -46,017 -49,081 
Notes: FWIB-Avg/IBT denote freshwater inflows constraint/interbasin transfers. SON 
denotes states of nature from heavily dry (HDry) to heavily wet (HWet). ag/ind/city 
stand for agricultural/industrial & mining/municipal sector respectively. 
 
Water use by river basins  
The total gain in water use (in the ninth column in Table IV-11) consists of IBT-U 
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with the FWIB recommendations (=C in the seventh column) plus FWIB-U without IBT 
(=B-A in the eighth column). FWIB-U of each river basin may differ in the without- and 
with- IBT scenarios, unlike the sectoral gain or loss in the average constraints, but total 
FWIB-U in all river basins is the same in both of the IBT scenarios. 
As a result of the implementation of IBT with the FWIB recommendations, water 
use has increased in the IBT destination basins, Guadsan, Trinity and San Jacinto, and in 
the IBT neutral basins, Brazos and Lavaca. However, along with the IBT source basin 
Colorado, water use is drastically reduced in the FWIB-recommended Neches River 
basin by 102,313 acre feet (150,080 → 47,767 acre feet) as total loss, which amounts to 
the magnitude of the entire FWIB-U (-102,145 acre feet) in all basins. This is caused by 
the fact that the basin had to barely satisfy 80% of the FWIB recommendations.  
The FWIB loss, FWIB-U, are found to be distinct in Neches, San Jacinto (-
19,388 acre feet in municipality) and Lavaca (-1,731 acre feet in agriculture).  
Based on FWIB-U, changes in water use are offset between Brazos and San 
Jacinto as well as between Colorado and Lavaca, approximately. The net effect of 
FWIB-U in these four basins becomes zero. This effect is also visible based on the effect 
of IBT-U in detail by river and sector as follows. 
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Table IV-11. Water Use under the FWIB-Avg by River (unit: acre feet) 
without FWIB with FWIB 
River without  
IBT (A) 
with  
IBT IBT-U 
without  
IBT (B) 
with  
IBT 
IBT-U 
(C) 
FWIB-U 
(B-A) 
Total 
Gain 
(B-A+C) 
Brazos  380,866 389,210 8,344 400,391 389,164 -11,227 19,525 8,298 
Colorado (S) 294,159 295,489 1,329 295,754 289,931 -5,823 1,595 -4,228 
Canadian 9,015 9,015 0 9,015 9,015 0 0 0 
Red 23,327 23,329 2 23,329 23,326 -3 2 -1 
Sabine 98,349 98,362 14 98,379 98,379 0 30 30 
Guadsan (D) 195,223 293,855 98,632 195,223 293,855 98,632 0 98,632 
Sulphur  8,794 8,792 -2 8,792 8,795 3 -2 1 
Cypress (S) 15,496 15,496 0 15,496 15,496 0 0 0 
Neches  150,080 149,989 -91 47,767 47,767 0 -102,313 -102,313 
Trinity (S, D) 169,578 209,125 39,546 169,716 209,185 39,469 138 39,607 
SanJacinto (D) 253,016 413,971 160,955 233,628 414,379 180,751 -19,388 161,363 
Lavaca 64,994 63,626 -1,368 63,263 68,822 5,560 -1,731 3,828 
SanioNues 232 232 0 232 232 0 0 0 
Nueces  35,557 35,557 0 35,557 35,557 0 0 0 
Total 1,698,687 2,006,048 307,361 1,596,542 1,903,902 307,361 -102,145 205,215 
Notes: FWIB-Avg/IBT denote freshwater inflows constraint/interbasin transfers. S/N 
denote source/destination. IBT-U denotes IBT gain in use. 
 
Increased water use in a basin due to IBT is offset by the same amount of 
decreased water use in another basin. This was observed in Chapter III in the agricultural 
sector between the Colorado and Lavaca River basins, industrial and mining sector 
between the Neches and Trinity River basins, municipal sector between the Brazos, 
Colorado and San Jacinto River basins, and finally between the Sabine and Neches River 
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basins (Table IV-12). These offsetting IBT effects also occur after the FWIB constraints, 
but the effects are intensified. The effects can be found again in agricultural water use 
between the Colorado and Lavaca River basins and also in municipal water use between 
the Brazos, Colorado and San Jacinto River basins. However, the offsetting effects of 
other basins vanish. Ultimately, basin-wide changes in water use occur only in the IBT 
destination basins, Guadsan, Trinity and San Jacinto. 
It is interesting that water use has increased in the IBT/FWIB-neutral Lavaca 
River basin after IBT under the FWIB constraints. Water use decreased due to the FWIB 
recommendations (FWIB-U) in the Lavaca River basin but IBT-U dominated FWIB-U. 
As stated in Chapter III, some agricultural users of the Colorado and Wharton County 
belong to both the Colorado and Lavaca River basins. Before the FWIB 
recommendations but after the IBT implementation, the agricultural users drew more 
water from the Colorado River basin and less water was drawn from the Lavaca River 
basin. Part of the reason is that these agricultural users of Colorado and Wharton County 
are located in the neighborhood of the control point (K10000) of the Lower Colorado 
River basin where the IBT water began to be transferred from the basin. But after the 
FWIB recommendations, the situation was reversed, resulting in more water being 
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drawn from Lavaca and less from Colorado.  
 
Table IV-12. Water Use under the FWIB-Avg by Sector and River (unit: acre feet) 
without FWIB Brazos  Colo- 
rado Sabine 
Guad- 
san 
Neches  Trinity San  Jacinto Lavaca 
ag without IBT 40,293 114,560 0 55,302 0 0 0 7,286 
  with IBT 40,293 115,928 0 55,302 0 0 0 5,918 
  Changes 0 1,368 0 0 0 0 0 -1,368 
ind  without IBT 180,130 13,531 81,776 130,633 102,679 23,464 91,496 0 
  with IBT 180,130 13,531 81,776 130,633 102,602 23,542 260,756 0 
  Changes 0 0 0 0 -77 77 169,260 0 
city without IBT 160,443 166,068 16,572 9,288 47,401 146,114 161,520 57,708 
  with IBT 168,787 166,029 16,586 107,920 47,387 185,583 153,215 57,708 
  Changes 8,344 -39 14 98,632 -14 39,469 -8,305 0 
total without IBT 380,866 294,159 98,349 195,223 150,080 169,578 253,016 64,994 
  with IBT 389,210 295,489 98,362 293,855 149,989 209,125 413,971 63,626 
  Changes 8,344 1,329 14 98,632 -91 39,546 160,955 -1,368 
with FWIB         
ag without IBT 40,293 116,292 0 55,302 0 0 0 5,554 
  with IBT 40,293 110,732 0 55,302 0 0 0 11,114 
  Changes 0 -5,560 0 0 0 0 0 5,560 
ind  without IBT 180,130 13,531 81,776 130,633 12,114 23,602 91,496 0 
  with IBT 180,130 13,531 81,776 130,633 12,114 23,602 260,756 0 
  Changes 0 0 0 0 0 0 169,260 0 
city without IBT 179,968 165,931 16,603 9,288 35,653 146,114 142,132 57,708 
  with IBT 168,740 165,667 16,603 107,920 35,653 185,583 153,623 57,708 
  Changes -11,227 -264 0 98,632 0 39,469 11,491 0 
total without IBT 400,391 295,754 98,379 195,223 47,767 169,716 233,628 63,263 
  with IBT 389,164 289,931 98,379 293,855 47,767 209,185 414,379 68,822 
  Changes -11,227 -5,823 0 98,632 0 39,469 180,751 5,560 
Notes: FWIB-Avg/IBT denote freshwater inflows constraint/interbasin transfers. 
ag/ind/city stand for agricultural/industrial & mining/municipal sector respectively. 
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The other offsetting change occurred in municipality between the Brazos and San 
Jacinto River basin. Before the FWIB recommendations, San Jacinto imported 169,260 
acre feet of IBT water and used 160,955 acre feet of it in the basin. The difference of 
8,305 acre feet went to the users of Brazos. After the FWIB recommendations, the 
amount that went to the users of Brazos contracted to 7,897 acre feet (169,260 acre feet 
of imported IBT water–161,363 acre feet of water use). Table IV-13 summarizes this. 
In summary, agricultural water use in Lavaca and Colorado offset each other, and 
municipal use in Brazos, San Jacinto and Colorado offset one another as well. 
We should note again that the issues involved in water rights are not incorporated 
in the simulation model. If water rights were introduced, it would not be possible for a 
user without water rights to divert the IBT water, even though the user is near the water 
basin. For instance, the water from LS IBT that runs from the Lower Colorado to the 
Guadsan River basins is allowed only for municipal use.  
In case where the agricultural sector is not a specified user and has no water 
rights, that user may not divert the IBT water. But the consequence of the offsetting 
effect in water use deserves to be investigated in the future research.  
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Table IV-13. Water Use Changes in Some Basins (unit: acre feet) 
without FWIB with FWIB 
County River basin 
Control  
point Without 
IBT 
with  
IBT 
IBT 
gain 
without 
IBT 
with  
IBT 
IBT 
gain 
FWIB 
gain 
Total 
gain 
Agricultural water use         
Colorado  Colorado  K20000 46,326 31,621 -14,706 47,071 47,638 567 745 1,312 
Wharton Colorado  K20000 38,262 54,335 16,074 39,248 33,122 -6,126 986 -5,140 
  Sub-total 84,588 85,956 1,368 86,320 80,760 -5,560 1,732 -3,828 
Colorado  Lavaca GS1000 74 68 -6 64 99 35 -10 25 
Wharton Lavaca GS1000 3,159 2,233 -926 2,512 6,607 4,095 -647 3,448 
Colorado  Lavaca WGS800 831 856 25 397 592 194 -434 -240 
Wharton Lavaca WGS800 3,221 2,760 -461 2,580 3,816 1,236 -641 595 
  Sub-total 7,286 5,918 -1,368 5,554 11,114 5,560 -1,732 3,828 
Municipal water use         
Fort Bend  Brazos  BRRO72 91,383 99,688 8,305 110,771 99,280 -11,491 19,388 7,897 
  Sub-total 91,383 99,688 8,305 110,771 99,280 -11,491 19,388 7,897 
Montgomery  San Jacinto A4963A 26,853 21,008 -5,845 15,701 22,210 6,509 -11,152 -4,643 
Harris San Jacinto A4964A 134,667 132,208 -2,460 126,432 131,413 4,981 -8,235 -3,254 
  Sub-total 161,520 153,215 -8,305 142,132 153,623 11,491 -19,388 -7,897 
Notes: FWIB/IBT denote freshwater inflows constraints/Interbasin Water Transfers.  
 
Use by major cities 
All of the four municipalities are not affected by the FWIB recommendations. 
There is no difference between municipal water use in the four municipalities before and 
after the FWIB constraints (Table IV-14).  
One of the reasons would be that changes in municipal water use are offset 
between the Brazos, Colorado and San Jacinto River basins and not affect the municipal 
water use in these four cities.  
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IBT increases municipal water use in Forth Worth and San Antonio. However, 
municipal water use in Dallas and Houston does not change at all under both of the 
FWIB and IBT implementation.  
 
Table IV-14. Water Use under the FWIB-Avg by Major Cities (unit: acre feet)  
without FWIB = with FWIB 
  Dallas  Forth Worth Houston  San Antonio  City total 
without IBT 389,548 110,127 252,903 7,441 1,417,960 
with IBT 389,548 149,596 252,903 106,073 1,556,061 
IBT-U 0 39,469 0 98,632 138,101 
Notes: Groundwater uses in San Antonio (=108,473 acre feet) and Houston (=136,179 
acre feet) are not included. FWIB_Avg/IBT denote freshwater inflows constraint/ 
Interbasin Water Transfers. IBT-U denotes IBT gain in use. 
 
4.5.6. Freshwater inflows into bays and estuaries 
The FWIB gain in freshwater inflows is the change (increase) in freshwater 
inflows due to the FWIB recommendations, denoted as FWIB-I. The FWIB 
recommendations are supposed to protect freshwater inflows. As a result of the FWIB 
recommendations, the total gain in freshwater inflows (FWI) shows that FWI increases 
because FWIB-I in the Neches River basin (+89,996 acre feet) dominates IBT-I in all 
basins (-42,218 acre feet). Water transferred to the IBT destination basins Guadsan and 
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San Jacinto contributes to increasing FWI (Table IV-15). 
In the optimal state, most river basins fully satisfy the FWIB recommendations 
above the minimum requirements of FWI except in two basins. In the case of the 
ColLavaca River basin where it only functions to flow out to the estuary, only an annual 
maximum of 5% of the FWIB recommendations can be met in the optimal state when 
the minimum requirements in the FWIB-Avg constraints are given 1.5% of the FWIB 
recommendations. The Neches River basin satisfies up to 80% of the minimum 
requirements under no IBT, increasing FWI by 89,996 acre feet from the without-FWIB 
optimal level. There is no IBT-I but only FWIB-I in this basin based on the with-FWIB 
scenario. 
In total, IBT reduces FWI by 42,218 acre feet as IBT-I under the with-FWIB 
scenarios. The FWIB-targeted and IBT destination basins, Guadsan and San Jacinto, 
show increases in FWI, partially offsetting decreases in the FWIB-targeted and IBT net 
source basin, Trinity.  
Overall, FWIB-I dominates IBT-I so that the total gain in FWI reaches positive 
56,477 acre feet in the whole river basins. 
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Table IV-15. Freshwater Inflows to Seven Major Estuaries (unit: acre feet) 
 without FWIB with FWIB 
Estuaries without  IBT 
with  
IBT IBT-I 
without  
IBT 
with IBT 
(=A) IBT-I 
 FWIB*  
(=B) (A/B) 
Guadsan 1,903,993  1,957,821  53,828  1,903,993  1,957,821  53,828  1,028,850  1.90  
Neches  5,519,204  5,519,262  57  5,609,200  5,609,200  0  7,011,500  0.80  
Trinity 6,020,715  5,873,003  -147,712  6,020,596  5,872,936  -147,661  3,118,950  1.88  
San Jacinto 1,937,978  1,998,595  60,617  1,946,795  1,998,410  51,614  1,039,650  1.92  
ColLavaca 78,104  78,104  0  78,104  78,104  0  1,617,500  0.05  
SanioNues 565,403  565,403  0  565,403  565,403  0  41,080  13.76  
Nueces  504,298  504,298  0  504,298  504,298  0  115,640  4.36  
Total 16,529,695  16,496,486  -33,209  16,628,390  16,586,171  -42,218  13,973,170  1.19  
Notes: FWIB/IBT denote freshwater inflows constraint/Interbasin Water Transfers. IBT-I 
denotes IBT loss in freshwater inflows. 
 
Policy options 
Our analysis of the FWIB issue and its relationship to IBT reveals that the 
FWIB recommendations can be met in more river basins based on averages than when 
the model is based on each state of nature. This suggests the need for policy changes by 
TPWD and TWDB. Under the FWIB-Avg constraints, the policy options can work 
independent of others but sometimes they should be mixed together as follows:  
(1) The first policy option is to lower the recommended inflow levels as the 
inflow levels of ColLavaca and Neches were lowered by the same percentage changes 
over the months. This alternative is feasible, less costly under the FWIB-Avg constraints 
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than under the FWIB-SON constraints, and merits study by ecologists. Table IV-16 (a, b, 
c) can be a basis to compute the shortages of optimal inflow levels against the 
recommended inflow levels.  
 
Table IV-16a. Freshwater Inflows to ColLavaca-Colorado (unit: 1000 acre feet) 
ColLavaca- 
Colorado 
interbasin 
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec sum 
ColLavaca HDry 2  4  0  1  0  3  0  0  0  5  0  1  17  
GS1300 MDry 3  6  1  2  2  5  1  1  3  4  1  1  28  
 Dry 1  2  1  3  8  11  0  3  9  9  2  5  54  
 Dnormal 8  4  3  1  19  3  0  0  2  30  4  2  78  
 Normal 4  9  5  7  9  8  7  1  5  16  6  5  83  
 Wnormal 6  2  1  3  8  10  3  2  2  24  0  9  72  
 Wet 14  13  6  7  10  16  2  1  6  3  5  7  91  
 MWet 33  16  12  24  10  4  15  2  40  1  2  20  176  
 HWet 11  23  9  30  23  23  2  0  1  27  16  3  169  
 average 7  8  4  7  10  9  3  1  6  13  4  5  78  
Colorado HDry 22  27  3  0  0  0  0  2  23  17  5  10  110  
K10000 MDry 21  32  23  0  0  13  0  14  47  27  25  19  221  
 Dry 34  36  29  13  34  3  0  15  63  144  203  113  685  
 Dnormal 73  122  66  27  285  41  12  18  51  141  54  76  965  
 Normal 64  1,435  249  368  352  407  146  23  133  1,703  159  216  5,255  
 Wnormal 63  93  47  53  142  130  25  34  48  155  34  65  890  
 Wet 199  113  271  71  388  652  83  41  139  135  91  72  2,256  
 MWet 303  177  79  262  198  156  80  28  122  30  26  223  1,684  
 HWet 226  1,664  412  403  1,722  626  62  38  140  343  134  76  5,847  
 average 92  580  156  163  310  272  65  24  95  599  108  118  2,584  
Two basin average (A) 99  588  160  170  320  282  69  25  101  612  112  123  2,662  
ColLavaca FWIB (B) 80  85  141  175  274  266  130  66  123  120  80  78  1,618  
A/B, % 124  695  113  97  117  106  53  38  82  509  140  159  165  
Notes: FWIB denotes freshwater inflows constraint. HDry through HWet denote states 
of nature from heavily dry to heavily wet. GS1300 and K10000 are control points. 
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Table IV-16b. Freshwater Inflows to Neches-Sabine (unit: 1000 acre feet) 
Neches-Sabine 
interbasin Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec sum 
Neches HDry 113  193  95  61  157  54  32  16  63  18  162  61  1,024  
NEBA MDry 166  189  270  308  144  34  44  43  72  21  170  232  1,692  
 Dry 114  93  200  1,996  313  160  61  44  82  62  38  354  3,518  
 Dnormal 160  272  499  601  827  117  33  30  49  264  57  78  2,987  
 Normal 190  567  414  345  664  357  572  349  108  1,026  109  381  5,082  
 Wnormal 519  3,307  637  331  856  1,091  719  206  81  620  72  105  8,545  
 Wet 875  380  923  661  363  665  367  93  230  59  416  502  5,535  
 MWet 3,885  716  788  1,907  843  609  564  3,340  3,493  140  157  3,795  20,236  
 HWet 1,180  574  4,109  753  1,124  544  317  133  3,711  432  842  527  14,244  
 average 499  616  683  706  554  383  340  289  460  430  190  459  5,609  
Sabine HDry 173  247  259  122  554  79  43  32  158  16  45  176  1,903  
SRSL MDry 235  226  558  573  124  151  76  147  68  40  39  112  2,349  
 Dry 310  194  206  197  336  205  55  66  176  174  88  215  2,221  
 Dnormal 245  285  265  301  607  226  28  50  45  185  120  140  2,496  
 Normal 4,205  376  839  660  1,001  479  210  118  119  85  4,749  256  13,097  
 Wnormal 330  313  1,159  686  334  468  771  122  77  171  189  107  4,726  
 Wet 476  310  956  1,000  664  554  239  72  198  44  115  214  4,842  
 MWet 365  314  960  457  319  831  293  136  262  118  98  272  4,426  
 HWet 215  888  411  344  1,189  272  270  98  201  172  257  319  4,638  
 average 1,479  335  663  548  645  375  206  96  137  105  1,504  208  6,300  
Two basin average (A) 1,978  951  1,346  1,254  1,199  758  546  386  596  535  1,694  668  11,909  
Neches FWIB (B) 624  771  854  882  692  479  424  362  575  538  238  574  7,012  
A/B, % 317  123  158  142  173  158  129  107  104  99  713  116  170  
Notes: FWIB denotes freshwater inflows constraint. HDry through HWet denote degrees 
of climate states of nature from heavily dry to heavily wet. NEBA and SRSL are control 
points. 
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Table IV-16c. Freshwater Inflows to Trinity (unit: 1000 acre feet) 
Trinity basin Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec sum 
HDry 1,906  0  16  85  1  8  1  1  2  1  85  47  2,152  
MDry 83  240  40  198  63  51  2  1  0  0  3  36  717  
Dry 16  13  34  85  280  2  2  24  17  0  1,915  4,749  7,136  
Dnormal 56  2,019  53  326  5  180  2  2  37  41  0  38  2,758  
Normal 2,569  67  547  694  1,396  764  227  28  65  1,943  92  123  8,516  
Wnormal 2,201  387  60  244  142  134  262  43  0  408  1  356  4,237  
Wet 160  55  1,193  76  1,101  130  223  76  36  1  1,883  101  5,033  
MWet 282  2,373  80  380  145  175  169  4  234  45  12  1,941  5,841  
HWet 261  159  231  245  2,244  295  173  2  79  4,259  138  2,256  10,343  
Trinity average (A) 1,126  350  367  331  771  303  138  27  44  876  574  967  5,873  
Trinity FWIB (B) 113  163  273  264  510  336  175  116  248  189  264  470  3,119  
A/B, % 997  216  134  125  151  90  79  23  18  464  218  206  188  
Notes: FWIB is freshwater inflows constraint. HDry through HWet is states of nature.  
 
(2) The next policy option is the interbasin management of the FWIB 
recommendations: the ColLavaca-Colorado interbasin for ColLavaca; the Neches-Sabine 
interbasin for Neches; the Trinity basin. This is also shown in Table IV-16. ColLavaca is 
surrounded by Colorado and Lavaca, and Neches is geographically in the neighborhood 
of Sabine. In order to successfully and effectively manage the interbasin, the 
geographical and ecological integration of the targeted basins and their control points to 
the extended interbasin are critical. This is beyond the scope of this analysis and these 
conditions are assumed to be met.  
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Particularly in the case of ColLavaca, the FWIB recommended levels are too far 
above the optimal levels so that FWI should be managed in the extended interbasin of 
ColLavaca and Colorado. This should be implemented with the first policy option. In the 
ColLavaca-Colorado interbasin, the annual two basin optimal FWI (2,662 thousand acre 
feet) can meet 165% of the integrated two basin FWIB recommendations16 (1,618 
thousand acre feet) on annual average.  
(3) Appropriate storage of the seasonal freshwater surpluses can make up for the 
shortages in conjunction with the second policy option. This must be implemented along 
with yearly management of FWI. In the extended interbasin of ColLavaca and Colorado, 
the recommendations could not be perfectly satisfied in some of the months. The FWIB 
recommendations in April and July through September still have not been met.  
This conflict could be adjusted by seasonal management: for example, the 
appropriate storage of the seasonal freshwater surplus in February through May (563,000 
acre feet) can make up for freshwater shortages in June through September (-108,000 
                                            
16
 Actually only the FWIB of the ColLavaca River basin is applied because the 
Colorado basin does not have the FWIB recommendations. 
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acre feet). After the critical summer season passes, the need for FWI lessens to meet the 
FWIB recommendations.  
It will be indispensable to store the annual surpluses in wet years and dispense 
them in dry years. There are five states of nature in which annual interbasin FWI is short 
of the recommended levels: HDry, MDry, Dry, Dnormal and Wnormal. Their total 
annual shortage reaches -4,970 acre feet. This shortage could be compensated by 
appropriate storage and management of surpluses from the other four water-affluent wet 
years, which amounts to a total of 9,089 acre feet. The limitation of this strategy assumes 
some benign cycle of water-scarce dry and water-affluent wet years. This strategy may 
not justify uncertainty when a series of unexpected consecutive water-scarce wet years 
are repeated.  
All monthly FWIB recommendations in the Neches-Sabine interbasin can be 
met except for very slight shortage in October. Neches can be extended into the Neches-
Sabine interbasin if lowering the recommended levels is not possible. Sabine-Neches 
Estuary touches Sabine Lake but essentially belongs to the Neches River basin so that 
the FWIB constraints are set on Neches. But if the Neches-Sabine interbasin is managed 
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as one unit, the annual two basin optimal FWI (11,909 thousand acre feet) satisfies 170% 
of the annual FWIB recommendations (7,012 thousand acre feet).  
The annual shortage in four dry years (HDry, MDry, Dry and Dnormal) amounts 
to 9,858 acre feet whereas the surplus in the other five wet years are 50,311 acre feet in 
total. For example, the surplus of the Normal year (11,167 acre feet) can supply the total 
shortage in four dry years. 
Extended basin-wide management of FWI are important especially when 
multiple FWI-out control points to bays and estuaries exist and their aggregated FWI 
must be comprehensively regulated, as in the case of Trinity. Trinity satisfies 188% of 
the FWIB recommendations on annual average. 
But the FWIB recommendations in the Trinity River basin are not met in 
summer from June to September by 363,000 acre feet. This shortage could be supplied 
by the seasonal management of the water surplus gained from March to May (422,000 
acre feet). There are three dry years in HDry, MDry and Dnormal where the total 
shortage reaches 3,730 acre feet which can be compensated by the surplus from the other 
six wet years which amounts to 22,392 acre feet. Only the surplus of the Normal year 
(5,397 acre feet) can supply the total shortage in the three dry seasons.  
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(4) Another possible option which is differentiated from the first policy option, 
is to relax the recommended FWI levels based on percentage ranges as is shown in the 
Tennant Method, meeting the FWIB recommendations by setting the “range” of 
recommended FWI levels that are flexibly relaxed in these months.  
The Tennant Method suggests 8 levels of environmental flow recommendations: 
flushing (200% of mean annual flow), optimum (100-60% of mean annual flow), 
outstanding (40% of mean annual flow from October to March and 60% of it in the other 
months), excellent (30% of it and 50% of it in the same periods), good (20% of it and 
40% of it), fair (10% of it and 30% of it), poor (10% of it), severe degradation (below 
10% of it). (American Fisheries Society, 1976) The marginal FWI levels between the 
tiers could be relaxed. 
(5) The last option is to lower the economic, biological and chemical standards 
of the FWIB recommendations, not just lowering the FWI levels. TPWD and TWDB 
define MinQ as the minimum inflows that maintain 80% of the mean historic harvest 
and all other physical constraints. Then, the average fish harvest rate from the current 
80% could be reevaluated.  
This alternative is beyond our current study because this will need some critical 
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interdisciplinary evaluation and compromise between the economic and environmental 
factors: fisheries harvest and ecological conditions of the estuaries. This task will be left 
for the future study. 
 
4.5.7. Effects on flows of water  
The FWIB gain in water flows is the change (increase) in water flows due to the 
FWIB recommendations, denoted as FWIB-F. Water flows increase generally in the 
whole basins by 8,651 acre feet (0.15%) as FWIB-F when IBT effects are removed. This 
is mainly contributed by the FWIB-recommended basins, Neches and San Jacinto. Table 
IV-17 shows the decomposition of the total gain (bottom of the seventh column), FWIB-
F (top of the fourth column) and IBT-F (bottom of the sixth column).  
Total gain in water flows is the change (increase or decrease) in flows due to both 
the FWIB recommendations and IBT implementation from none of them. Overall, 
water flows decrease by 11,837 acre feet, 0.21%, in the whole basins. This reflects the 
dominance of IBT-F over FWIB-F. That is to say, the IBT flow decreasing effect (-
20,488 acre feet) dominates the FWIB flow increasing effect (8,651 acre feet).  
In IBT-neutral but IBT-adjacent basins which is geographically close to those 
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regions where IBT is actually realized, Lavaca’s flow decrease in terms of the total gain 
(-1,769 acre feet) is caused by increase in water use in the basin.  
FWIB-F takes effect in the FWIB-recommended basins such as Neches and San 
Jacinto. Water flows in the Neches River basin increase by 5,697 acre feet as FWIB-F 
effects, and this is resulting from the strict 80% satisfaction of the FWIB 
recommendations. In the San Jacinto River basin, FWIB-F surpasses the IBT-F. FWIB-F 
effects increase water flows by 2,660 acre feet while IBT-F effects decrease them by 
1,562 acre feet. 
Water flows in the Guadsan River basin increase by 4,689 acre feet in terms of 
the total gain. However, there are no FWIB-F effects but only IBT-F effects. Water flow 
increases in the Guadsan River basin are due to water flows completely from IBT into 
the basin, but not due to the FWIB recommendations.  
The Cypress and Trinity River basin are the IBT source/net source basins. Water 
flows in the Cypress and Trinity River basin decrease by 7,224 acre feet and 14,417 acre 
feet in terms of the total gain, respectively, as IBT-F effects are dominating. 
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Table IV-17. Flows of Water under the FWIB-Avg by River (unit: acre feet) 
without 
IBT 
without 
FWIB(A) 
with 
FWIB(B) 
FWIB-F 
(B-A) 
FWIB-F  
% change IBT-F 
Total gain 
(B-A) 
Brazos  496,260 495,992 -268 -0.05 0 -268 
Colorado  400,298 400,285 -13 0 0 -13 
Canadian 74,758 74,758 0 0 0 0 
Red 469,382 469,381 -1 0 0 -1 
Sabine 1,193,648 1,193,643 -5 0 0 -5 
Guadsan 273,457 273,457 0 0 0 0 
Sulphur  427,255 427,255 0 0 0 0 
Cypress  196,610 196,621 11 0.01 0 11 
Neches  847,962 853,659 5,697 0.67 0 5,697 
Trinity 807,056 807,040 -16 0 0 -16 
SanJacinto 278,291 280,951 2,660 0.96 0 2,660 
Lavaca 167,881 168,468 587 0.35 0 587 
Nueces  116,951 116,952 1 0 0 1 
Total 5,749,810 5,758,461 8,651 0.15 0 8,651 
with IBT without FWIB(C) 
with 
FWIB(D) 
FWIB-F 
(D-C) 
FWIB-F  
% change 
IBT-F 
(D-B) 
Total gain 
(B-A+D-B) 
Brazos  496,153 496,122 -31 -0.01 130 -138 
Colorado  400,278 400,426 148 0.04 141 128 
Canadian 74,758 74,758 0 0 0 0 
Red 469,382 469,380 -2 0 -1 -2 
Sabine 1,193,652 1,193,661 9 0 18 13 
Guadsan 278,143 278,146 3 0 4,689 4,689 
Sulphur  427,255 427,255 0 0 0 0 
Cypress  189,391 189,386 -5 0 -7,235 -7,224 
Neches  848,005 853,745 5,740 0.68 86 5,783 
Trinity 792,645 792,639 -6 0 -14,401 -14,417 
SanJacinto 279,546 279,389 -157 -0.06 -1,562 1,098 
Lavaca 168,442 166,112 -2,330 -1.38 -2,356 -1,769 
Nueces  116,952 116,952 0 0 0 1 
Total 5,734,602 5,737,973 3,371 0.06 -20,488 -11,837 
Notes: FWIB_Avg/IBT denote freshwater inflows constraint/Interbasin Water Transfers. 
IBT-F/FWIB-F denote IBT loss/FWIB gain in flows. 
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4.5.8. Relationship between water use, freshwater inflows and flows  
Once constructed, an IBT project relocated water to increase economic use 
efficiency and forced FWIB-U to be reduced. And the process of mutual interaction 
between IBT-F and FWIB-F moved to finally reduce water flows because of the 
dominant IBT-F effect. But in the freshwater inflows, FWIB-I dominated IBT-I. Table 
IV-18 summarizes the water use and flows/inflows relationships. 
In terms of the total gain in the whole basins, water use increased (12.08%) and 
FWI increased (0.34%) in the seven basins, but water flows decreased (-0.21%). We 
have seen that FWI has decreased in the IBT-only scenario in Chapter III. The IBT 
destination basins contributed to increasing water use and FWI, and the major IBT 
source basins contributed to decreasing water flows. The FWIB recommendations 
played a role of protecting FWI. FWI decreased in the IBT net source basin Trinity. 
However, in the IBT-neutral Neches River basin where 80% of the FWIB 
recommendations were barely met after a series of simulation efforts, the 
recommendations contributed to 91.2% (89,996 acre feet) of the FWIB-I (98,695 acre 
feet) in the whole basins under no IBT scenario. And this contribution of Neches turned 
FWI to increase (positive total gain) overall in the seven basins against the FWI 
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decreasing effect of IBT, with the help of increasing FWI in the IBT destination basin 
Guadsan and IBT-FWIB simultaneously applied basin San Jacinto. The inverse 
relationship between water use and flows was also realized in the IBT-neutral but IBT-
adjacent basins such as the Brazos and Lavaca River basin. But in the destination basin 
Guadsan and San Jacinto, water use, flows and FWI all increased. Water use in all three 
of the destination basins absolutely increased.  
 
Table IV-18. IBT, FWIB, Total Gains under the FWIB-Avg Constraints (unit: %)17 
Water use FWI (7 basins) Water flows Source/ 
Destination River IBT 
gain 
FWIB 
gain 
Total 
gain 
IBT 
gain 
FWIB 
gain 
Total 
gain 
IBT 
gain 
FWIB 
gain 
Total 
gain 
Source Cypress  0 0 0 --- --- --- -3.68 0.01 -3.67 
Source Colorado  -1.97 0.54 -1.44 --- --- --- 0.04 0 0.03 
Net source Trinity 23.26 0.08 23.36 -2.45 0.00 -2.45 -1.78 0 -1.79 
Destination Guadsan 50.52 0 50.52 2.83 0.00 2.83 1.71 0 1.71 
Destination San Jacinto 77.37 -7.66 63.78 2.65 0.45 3.12 -0.56 0.96 0.39 
IBT-neutral Brazos  -2.80 5.13 2.18 --- --- --- 0.03 -0.05 -0.03 
IBT-neutral Lavaca 8.79 -2.66 5.89 --- --- --- -1.4 0.35 -1.05 
FWIB Neches  0 -68.17 -68.17 0 1.63 1.63 0.01 0.67 0.68 
Total All rivers 19.25 -6.01 12.08 -0.25 0.60 0.34 -0.36 0.15 -0.21 
Total amount (acre feet) 307,361 -102,145  205,216  -42,218 98,695  56,476  -20,488 8,651  -11,837  
Notes: FWIB_Avg/IBT denote freshwater inflows constraint/Interbasin Transfers. 
                                            
17
 Increasing rate (%) = (increased water due to IBT / water amount without IBT)*100. 
Water amount is based on average after applying probabilities depending on the states of 
nature. 
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FWI significantly increased in both of the destination basins where they received 
enough water from the IBT projects for use and also enough water to increase the flow 
levels. The FWIB recommendations in the San Jacinto River basin showed relatively 
strong flow protection effects against the flow decreasing effect of IBT. 
The Colorado, Lavaca, Brazos and San Jacinto River basins are interesting areas. 
Colorado is an IBT source basin but Lavaca and Brazos are IBT-neutral. All three basins 
are not constrained by the FWIB recommendation, but Colorado and Lavaca are close to 
the FWIB-recommended basin ColLavaca. San Jacinto is not only an IBT destination but 
also a FWIB-recommended basin. We have seen that the changes in agricultural water 
use were exactly offset between Colorado and Lavaca while the changes in municipal 
water use were also exactly offset between Brazos, Colorado and San Jacinto. 
Furthermore, in Colorado, Lavaca and Brazos, as is shown in Table IV-19, the FWIB 
recommendations reinforced the IBT gain effect more in the with-FWIB than in the 
without-FWIB recommendations, probably as a result of the interaction between the 
FWIB recommendations and IBT implementation.  
This phenomenon tells of the complicated relationships between changes in 
water use and flows before and after the FWIB recommendations and IBT 
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implementation. These four river basins are all close in proximity to the basins where the 
FWIB and IBT are interconnected. This implies that water use and flows are interacting 
with the neighboring IBT source/destination and FWIB-recommended basins. 
 
Table IV-19. Gain of Geographically and IBT-FWIB Interconnected Basins (unit: %) 
IBT gain without FWIB IBT gain with FWIB 
Source/ 
Destination River Water use Water flows Water use Water flows 
Source Colorado  0.45 -0.01 -1.97 0.04 
IBT-neutral Brazos  2.19 -0.02 -2.80 0.03 
IBT-neutral Lavaca -2.10 0.33 8.79 -1.40 
Total All rivers 18.09 -0.26 19.25 -0.36 
Notes: FWIB/IBT denote freshwater inflows constraint/Interbasin Transfers. 
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4.6. Conclusions     
This chapter focuses on the economic, hydrological and environmental effects of 
imposing minimum requirement levels for freshwater inflows to bays and estuaries 
(FWIB). Such an imposition causes a welfare loss due to decreases in water use and net 
benefits. Using the model TEXRIVERSIM developed in Chapter II and III, we examined 
the changes in welfare gains, interactions and conflicts between water use and 
environmental flows according to the different freshwater inflow constraints by TPWD 
and TWDB on the seven river basins as well as the IBT implementation. 
This will be the first academic and professional evaluation study of the economic 
and environmental impacts of the IBT implementation and the FWIB recommendations 
in Texas.  
We developed simulation results for the imposition of two types of FWIB 
constraints. First the FWIB constraints were imposed for each state of nature (FWIB-
SON). However, the FWIB-SON constraints could not satisfy the recommendations in 
the four basins, SanioNues, Trinity, ColLavaca and Neches, only just satisfying them in 
the three basins, Guadsan, Nueces and San Jacinto. In ColLavaca and Neches, the 
recommendations were hardly satisfied almost in every state of nature in every month. 
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SanioNues and Trinity could meet the recommendations on average but not in some 
states of nature depending on the month.  
As TEXRIVERSIM found that the FWIB recommendations could not be 
satisfied, we modified the constraints in order to consider an option that is both feasible 
and to reflect the policy objectives of TPWD and TWDB. We introduced the FWIB-Avg 
(average) constraints instead of the FWIB-SON (state of nature) constraints. There are 
three reasons behind this alternative constraint specification. First, the FWIB-SON 
constraints are simply impossible when average constraints cannot be satisfied. 
Satisfaction of the average constraints is a required (not a sufficient) condition for the 
satisfaction of the FWIB-SON constraints.  
Second, when there are large variations of FWI levels depending on each state of 
nature, it is harder to meet the recommendations in some state of nature, and accordingly 
the recommended FWI levels under the FWIB-SON constraints should be lowered to 
meet them in every state of nature than those needed under the FWIB-Avg constraints. 
The FWIB-Avg constraints can be more realistic if the policy mix of alternative 
approaches described below could achieve the policy goal and cost less, not needing to 
lower the recommended FWI levels further below the average level. The FWIB-Avg 
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constraints exhibit the flexibility of the constraints which keep each sectoral IBT gain 
(FWIB loss) in net benefit and water use to be the same in both of the without- and with-
FWIB (IBT) scenarios, unlike the FWIB-SON constraints. 
Third, even if the FWIB-SON constraints were possible, it will be costly to set 
the recommended FWI levels in each and every state when the state is not realized but 
exists just probabilistically: opportunity costs and searching costs of finding the 
comprehensive FWI level table. And FWI levels for each and every state must be 
readjusted even under a small change of the model assumption such as groundwater 
demand portion. 
When The FWIB-Avg constraints are adopted, the FWIB recommendations 
could be met feasibly in five basins adding SanioNues and Trinity. To make the model 
feasible, we had to reduce the minimum requirements of the FWI levels in ColLavaca 
and Neches to 1.5% and 80% of the originally suggested FWI levels, lowering the 
inflow levels by 98.5% and 20% of them in the two basins, respectively.  
Our analysis of the FWIB issue and its relationship to IBT shows that the FWIB 
recommendations can be met in more basins based on averages than in each and every 
state of nature. This suggests the need for policy changes by TPWD and TWDB. Under 
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the FWIB-Avg constraints, the policy options can work independent of others but 
sometimes they should be mixed. (1) The first policy option is to lower the average 
recommended FWI levels as are the cases of ColLavaca and Neches. This alternative is 
feasible and less costly, and merits study by ecologists. (2) However, in the case of 
ColLavaca, the FWIB recommended levels are too far above the optimal levels so that 
FWI should be managed in the extended interbasin of ColLavaca and Colorado, and this 
should be implemented with the first policy option. FWI in Neches can be managed in 
the extended interbasin of Neches and Sabine if lowering the recommended levels is not 
possible. Extended basin-wide management of FWI is especially important when 
multiple FWI-out control points to bays and estuaries exist and their aggregated FWI 
must be comprehensively regulated, as in the case of Trinity. (3) Appropriate storage of 
the seasonal freshwater surpluses can make up for the shortages in conjunction with the 
second policy option. In the extended interbasin of ColLavaca and Colorado, the 
recommendations could not be perfectly satisfied in some months but the seasonal FWI 
surpluses from February to May can compensate for the shortages from June to 
September if the seasonal storage is assumed to be feasible. This seasonal management 
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strategy must be implemented along with the yearly management of FWI to be prepared 
for the shortages of dry years.  
(4) Another possibility that would be differentiated from the first policy option is 
to relax the recommended FWI levels based on percentage ranges as is shown in the 
Tennant method which suggests seasonally different 8 levels of environmental flows 
recommendations. (5) The last option is to lower the economic, biological and chemical 
standard of the FWIB recommendations, not just lowering the inflow levels: for example, 
we may need to agree on the average fish harvest rate from current 80%. This alternative 
is beyond our current study because there should be some compromise between 
economics and ecology/environment when the FWI levels are reevaluated and enforced. 
 Under the FWIB-Avg constraints after lowering the recommended inflows 
levels in ColLavaca and Neches, the same three IBT projects as are in chapter III were 
chosen with the IBT implementation and the FWIB-Avg constraints: Luce Bayou, 
LCRA-SAWS and Cypress IBT. The FWIB provisions absolutely cost money as they 
decrease water use and net benefits. The FWIB loss in net benefit (FWIB-NB) directly 
from the FWIB recommendations without IBT projects was -$211 million, and the total 
loss was -$8 million after FWIB-NB and The IBT gain in net benefit (IBT-NB) are all 
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considered. This total loss came primarily from FWIB-NB dominance in the industrial 
and mining sector (Neches) over IBT-NB in the same sector (San Jacinto) and in the 
municipal sector (Guadsan and Trinity). The FWI sector made negative contribution to 
the net benefit while agricultural sector showed no change. 
An IBT implementation relocates water to increase economic use efficiency and 
forces the FWIB loss in water use (FWIB-U) to be reduced. And the process of mutual 
interaction between the IBT loss in water flows (IBT-F) and the FWIB gain in water 
flows (FWIB-F) moved to finally reduce water flows because of the dominant IBT-F 
effect. But in the freshwater inflows, the FWIB gain in freshwater inflows (FWIB-I) 
dominated the IBT loss in freshwater inflows (IBT-I). 
In terms of the total gain, water use increased primarily in the IBT-destination 
basins, FWI also increased due to contribution of the Neches River basin unlike the IBT-
only scenario, but water flows decreased mainly in the IBT source basins. The IBT 
destination basins contributed to increasing water use and FWI, and the major IBT 
source basins contributed to decreasing water flows. The FWIB recommendations served 
to protect FWI. FWI decreased in the IBT net source basin Trinity. But the decreasing 
effect was overwhelmed by the increasing effect in the IBT destination basin Guadsan, 
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and IBT-FWIB simultaneously applied basin San Jacinto and especially in the FWIB-
recommended basin Neches. 
In the IBT destination basin Guadsan and San Jacinto, water use, flows and FWI 
all increased due to sufficient injection of water. The FWIB flow protection effect was 
relatively strong in the FWIB-recommended basin San Jacinto. 
The Colorado, Lavaca, Brazos and San Jacinto River basins are all 
geographically close and interconnected with the IBT implementation and the FWIB 
recommendations. Changes in water use were exactly offset by the same sector of a 
neighboring basin: agricultural water use is offset between Colorado and Lavaca, and 
municipal water use is offset between Brazos, Colorado and San Jacinto. The FWIB 
recommendations reinforced the IBT gain effect more in the simultaneous 
implementation of the FWIB-Avg constraints and IBT than in the IBT-only scenario. 
These facts imply that water use and flow patterns in these basins are interacting with 
those in the IBT and FWIB-neighboring basins.  
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CHAPTER V 
MULTIPLE MARKETS IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION MARKETS: 
THEORETICAL AND SIMULATION ANALYSIS 
 
5.1. Overview18 
5.1.1. Introduction 
Market-based approaches to environmental management are expanding at a 
remarkable rate. Driven by the simple intuition that it makes sense to minimize the cost 
of pursuing environmental improvements, since the early 1990s a wide range of 
programs have been established that differ in an important way from the traditional 
“command-and-control” approach. In what we will call “market-based” approaches, a 
regulatory mechanism exists that allows environmental harm at one point to be offset 
through environmental improvements elsewhere. Such programs may take a variety of 
forms, from a pure market in which uniform credits are traded at a market-determined 
                                            
18
 This overview section is based on the paper to be presented at the annual meeting of 
the American Agricultural Economics Association, Denver, Colorado, August 2004, by 
Richard Woodward and Manseung Han, associate professor and Ph.D candidate of the 
department of agricultural economics at Texas A&M University. 
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price, to offset programs in which the agency gives regulated parties flexibility to 
comply with regulations by offsetting damages at other locations.   
Market-based (MB) approaches are being applied to a wide range of 
environmental problems; the highly visible SO2 trading program is but the tip of the 
iceberg. Air pollution trading ranges from California’s Reclaim program to the multi-
state Ozone Transport Commission. In the water pollution arena, a recent report to the 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) lists sixteen programs in various stages of 
implementation and nine more programs under development (Environomics 1999).  
MB elements appear in wetland mitigation banking, in Habitat Conservation Plans that 
can be used to comply with the Endangered Species Act, in transferable development 
rights programs, in climate change policies, and virtually every new environmental 
policy in the U.S. presents an extensive list of environmental goods and services that are 
either covered by MB programs or are under consideration (the table on page 270). 
As the number of market-based programs grows, so does the potential for 
interaction among the programs. As a result, there is a rising interest in the concept of 
“multiple markets” (e.g., Kieser & Associates, 2003), the notion that generators of 
environmental credits might be able to sell credits in many markets, what we will call 
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“double dipping”. Suppose that a single action, such as a land management change, can 
generate environmental benefits of two types, such as carbon sequestration and nutrient 
reduction. And suppose that markets exist such that credits might be sold in two different 
markets. If double dipping is allowed then the returns to those that implement these 
management practices can increase, increasing the incentives to implement the most 
environmentally effective projects. On the other hand, if one project can sell credits in 
two markets, then this will reduce the number of projects that are included, diminishing 
the environmental benefits achieved. Hence, it is not immediately obvious that allowing 
double dipping will be socially efficient.   
In this paper we explore the issues that arise when considering multiple 
environmental markets. We begin with a straightforward analysis building on 
Montgomery of multiple rights markets when there are caps placed on each such 
pollutant. In this case, it follows immediately that allowing double-dipping will achieve 
the efficient allocation of the pollution rights. Building on this framework we show that 
when pollution credits are generated as a joint product, it may be that the prices of some 
rights might go to zero. This adds a new twist to the standard policy advice that the 
socially efficient level of abatement is where the marginal benefit is equal to the 
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marginal cost. This leads us to the complete planner’s problem in which we also consider 
the societal benefits of pollution abatement. This problem is considered in both a first-
best and second-best economy. In the first-best case, we again find that double-dipping 
leads to the optimal solution. However, in a second-best setting in which the caps are set 
suboptimally on incomplete information, the results are mixed and double-dipping may 
not be socially optimal. The paper concludes with a discussion of problems for future 
investigation.   
 
5.1.2. Literature review 
Dales (1968a, 1968b) and Crocker (1966) are credited with coming up with the 
idea of pollution permits to control pollution. The first formal treatment of this problem 
was provided by Montgomery (1972). As we discuss below, Montgomery’s model 
incorporated the general features of a multiple pollutant problem, although he 
characterized it as a single pollutant with multiple receptor points.   
There are several recent papers that have addressed issues involving tradable 
credits programs involving multiple permits, though none of these considers the same 
problem that we look at here. Montero (2001) is the first author to carefully analyze a 
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problem similar to that we consider here. Montero considers the question as to whether 
cross-pollutant trading should be allowed, i.e., whether a firm should be allowed to 
increase emissions of pollutant A by buying credits generated by reducing pollutant B.  
Such cross pollutant trading runs counter to the piecemeal approach that is pervasive in 
most environmental policy. Nonetheless, at a conceptual level it is appropriate to ask 
what would be the optimal mix of pollution reduction across the pollutants. Cross 
pollutant trading with the appropriate trading ratio could yield the optimal allocation.  In 
a fashion akin to Weitzman (1974), Montero finds that the relative slopes of the marginal 
benefit and marginal cost curves prove critical to determining if cross-pollutant trading 
should be allowed or not. If the marginal damage curves are steep, then it is less efficient 
to allow cross pollutant trading.  
 Perhaps most closely related to the theme in the current paper, Horan et al. 
(2004) examine the case of double dipping for water quality improvements in which the 
same abatement is paid twice from two programs differently run by an agricultural 
agency and a state agency. They show that efficiency gains occur under double dipping 
when two payments scheme is coordinated. But under the uncoordinated or stand-alone 
setting, double dipping increases efficiency with well-targeted payment incentives. The 
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trading program between point and nonpoint sources provides better incentives when 
payment incentives are not well-targeted. 
Caplan and Silva (2005) investigate correlated externalities that cause regional 
and global impacts. Their “correlated” pollutants mean multiple pollutants such as smog 
and global warming which are jointly produced by the same source. They justify that 
joint domestic and international permit markets over different jurisdictions are Pareto 
efficient using a sub-game equilibrium model. 
The issue of double-dipping is particularly important in programs in which there 
is not a hard cap on aggregate pollution. As highlighted by Dewees (2001), many of 
pollution trading programs do not have caps. Instead, a source obtains a credit by 
reducing emissions below its historic levels generating an Emission Reduction Credit 
(ERC). Interest in the use of ERCs, also known as baseline-and-credit programs, is rising 
since such instruments can be used to control sources that are not typically regulated so 
that implementation of a cap is problematic. For example, ERCs are used to reduce 
nonpoint source pollution (Woodward, Kaiser and Wicks, 2002), or to offset wetland 
losses. The idea of taking advantage of multiple markets is receiving substantial 
attention in ERC programs (Kieser & Associates, 2003). For example, a created wetland 
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might reduce nutrient runoff, sequester carbon and provide habitat for species: four 
environmental services are provided and quadruple-dipping could generate substantial 
revenue to the landowner.  
For ERC type programs, there is a great deal of attention to the issue of 
“additionality”, i.e., a credit is only real if it is in excess of a baseline that the firm would 
otherwise be providing. When multiple markets are in place, this becomes extremely 
difficult. For example, a firm that establishes a containment pond to create nutrient 
credits might also be creating a wetland that provides habitat for water-fowl. If someone 
nearby needs to offset wetland loss, should the containment pond also be allowed to 
count for that? Would this second transaction be permitted? From a cost minimization 
perspective the answer is, “Probably yes.” From a social efficiency perspective the 
answer is, “Perhaps no” (Woodward and Han, 2004). 
 
5.1.3. Multiple cap-and-trade markets to achieve cost efficiency 
We begin our analysis of multiple pollution rights markets building on the 
familiar model of Montgomery (1972). Montgomery considered the use of transferable 
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permits for the case of a market in which firms, i=1,…, n, emit a single pollutant, ei, 
which is dispersed to m receptors according to the dispersion coefficients hij.   
Licenses, lij, in this case place a cap on the ith firm’s emissions of the jth pollutant, 
j=1,…, m. The firm’s initial allocation of permits is denoted lij0. 
Define ),...( 1 imii eeF  as the ith firm’s cost of reducing emissions to a particular 
level, i.e., the difference between the firm’s profit at the unconstrained maximum and the 
profits that can be achieved given that emissions are reduced to imi ee ,...1 . Following 
Montgomery, we assume that F (⋅) is convex. The problem of each firm is to minimize 
its cost of emission reduction, F (⋅), plus its license cost, 0ijij ll − , subject to emission 
constraint, and non-negativity conditions as follows.  
(1) 
jle
jletosubject
llpeeFMin
ijij
ijij
m
j
ijijjimii
le ijij
∀≥≥
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=
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,
)(),...(
1
0
1
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where pj is the price for the jth pollution license, which is defined in the market. Like 
Montgomery, we assume zero transaction costs. 
 A market equilibrium can be defined as solution vectors of the above 
minimization problem for all i, ,, ** ijij le  such that the following market clearing 
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conditions are also satisfied. 
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Now, the social cost minimum that is efficient is obtained by solving a following 
social problem.19  
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As in Montgomery, from this individual firm and social planner’s problem, two 
lemmas follow (all proofs are provided in APPENDIX B). 
Lemma 1: A market equilibrium of the license market exists for ∑
=
=
n
i
ijj ll
1
00
 
Lemma 2: Any emission vector ),...,( 11 nmee that satisfies the market equilibrium 
c o n d i t i o n s  w i t h  ( ) 000201 ,....,, Llll m =  i s  a  s o c i a l  c o s t  m i n i m u m . 
As in the single pollutant with multiple locations case considered by 
Montgomery, Lemmas 1 and 2 establish that a pollution trading market can lead to a 
cost-minimizing equilibrium if a cap exists for all pollutants and all pollutants are traded.  
                                            
19
 The dispersion coefficients in Montgomery’s model, hij, are omitted. This does not 
affect the implication of the result. 
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Under the assumptions maintained here, it also follows that the initial allocation of rights 
does not affect the final allocations or the price of the pollution licenses:  
Lemma 3: If ∑ =≥
i
jijij llandl ,0 000  then, vectors of emission, price and license 
demand for firm i, ),...,(),,...,(),,...,( **1**1**1 imimimi llppee , are independent of 
initially distributed license vector to firm i, ),...,( 001 imi ll . 
We find, therefore, that multiple markets can achieve the cost-minimizing 
allocation of rights across producers. This result is not surprising, but we did not find 
similar results anywhere else in the literature.  
We should note that the assumption of convexity in the cost function in this case 
is more restrictive than in the single-pollutant case though it remains intuitively plausible. 
If two pollutants are under consideration, the cost function is convex if it has a bowl-like 
shape, with the slope increasing as the firm’s pollutions differ from the unconstrained 
optimum. Convexity of the cost function implies that for any price vector, P={p1,…, pm}, 
there is a unique point at which DF(⋅)=P, where DF denotes the gradient of F. Hence, 
there is a unique global maximum to the firm’s optimization problem.  
Graphical analysis of the firm’s problem in a multiple-market setting  
In a fashion similar to Helfand (1991), in Figure V-1 we present the iso-cost 
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curves associated with differing levels of the two pollutants for a representative firm.  
The ellipses in the figures indicate combinations of e1 and e2 that yield equal costs to 
the firm relative to the profit maximizing levels of emissions, e1* and e2* , where 
( ) 0, *2*1 =eeF  and ( ) ( ) 0,, *2*12*2*11 == eeFeeF .20 Along the lines traversing the ellipses the 
marginal cost of reducing the pollutants independently are equal to zero. These lines 
indicate, therefore, the reaction functions of the firm’s emissions of one pollutant to 
restrictions on the other pollutant. In Figure V-1-a, these reaction curves are horizontal 
and vertical, so that the optimal levels of emissions of the two pollutants are independent 
of the emissions of the other pollutant. In the b and c, the cost-minimizing level of 
emissions of the pollutants is related to the emissions of the other pollutant. In Figure V-
1-b the pollutants are complements – if the firm is forced to reduce e1, then to minimize 
costs it will also reduce e2. In Figure V-1-c, on the other hand, the pollutants are 
substitutes – a requirement to reduce e1 will lead the firm to increase its emissions of e2.  
                                            
20
 The first derivatives F1 and F2 actually are negative so that negative signs should 
precede them.  
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(a)                  (b)               (c) 
Figure V-1. Iso-cost curves for two pollutants where costs are independent (a) 
where the pollutants are complements (b) and substitutes (c) 
 
As can be seen in Figure V-1, the relationship between the two emissions in the 
firm’s cost function is central to determining the optimal emissions. Moreover, the 
marginal cost of reducing emissions is critically dependent upon the full set of emissions. 
Although some analysis below can apply to situations in which the marginal cost of 
abatement is independent across pollutants (Figure V-1-a) or when the pollutants are 
substitutes (Figure V-1-c), we will focus on the case in which the pollutants are 
complements (Figure V-1-b). This is an important set of cases for it is often true that a 
single intervention will lead to reductions in more than one pollutant. 
In Figure V-2, we present the case of a firm that faces a tradeable permits 
program on pollutant 1 at price p1. This price on its emissions of e1 causes it to reduce 
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its emissions from e1* to e1, where -F1 = p1. As can be seen in the figure, the marginal 
cost of abating the second pollutant changes depending on the level of abatement of the 
pollutant 1. In order to efficiently regulate pollutant 2, i.e. set abatement such that the 
marginal benefit equals the marginal cost, the emission level of pollutant 1 must first be 
known. If the marginal cost for e2 were evaluated at point A, the original level for e2 and 
the new level for e1, the marginal cost of reducing emissions of 2 is positive (F2>0 from 
point A to C) – costs go down by reducing e2. At B, the new level for e2 but at the 
original level of e1, e1*, then the marginal cost of reducing e2 would be negative (F2<0). 
At C, where the firm has optimally adjusted e2 to the new level of e1, F2=0. We see, 
therefore, that when pollutants are joint products it is important to consider the levels of 
all other pollutants when evaluating the marginal cost of controlling any one pollutant.  
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Figure V-2. Iso-cost curves and optimal responses to reducing pollutant 1 
 
5.1.4. Social efficiency and multiple cap and trade programs  
Following the Montgomery model, we have seen that when multiple pollutants 
are emitted, allowing for multiple emissions trading programs can identify the cost-
minimizing allocation of emissions. In this section we consider the relationship between 
multiple markets and the socially efficient level of emissions. The conclusion is quite 
straightforward: the socially optimal level of pollution reduction is achieved by allowing 
multiple markets, but the cap on pollutants should reflect this. As we show in the section 
that follows, however, if the cap is not set optimally, taking into account the 
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complementarities in abatement, then it is not always socially preferred to allow multiple 
markets.   
Define a firm’s emission abatement, aij, as the difference between eij* and actual 
emissions eij, i.e., aij=eij*−eij. Aggregate abatement of the jth pollutant is 
written ∑=
i
ijj aA . The industry costs (TC) are simply the sum across all firms: 
( ) ( )1 1, , , ,i im i i im
i i
TC F e e g a a= =∑ ∑K K . Our focus here is on the interactions between 
the pollutants in the firms’ cost functions, hence for simplicity we assume that the social 
benefits of abatement (TB) are additively separable and that, since all pollutants are 
assumed to be uniformly dispersed, are functions of aggregate abatement: 
( )j j
j
TB B A=∑ .21 The planner’s problem, therefore, is to maximize total net benefits:  
(4) ∑ ∑−
j i
imiijj
a
aagABMax
ij
)...()(
,1
,
  
At the optimum, for all pollutants the marginal cost of abatement must be equal 
across firms, that is to say, ( ) ( )
kj
k
ij
i
a
g
a
g
∂
∂
=
∂
∂
 for all i, k )( ki ≠ . The optimal cap will be 
set at a level where the marginal benefit equals the marginal cost, CTBT ′=′  for all j. If 
the caps for all pollutants are set simultaneously at the optimal levels, then by Lemma 2, 
                                            
21
 There has been some attention to cases where pollutants jointly interact in the 
environment (e.g., Schmieman et al., 2002).  
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a multiple-markets program where sources are able to trade credits in all pollution credit 
markets will lead to the social optimum.   
Social optimum for fixed-coefficient technology   
As an interesting example, consider the case which j = 1, 2 and the firms’ 
abatement of the two pollutants occurs in fixed proportions, i.e. ai2=γiai1, for all i. In this 
case the optimization problem becomes:  
(5) ),( 212211 ii
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Because abatement occurs in fixed proportions, we can rewrite ai2 in terms of ai1 
and the cost function, g(⋅), can be expressed in terms of a single argument, that is to say, 
( ) )(~,),( 11121 iiiiiiiii agaagaag == γ  when ai2=γiai1, ( ) ( )
1 1
i i
i i
g g
a a
∂ ⋅ ∂ ⋅
=
∂ ∂
%
, and 
ii
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
a
g
a
a
a
g
a
g
γ
1~~
12
1
12 ∂
∂
=
∂
∂
∂
∂
=
∂
∂
 
The first order condition of the planner’s problem for ai1 is 0121 =′−′+′ igBB γ . 
What is significant here is that the optimal level of total abatement is set not 
where ijj gB ′=′ , because of the joint production of a1 and a2, the benefits across both 
pollutants must be taken into account.  
If an aggregate abatement goal were set where the marginal cost equals the 
marginal benefit on a pollutant-by-pollutant basis, then suboptimal pollution abatement 
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would be sought. This fact points out a weakness in simplistic formulations of the 
standard guidance for policy: abate pollution up to the point where the marginal benefit 
equals the marginal cost. It is our impression that to the extent that any criterion of 
optimality is being sought in such policies, it almost certainly is being done on a 
pollutant-by-pollutant basis. Hence this implies that the standard policy is a second-best 
resulting in suboptimal caps. 
 
5.1.5. Multiple markets in a second-best economy  
To motivate our analysis of multiple markets in a second-best setting, we 
consider a very simple case presented in Figure V-3. We assume that some polluters emit 
two pollutants and that regulation of e1 will lead to abatement of a2 by those firms as in 
Figure V-2 above. As a result of the reduction from e1* to e1, the marginal cost of abating 
e2 will shift from MC2 to MC
*
, taking into account the “free” abatement of a2.  Hence, 
the socially optimal level of abatement of pollutant 2 is *2A , where the social marginal 
cost equals the social marginal benefit, B'(A2). To optimally set this cap, however, the 
planner must know not only the cost functions and benefit functions, but how the cost 
functions interact between the two pollutants. If policy is mistakenly set without taking 
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into account of the interactions in the cost function, then the cap would be set at 2A , 
where MC2=B'(A2). This is the second-best cap that will be considered in detail below. 
$
A2A2
B'( )A2
MC*
a2 A2
*
MC2
 
Figure V-3. Marginal benefit and marginal cost of abating pollutant 2 
If the cap is set at *2A , then it is efficient to allow double-dipping. If the cap is set 
inappropriately at 2A , however, then it is not so clear that double dipping is the socially 
optimal response. Note that regardless of whether double-dipping is allowed, the a2 units 
of abatement created by the regulation of pollutant 1 will take place and will yield social 
benefits. If multiple markets are not allowed, then the remaining firms must 
supply 2A units of abatement, leading to total abatement of 2 2A a+ . If double-dipping is 
allowed, then only 2A  units of abatement would be provided, with 2a  and 22 aA −  
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units supplied by the firms presented in Figure V-2 and by remaining respectively. 
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Figure V-4. Welfare losses under a second-best cap if double-dipping is allowed (A) 
or not allowed (N)  
 
Because 2A  is not socially optimal, a welfare loss will result; the question is 
whether the loss is greater with or without double-dipping. If double-dipping is allowed, 
then as seen in Figure V-4, total abatement will be 2A  and the equilibrium price in the 
market will be at p. Relative to *2A , an inefficiently low level of total abatement results 
leading to welfare cost, the triangle A in Figure V-4. The alternative is to not allow 
double-dipping. In this case the a2 credits would not be counted in the pollutant 2 market 
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and total abatement would be 2 2A a+ , an oversupply of abatement. From 
*
2A  to 
2 2A a+ , the social marginal benefit is less than the social marginal cost, and the welfare 
loss is indicated by the shaded triangle labeled N.   
In this simple example, the efficiency of allowing for multiple markets depends 
on the relative slopes of the MC and MB curves. If the MB curve is relatively steep, then 
the N triangle grows implying that it is more efficient to allow double-dipping.  
Intuitively, this makes sense since a steep MB curve indicates that total abatement goal is 
fairly well defined, and multiple markets allow us to achieve that goal at the lowest 
possible cost. On the other hand, if the MB curve is relatively flat, then the total 
abatement goal is not so well defined but is quite sensitive to the marginal cost. As the 
MB curve becomes more horizontal, the triangle A grows and the triangle N shrinks.   
In this case, allowing multiple markets would be more inefficient. At the extreme, if the 
MB curve is horizontal, then it clearly holds that it is inefficient to allow double dipping. 
 The simplistic analysis in Figure V-4 shows when the caps are not set optimally, 
it is not clear whether allowing double-dipping is more efficient (or less inefficient) than 
not allowing it.  
As general analytical results are not available, we turn to a specific case with 
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quadratic cost and benefit functions. Even for this simplistic model, however, we find 
that analytical results cannot be obtained, so the use of numerical analysis is required. 
  
5.2. Multiple Markets in an Economy with Quadratic Abatement Costs 
5.2.1. Firm’s cost function and its basic conditions 
In this section, we analyze the multiple market problem in the context of an 
economy in which the abatement cost curves of the firms are quadratic in abatement 
with an interaction term across the two pollutants. This analytical work is the precursor 
to the numerical simulations which are presented in the next section and allow us to 
explore how changes in parameter values will affect whether it is socially preferred to 
allow double dipping.  
Perfectly competitive market structure is assumed, in which there are n firms 
(i=1,…,n) and two pollutants (j=1,2). We assume a quadratic abatement cost function for 
a firm i which is a negative function of emission ,, 21 ii ee  but a positive function of 
pollution abatement 21 , ii aa  when ijijij eea −= with an interaction term: 
(6) 
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As equation (6) shows, ije is the equivalent of *ije  in the first section, standing 
for the optimum emission level that achieves a firm’s maximum profit without any 
restriction on emissions. If the coefficient of the interaction term between 1ie and 2ie , 
,iγ  is positive, then the pollutants 1 and 2 are substitutes. If iγ  is negative, they are 
complements. We focus on the case of complements where the reaction curves of an iso-
cost ellipse are positively sloped as are the cases of Figure V-1-b and Figure V-5.  
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Figure V-5. Iso-cost curve for quadratic cost function 
 
For the simulation exercise in the next section, this cost function must be defined 
to take on reasonable value in the first quadrant. Hence, the inequalities 10 ijij ee ≥  
should be satisfied and parameters must be chosen for these inequalities to be satisfied. 
As we see below, a positive price on pollution abatement will cause firms to abate their 
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pollution as long as 0221 >− iii γαα .22  
 
5.2.2. Two ways of firm’s cost minimization: emission or abatement 
A firm minimizes the sum of abatement cost plus license purchase cost with the 
restrictions that emission must be limited by the licenses the firm holds ( ijl ). When two 
license markets are available a firm’s problem becomes23 
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where 0ijl  denotes the initial distribution of tradable permits to a firm i for the pollutant j 
and pj is the price at which the tradeable rights are transacted.  
                                            
22
 See APPENDIX B for proof. The conditions for 01 ≥
ije  also must be satisfied. These 
conditions are summarized as kjijeijeike
ij
i ≠−≥− (
α
γ
 in Appendix C. But these 
depend on the exogenously given individual firm’s technological parameter ( ije ) which 
is not explicitly controlled in this analysis. These hidden conditions are assumed to hold. 
 
23
 Non-negativity conditions of variables are absolutely assumed even if those are 
omitted hereafter. 
 
  202 
This minimization problem is equivalent to the following problem in terms of 
abatements which will be adopted when ijijij eea −= and 
0
ijij
d
ij lll −=  where 0>
d
ijl  is 
license demand and 0<dijl  is license supply of a firm i for a pollutant j. 
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The optimization problem must satisfy the following market clearing conditions 
when no transaction costs are assumed.  
(9) ( ) ( ) 2,10,0 0*0* =≤−=− ∑∑ jllllp
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ijijj  
Where *ijl denotes optimum licenses a firm holds with the restriction on abatements 
 
5.2.3. Supply function for tradable permits with double-dipping 
When multiple markets are allowed, the Lagrangian of a firm i’s problem is 
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The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the minimization problem are 
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It should hold that ija >0 in the first two conditions.
24
 Thus at the optimum, the 
marginal cost of abatement equals its shadow price, kjaaMC ijikiijijij ≠=+= ,λγα . The 
following three graphs show relationship among the exogenously given maximum 
emission level of a firm to maximize its profit “without” restriction on abatement )( ije , 
                                            
24
 From the first condition ( ) kjkjaaaaa ijikiijijijijikiijij ≠∀=−+≥−+ ,,0,0 λγαλγα , 
(1) if ( ) 0>−+ ijikiijij aa λγα , then 00 21 == ii aanda  from the first two conditions. If 
00 21 == ii aanda are put into ( ) 0>−+ ijikiijij aa λγα , it leads to contradictive 0<ijλ . 
Therefore, it must hold that ( ) 0=−+ ijikiijij aa λγα . (2) If 021 == ii aa , then 021 == ii λλ . 
We can exclude this case which will be explained immediately next. (3) And when one 
of abatement is strictly greater than zero, the other abatement should be also strictly 
greater than zero because technical complementarity exists, say, the case that 
)(0and0 mkaa imik ≠=>  does not exist in this technology. Therefore, there is no such 
case as 021 == ii aa  simultaneously. 
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optimum abatement level “with” restriction on abatement )( *ija , market price and 
marginal cost.  
The Lagrange multiplier ijλ is interpreted as an intrinsic value or shadow price; it 
represents the maximum willingness to pay (WTP) for abatement or license purchase or 
combination of abatement and license purchase by a firm at the optimum incurred by the 
unit change of maximum emission capacity of the firm i ( ije ). 
In Figure V-6, we present the three possible cases of firm’s cost minimization.  
In Figure V-6-a, we present the case that ijij ea >
*
, i.e., the case in which the optimal 
pollution level would be negative. But this is impossible from 0≥−= ijijij aee . No firm 
would abate more than its maximum emission level and such a corner solution is not 
possible. There is also no such case as 021 == ii λλ  simultaneously. This is the case only 
when kjjaaMC ijikiijijij ≠∀==+= ,,0λγα . Since αij>0 and γi<0, this could only hold 
if 021 == ii aa which means p1=p2=0. We do not have any reason to analyze this case. 
Hence, in this situation, a firm’s WTP is strictly greater than zero in at least one market. 
Figure V-6-b is the interior solution case of cost minimization, where *ijijj MCp λ==  
with ijijij eal ==
**
,0 . Finally, Figure V-6-c presents the case where *ijijj MCp λ== , 
.,0 ** ijijij eal <>  In either case, we find the relationship 0
* ≥== ijijj MCp λ  with at 
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least one of *ijλ  strictly greater than zero and ijijij eal ≤≥ ** ,0  at the optimum.   
jp  
 jp  jp
 
ije  k        eij=0     
*
ija  
(a) 0, ** => ijijij lea  
  ije               eij=0 (= *ija  )      
   (b) 0, * === ijlijijMCjp λ  
   ije                
*
ija   eij=0       
  (c)  0, * >== ijlijijMCjp λ  
 
Figure V-6. Marginal Cost (MC) curves 
 
Finally, the optimum conditions for a cost minimizing firm i from pollution 
abatement efforts are set at ( ) ( )2121 ,, iiijiiijj aagaaMCp ==  where ijg denotes the first 
derivative of the cost function ig with respect to ija . Hence, the following holds: 
0,0,, 21221222112111 ≥≥==+===+= iiiiiiiiiiiiii llpaaMCpaaMC λγαλγα  
Then, each firm’s supply function is derived as follows. 
(11) 2122
21
212
1 ˆˆ pp
pp
a ii
iii
ii
i γαγαα
γα
−=
−
−
=   
(12) 1212
21
121
2 ˆˆ pp
pp
a ii
iii
ii
i γαγαα
γα
−=
−
−
=  
where 2
21
2
21
2
22
21
1
1 ˆ,ˆ,ˆ
iii
i
i
iii
i
i
iii
i
i γαα
γγ
γαα
α
α
γαα
α
α
−
=
−
=
−
=  
Because the denominator ( )221 iii γαα −  is strictly greater than zero by assumption 
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(APPENDIX C), each firm’s supply is a positive function of own and complement 
abatement prices as is clearly expected since we assumed 0,0 <> iij γα .  Whether a 
firm is a buyer or seller in the market will be determined by the optimal abatement levels 
identified in (11) and (12).  
Aggregate supply function is just a horizontal sum of each firm’s supply in terms 
of pollution abatement, say, ∑=
i
ijj aA .  By Lemma 2, individual optimization leads to 
the social optimum. Therefore, the aggregate supply function is a positive function of 
own and complement abatement prices. 
(13) ∑∑ ∑ ∑ −=
−
−
−
=
i
i
i i i
i
iii
i
iii
i ppppAS γα
γαα
γ
γαα
α
ˆˆ 2212
21
22
21
2
11  
(14) ∑ ∑ ∑∑ −=
−
−
−
=
i i i
i
i
i
iii
i
iii
i ppppAS γα
γαα
γ
γαα
α
ˆˆ 1122
21
12
21
1
22  
 
5.2.4. The social benefit function  
Social benefit function )( jB for a pollutant j is assumed to be quadratic. The 
aggregate social benefit function is additively separable as ∑=
j
jj ABAB )()(  with  
(15) 2,1,,0,0where
2
)( 2 ==>>Ω−Ω= ∑ jaAAAAB
i
ijjjjj
j
jjjj θ
θ
. 
The optimum will exist at the values of Aj such that 0)( ≥′ jj AB , which leads to the 
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condition, .
j
j
jA θ
Ω
≤  Diminishing marginal benefit automatically holds in this function, 
that is to say, .0)( <−=′′ jjj AB θ  
 
5.2.5. The first best and second best case  
Market equilibrium in the first best case 
In the context of the parametric assumptions made above, we consider now the 
first best case where an environmental regulatory agency is fully aware of the 
technological complementarity among each firm’s pollution abatement efforts, say, 
0<iγ . Then, the agency determines the abatement cap for the pollutant j by maximizing 
the net social benefit function.25 
(16) 
∑
∑∑
==






++−



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
−Ω
i
jij
i
iiii
i
i
i
j
j
j
jj
a
jAats
aaaaAAMax
ij
2,1,..
222 21
2
2
22
1
12 γααθ
 
Under the first best case the social optimum is found taking into account the full 
degree to which prices will adjust. Hence, the social optimum will be set where 
                                            
25
 
( ) ∑∑ ∑ =






−+
i
iii
i j
ijijjiii aagllpaag ),(),( 21021  because ( ) 00 =−∑
i
ijijj llp  
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( ) jjj pAMB = and then aggregate demand function is  
(17) 
j
jj
jj
p
AAD
θ
−Ω
==  
Now, we can generate the market clearing prices that satisfy both the aggregate 
supply function (13) and (14), and the aggregate demand function (17). The optimum 
will clear the market, .*jjj AADAS ==  
*
jA is, therefore, the abatement cap in the first-
best case for the pollutant j, which will be set by the agency. In the first best case, 
double-dipping provides the first best outcome as is explained previously. 
The resulting optimal market clearing prices are shown as follows: 
(18) 
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑∑
∑∑
+++−
Ω+Ω+Ω
=
i i i i
ii
i
iii
i
i
i
i
p
1ˆˆ})ˆ(ˆˆ{
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1221
2
2121
112121
*
1
αθαθγααθθ
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(19) 
∑
∑
+
+Ω
=
i
i
i
i p
p
12
*
122
*
2
ˆ1
ˆ
αθ
γθ
 
It is assumed that∑ ∑ ∑ >−
i i i
iii 0)ˆ(ˆˆ 221 γαα  for a positively sloped social supply curve 
as equation (24) and (25) show. Prices must be positive so that numerators 
0ˆˆ 112121 ≥Ω+Ω+Ω ∑∑
i
i
i
i γθαθ and 0ˆˆ 221212 ≥Ω+Ω+Ω ∑∑
i
i
i
i γθαθ are assumed using 
symmetry between prices and parameters. The positive prices conditions guarantee that 
the marginal social benefit must be positive, .
j
j
jA θ
Ω
≤  
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Market equilibrium in the second best case 
As we have indicated above, to optimally choose the caps on pollution (i.e. to 
choose A1* and A2*) the regulatory agency must know the parameters of the cost 
functions and be able to anticipate the response of the firms that result due to the 
complementarities in the abatement cost functions. This seems like an unrealistic level of 
knowledge. In practice, to the extent that optimal policies are sought, it might be more 
realistic to assume that regulators look at the marginal cost curves of each pollutant 
separately, ignoring the interactions between the two pollutants. This would be roughly 
equivalent to assuming that if the environmental regulatory agency does not consider the 
technologically complementary relationship among each firm’s pollution abatement 
efforts, 21, ii aa , the agency ignores the interaction effect, i.e., for some reason, it acting as 
if 0=iγ . In this case, the agency determines the abatement cap for the pollutant j by 
maximizing the following net social benefit function which is additively separable with 
the equality constraint in order to set up the cap. 
(20) 
∑
∑∑
==






+−





−Ω
i
jij
i
i
i
i
i
j
j
j
jj
a
jAats
aaAAMax
ij
2,1,..
222
2
2
22
1
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The abatement cap on the second best case )( **jA can be obtained from the first-
  210 
order conditions which is jiaA ijijjjj ,0 ∀=−−Ω αθ .We can, therefore, write the 
second best abatement cap as the solution to a system of linear equations as follows. 
(21) 
∑ ==
∀Ω=+
i
jij
jijijjj
jAa
jiaA
2,1,
,
**
αθ
 
The linear system of equations that would satisfy the optimum could, therefore, 
be rewritten as a linear equation system for the pollutant j as 
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From this linear equation system with (n+1) variables and (n+1) equations, we can solve 
it for ija  and .
**
jA  
However, this does not explicitly express the relationship of price and abatement. 
Let’s use the method in the first best case to go around this computational problem. The 
environmental agency faces the aggregate demand function in terms of price as in 
equation (17). In order to compute a socially optimal abatement cap, the agency needs to 
obtain each individual firm’s optimal abatement from ijijijj aMCp α== , ignoring the 
term kjaiki ≠whereγ . Then, the second best abatement cap that it computes equals 
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∑ ∑===
i i ij
j
ijij
p
aAS
α
γ )0( . From the relationship **)0( jjij AADAS ===γ , the 
resultant prices which are not actual market prices but needed to compute the second 
best cap are obtained as follows. Actual market prices at these abatement caps will be 
given by the prices of the equation (24) and (25), which are denoted by MMjp .  
(22) 2,111
ˆ =
+
Ω
=
∑
jp
i ij
j
j
j
α
θ
    
Finally, **jA , the abatement cap on the second best case for the pollutant j, can be 
computed from ASj or ADj with jpˆ . These prices and caps are shown in Figure V-7. 
                
**
jA
*
jA              abatement 
    jpˆ  
    
*
jp  
 
MM
jp  
)0( <ijAS γ  
)0( =ijAS γ
 
jAD
 
Figure V-7. Demand, supplies and prices26 
 
                                            
26
 AS, A*, A** denote aggregate supply, first best and second best caps. γ is a 
complementary abatement term in the supply function and p is a price. 
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Multiple Market (MM) case with the second best cap 
In the multiple market case, firms can sell the permits in both markets. We 
assume that although the planner is unaware of γi, each firm surely knows 0<iγ  and 
makes optimal choices accordingly. Then, each firm will minimize the following 
equation, subject to the inequality constraints on minimum abatement requirement.  
(23) ( ) ( )
2,1,..
0
222
0
11121
2
2
22
2
2
11
2,1,2,1
)2,1,2,1(
2,1,2,1
=≤−
−+−+++=
jijaijlijets
ililpililpiaiai
iaiiai
ililiaia
MinililiaiaiC
ililiaia
Min γ
αα
 
We know the solution of firm’s supply and aggregate supply functions as are 
generated in the equation (11), (12), (13) and (14) above, which was the interior solution. 
If the linear equations (13) and (14) are solved in terms of 21 and pp with the given 
second best abatement caps **jA instead of the first best abatement caps
*
jA , the solutions 
are shown as follows: 
(24) 
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(25) 
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An individual firm’s behavior was already analyzed as is summarized as follows.  
(26) 2122
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−
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(27) 1212
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−
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Single Market (SM) case with the second best cap 
In the single market case in which firms are allowed to sell permits in only one 
market, they will choose the market that generates the highest profits or lowest costs. 
Each firm decides which market to participate by comparing its cost function 
.and 21 ii CC  
Let us assume temporarily that a firm participates in market 1 to know a typical 
behavior of a firm, the cost function that will be minimized becomes27 
(28) 
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The second constraint comes from .0222 ii
d
i lll −=
28
 Here, 022 =−=
d
i
d
i ll  because market 
2 is assumed to be not available. We also assumed that initial license distribution is 
                                            
27
 This cost function is symmetric so that solution of participating in market 2 is also 
symmetric. 
 
28
 If ,02 >
d
il  it is excess license demand. If ,02 <
d
il it is excess license supply. 
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grandfathered )0( 0 >ijl . 
The Lagrangian for the second best (SB) case is 
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The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are: 
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Again, 21 and ii aa  are strictly greater than zero. At the optimum it must be that 11 ip λ= , 
otherwise the price exceeds the marginal cost in the first condition so that cost 
minimization is not achieved. There was no such case as 021 == ii λλ  as was examined.  
The shadow price or maximum willingness to pay for abatement 1 )( 1iλ must be 
greater than zero and the constraint for abatement 1 binds when a firm is committed in 
market 1.29 Therefore, there are two solutions accordingly with 0,0 21 ≥> ii λλ  when the 
                                            
29
 See the case when 02,01 >= ii λλ  because there is no such case as 021 == ii λλ . 
( )
,
1
0
22
1,Then
i
iliei
ia α
γ −−
=
0
222 ilieia −= . This firm is not price-responsive and does not 
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firm is committed in market 1.  
The first solution is when 0,0 21 => ii λλ . The equilibrium point corresponds to B 
in Figure V-8 below. At such an equilibrium, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions become: 
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The solution for this system of equations yields  
(30) 2
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2
21
2
212121 ˆ,ˆwhereˆ,ˆ
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B
i papa γαα
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−
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The second solution is when 0,0 21 >> λλ . In this case the firm participates only 
in market 1, but must take additional steps in order to come into compliance with market 
2. The equilibrium point corresponds to C in Figure V-8, which will be graphically 
investigated in detail in the following two cases, say, case 1 and case 2, depending on the 
amount of initially given licenses.30   
                                                                                                                                 
have any incentive to join market 1. The firm should have joined market 2 with 
abatement, 21ˆ2,21 piiapiia αγ =−= . 
 
30
 At the point C of the right hand side graph, .Bij
C
ij aa >  Then, the conditions, 
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The solution is 
(31) ( ) 0222
1
0
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1 , ii
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( )( ) ( )kj
i
iiiike ik
j
l
p ≠
−−
−< ,
2
21
0
γ
γαα
 must be satisfied. But these depend on the 
exogenously given individual firm’s technological parameter ( ike ) which is not 
explicitly controlled. These conditions are assumed to hold.  
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       P1                     A              B                C            D 
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1
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*
1il : optimum license demand 
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    B 
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Figure V-8. Marginal Cost (MC) and license market: second best case 
 
The initial distribution of license )( 0ijl does matter to find the optimum, B or C on 
the above graph in the second best case when double dipping is not allowed.  
There are four possibilities about the decision on which market to participate. 
Depending on the initial distribution of licenses, the firm compares the cost of 
participating in market 1 to that of participating in market 2 and decides which market it 
enters. The firm sells in market 1 if the cost function shows the relationship 21 ii CC ≤ . 
Case 1 is when the initial distribution is given as 2
0
2 ˆii el ≥ , 1
0
1 ˆii el ≥ . If 
0
2il  is 
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initially given relatively abundant between 22 andˆ ii ee  in the right-hand side graph, the 
equilibrium occurs at point B because 0111 >== pMC ii λ and 022 == iiMC λ as the first 
case above and the firm satisfies the requirement of abatement for the pollutant 2, say, 
0
22222 ˆˆ iiiii leaee −≥=− , which is the last inequality Kuhn-Tucker condition of the first 
case. The abatement of the participant of market 1 is determined as  
2
0
212121 ˆbecauseˆ,ˆ iiiiii elpapa ≥−== γα .  
When these values are substituted in the cost function, its value becomes a 
function of parameters as follows.31 
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If a firm participates in market 2 and initial distribution is given as 1
0
1 ˆii el ≥ , then 
the same logic applies as above and the firm decides the abatement as  
1
0
121221 ˆbecauseˆ,ˆ iiiiii elpapa ≥=−= αγ , and cost functions are 
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Case 2 is when 2
0
2 ˆii el < , 1
0
1 ˆii el < . If the firm participates in market 1 and 
0
2il  is 
distributed below the level of 2ˆie  as shown in the graph, the firm cannot meet the 
                                            
31
 See the APPENDIX D. 
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regulation for the pollutant 2 at the point B since the amount of pollution that this firm is 
willing to emit )ˆ( 2ie is greater than the initial distribution )( 02il but it cannot participate in 
market 2. Therefore, it must just abate more of the pollutant 2 until 0222ˆ iii lea −= , which 
is the last equality Kuhn-Tucker condition of the second case. This occurs at point L 
where 0, 22111 >=<= iiii MCpMC λλ . MCi1 decreases when the firm increases 2ia  
from the point B with a given level of 1ia since 0<iγ in the equation, 
12111 paaMC iiiii =+= γα . The 1iMC curve moves to the right in the left-hand side graph. 
At the point L, the firm can minimize the cost or maximize the profit by abating more of 
pollutant 1 because 11 pMCi <  until the point C is reached )ˆˆˆˆ( 1111 ii eeoraa →→ . 1iMC  
increases along the new MCi1 curve in the left-hand side graph as the abatement for the 
pollutant 1 increases until 11 aˆai = . The abatements and cost function are  
(34) 
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If a firm participates in market 2 and initial distribution is given as 1
0
1 ˆii el < , then 
the same logic applies as above, and the abatements and cost function are  
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(35) 
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Case 3 is when 2
0
2 ˆii el < , 1
0
1 ˆii el ≥ . If a firm participates in market 1 the abatement 
levels and cost function are summarized as 
(36) 
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But if a firm participates in market 2, 
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Case 4 is when 2
0
2 ˆii el ≥ , 1
0
1 ˆii el < , If a firm participates in market 1,  
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If a firm participates in market 2  
(39) 
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Case 1 seems likely in the real world when the initial distribution is given as 
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2
0
21
0
1 ˆ,ˆ iiii elel ≥≥ . The special but reasonable case is 0,0
0
22
0
11 >=>= iiii lele . This is the 
allocation that would be used in programs in which emission rights to (some) polluters 
are grandfathered based on pre-existing levels, especially for non-point source polluting 
firms. Baseline and credit programs, in which nonpoint polluters are allowed to sell 
credits if they reduce their emissions, would fit into exactly this case. In this case the 
firm does not have any legal obligation to abate or it has abundant initial distribution of 
license enough to not reduce emission; the transferable credit program is simply a 
positive incentive to reduce pollution. The firm participates in the market just to make 
profits by selling the abatement product, and a governmental agency mainly endeavors 
to facilitate the effectiveness of the multiple markets rather than to reduce pollution itself. 
We can find many of these examples in the real world. For example, a containment pond 
to create nutrient emission abatement credits for improving water quality might also be 
creating a wetland that can be exchanged in the market. At the same time, this has a role 
of reducing greenhouse gases and offers habitat for species. These complementary 
environmental goods for non-point source polluting firms may have little to do with 
governmental restriction on abatement or emission. In this chapter, we focus primarily 
on such cases.   
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The case 2, tight pollution control, is generally the typical case of traditional 
pollution reduction, for instance, SO2 reduction, to protect from hazardous effects of 
pollution emission. The governmental agency has been reinforcing the environmental 
standard stricter than before as damage has increased and/or been accumulated.  
Cases 3 and 4 are basically the same since the equations are symmetric 
depending on the market index 1 and 2, so that either case is analyzed in the same way. 
These cases will not be easily found as long as the environmental agency is rational and 
traces the complementarity. If one environmentally hazardous pollutant should be 
reduced, another complementary pollutant should also be reduced, so that these two 
pollutants should be regulated in a complementary way. It will not be very realistic that 
the agency will distribute one pollution license abundantly and the other complementary 
license scantly.  
 The Multiple Market problem with point and non-point sources 
Let’s assume that there are two types of polluting firms: Nonpoint source (NPS) 
firms and Point source (PS) firms. For the nonpoint firms we assume that we are in case 
1 above where each firm i (=1,2,…n) chooses which market to participate in and has 
abundant initial distribution of licenses.  
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The condition to sell in market 1 is rearranged as follows starting from 21 ii CC ≤ . 
(40) ( ) ( )02220111122221 2
ˆ
2
ˆ
iiii
ii lepleppp −−−≥− αα  
It is assumed that the initial distribution 01il  and 
0
2il  are set as 
0
22
0
11 , iiii lele == . 
In this case it follows that:32 
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= , the firm is indifferent between market 1 or 2. 
The cost functions are summarized as: 
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(45) 
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−= , for the firms selling in market 2 
These cost functions are negative so that the negative cost functions become the profit 
functions, that is to say, )()( ⋅=⋅− jijiC pi . 
We assume that the point source firms in our model t (= n+1, n+2,…, m) do not 
produce multiple pollutants; either they emit pollutant 1 or pollutant 2, or, 
mathematically equivalently, they produce both pollutants but without an interaction 
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term γ. The key point is that their cost minimization problem is additively separable, and 
they will minimize the cost of abating pollutant 1 without reference to the level of 
abatement of pollutant 2. They are allowed to participate in either market. The initial 
distribution will not matter to their optimal level of abatement; they will always abate up 
to the point where the marginal benefit equals the price. If a firm received initial 
distribution of license that does not fully satisfy its need to reduce emission, then, the 
firm would buy the licenses supplied by non-point source firms in the market, say, 
.00111 >−= tt
d
t lll   
A point source firm would minimize the following cost function that does not 
have an interaction term between .and 21 tt aa  
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If the interior solution for the point source firms is assumed, it will make a decision 
when 2,1,0with ==−−== jalepaMC tjtjtjjtjtjtj α . The solution and cost functions 
would be 
(47) 
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where 2,1,0 =∀>≥ jlee tjtjtj  
We will make some assumptions to simplify the simulation analysis which 
follows this section. First, only one PS firm exists but it is still a price taker. Second, this 
firm is very cost-inefficient for abatements since its abatement cost is too high, so that it 
will demand credits from the relatively efficient NPS polluters. Third, social abatement 
cap is set at the level, **0 jtjtj Ale =− . This implies that the PS firm buys all licenses for 
pollutant 1 and 2 which all NPS firms supply in the market.33 Let’s assume the cost 
function of the PS firm is ( ) 2211
2
22
2
11
21 22
, tttt
tttt
ttt akak
aa
aag +++=
αα
. According to the 
assumptions above, the solution of this firm’s cost minimization would be: 
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The NPS firms supply abatements without purchasing those and one PS firm 
demands all credits without any abatements. The PS firm’s cost function becomes the 
costs of purchasing the social abatement cap which collapses when cost functions of all 
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NPS firms and the PS firm are aggregated34 since we assumed that the markets are 
perfectly competitive and there are no transaction costs. Actually, the social abatement 
cost function ends up with the summation of the n NPS firms’ abatement cost functions 
since the PS firm does not abate and terms for transaction of licenses between the NPS 
firms and the PS firm vanish. 
 The Solution algorithm for the second best case 
In our simulation analysis, we are able to find analytical solutions to the case 
when multiple markets are allowed. However, when polluters are only allowed to sell 
credits in one market, a numerical solution method is required. Here we outline NPS 
firms are ordered in terms of the ratio )/( 21 ii αα .  
The market equilibrium is defined as a division k and a price vector, 21 , pp  
subject to three conditions. (1) Out of n firms, firms i=1…k participate in market 1. The 
kth participant will be that with the highest ratio
2
1
k
k
α
α
. (2) The constraints, **1
1
1ˆ Aa
k
i
i ≥∑
=
 
and **2
1
2
ˆ
ˆ Aa
n
ki
i ≥∑
+=
 must be satisfied, where A1** and A2** are the total number of credits 
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that must be purchased by the point sources in markets 1 and 2 respectively, and 1ˆia  
and 2ˆˆia  are abatements committed to markets 1 and 2 respectively. (3) The resulting 
abatement levels of the division k must yield the least cost way to satisfy the abatement 
targets. 
The first step is to the participants in terms of
2
1
i
i
α
α
. Let the kth participant to be the 
one with the highest ratio such that the firm participates in market 1. There are n−1 
possible divisions, from k=1 to k=n−1. For an each of these possible divisions, the first 
step is to find the price ratio that would support this division. For the kth division, it must 
hold that  
(48) 2
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A market equilibrium supporting a division at k must supply **2**1 and AA credits 
from the firms participating in each market. It must hold that35 
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If the equations are rearranged in terms of ,and 21 pp then, 
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We can therefore set up the starting prices as  
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From this starting point, we can then raise p1 or p2 until the following inequalities 
hold, 
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Once the prices that will support the kth division are found, the total costs of that 
division are identified:  
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This simplifies to36 
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After finding the total cost for all possible divisions of the set of producers, the market 
equilibrium is the one that minimizes costs. 
 
5.3. Simulation Analysis 
In this section, we present the results of the simulation analysis that is used to 
evaluate the relative merits of allowing double dipping in a second-best economy in 
which the aggregate cap is set suboptimally. The purpose of the simulation analysis is to 
explore the theoretical properties of the problem in the spirit of Judd (1997). Hence, the 
parameter values are not chosen to reflect any particular “real-world” economic system, 
but are used instead to explore the general relationships of the model. 
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 See the APPENDIX D for proof. 
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5.3.1. Parametric conditions of the model for simulation 
We limit our analysis to sets of parameter values that yield positively sloped 
individual firm and social supply functions. This requires the following parametric 
conditions to hold: 
(55)
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We also limit our analysis to the concave social benefit function that limits its 
domain where the marginal net benefit is nonnegative. 
(56) },|2,1{where *** jjj
j
j
j AAjAA ==
Ω
≤
θ
.  
However, the equation (56) is guaranteed by the positive price condition, 
},,ˆ,|2,1{where0 * SMjMMjjjjj ppppjpp ==≥ . These conditions ensure that the 
equilibrium prices are greater than zero and aggregate abatement is greater than zero. 
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5.3.2. Simulation methodology 
We used Matlab programming language to run a simulation model. For the 
results presented here, we limit ourselves to the case where the number of nonpoint 
source firms (i), point source firms (t), pollutants (j) are i=10, t=1, j=2, respectively.  
In each simulation, the parameters of benefit and cost functions ( iijjj γαθ ,,,Ω ) 
are initially chosen randomly using uniform random number generation method until the 
positive price conditions are met during the 50 loops of the random number generation 
process.37  
The intercept parameters of marginal benefit (MB) function, jΩ , are initially 
chosen between 0.1 and 10 in order to scale up magnitude so that positive prices are 
easily obtained without going through continually iterated loop and enough net benefits 
can be earned. The slope parameters of the MB function, jθ , are chosen between 0 and 1. 
The parameters of the cost functions, ijα , are selected between 0.2 and 3 to see when the 
                                            
37
 If positive price conditions are not satisfied until the 50 loops, negative prices could 
be generated and these points are differentiated in the simulation graphs, being ignored 
in our analysis. 
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single market dominates. The other cost function parameters, iγ , are randomly chosen, 
but rejected until the conditions 0221 >− iii γαα  are satisfied.  
With these initially chosen parameters, each market equilibrium, { *** ,, jijj Aap }, 
{ **,, jMMijMMj Aap }, { **,, jSMijSMj Aap }, was computed, and the corresponding social 
welfares were calculated using the social benefit and cost functions. Then, comparative 
static analysis was carried out by varying one parameter or a set of parameters at a time. 
Representative results are presented in the figures below, which indicate the qualitative 
properties of different types of results that might be encountered. We focus on how the 
social welfares of all three cases, the first best case (FB), the multiple market case (MM) 
and single market case (SM) in the second best case (SB), will be changing as one 
parameter or a set of those parameters changes. The equations that form the core of the 
simulation model are provided in APPENDIX E. 
 
5.3.3. Simulation results 
As we have discussed above, when a second-best cap is set on aggregate 
emissions, it is not known whether allowing multiple markets is efficient. If the cap is set 
too low, then it can be preferred to force polluters to choose one market or the other, 
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ensuring that additional emission reductions are achieved due to the complementarity. 
The simulation analysis seeks to help us understand the conditions under which multiple 
markets might be preferred. This analysis can be thought of as simulated comparative 
statics analysis – holding all other parameters constant, one parameter is varied and the 
consequences for net benefits in the alternative institutional structures are calculated.  
For notation, every index (j=1, 2) which follows capital letters denotes market 1 
and 2. For example, MB1 represents marginal benefit of market 1, or SM1 and MM2 
represent the single market case in market 1 and the multiple markets case in market 2. 
When we want to explain an overall market, there is no index in those capital letters such 
as SM or MM which stand for overall single or multiple markets including market 1 and 
2. Unless indicated, any other notation will be used in the same way. 
Changes of the slopes of Marginal Benefit (MB) curves: jθ   
In the very simple graphical model discussed above in Figure V-4, allowing 
multiple markets tended to be more efficient as the marginal benefit curve became 
steeper. Does this effect continue in a more general setting? We begin by considering 
changes in the slope of one of the marginal benefit curves, 1θ . As θ1 increases with an 
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intercept remaining unchanged, social benefits will decrease because total benefits are 
integrated underneath a new MB1 curve which is steeper than before.  
Figure V-9a through Figure V-9e present the total net benefits in the economy 
under the first-best setting (+), and in the second best options when trading in only one 
market is allowed (o), and when multiple markets are allowed (*). All graphs except for 
Figure V-9e show that all net benefits decline monotonically as 1θ  increases. Of course, 
the FB case (+) always dominates since it does not have any social welfare loss. The FB 
graphs will not be drawn unless the FB case is needed to follow up the analysis because 
our main focus is on the relative performance of the MM and SM cases.   
The simulation analysis shows us several things about the relative merits of the 
MM and SM structures. Figure V-9aa is typical of many of the simulated results; it 
shows that once 1θ  exceeds some level, the MM policy dominates.  
Figure V-9b and Figure V-9e show a strong MM dominance over the entire range 
of increase in 1θ . The MM dominance pattern also holds in Figure V-9c when both slope 
parameters, 1θ and 2θ , increase simultaneously and MM catches up with SM. Hence, our 
simulation results support our hypothesis that MM tends to be more efficient than SM as 
the MB curve becomes steeper. In most of our simulations the MM dominated, but this is 
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not general as seen in Figure V-9d38 nor necessarily reflective of conditions that might 
exist in a true market. 
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Figure V-9a. Net benefits change with a demand slope parameter changing 1 
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 The first two points violate the positive price conditions so that they are ignored in the 
analysis. 
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Figure V-9b. Net benefits change with a demand slope parameter changing 2 
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Figure V-9c. Net benefits change with demand slope parameters changing 3 
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Figure V-9d. Net benefits change with a demand slope parameter changing 4 
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Figure V-9e. Net benefits change with a demand slope parameter changing 5 
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There are some anomalies to this general finding, however. Figure V-9d shows 
that SM (o) can dominate over a wide range even the scale of 1θ  increases. But 
differences between net benefits of SM and MM gradually decline as 1θ  increases. One 
reason this could occur is that even if MM1 dominates in market 1, SM2 dominance 
effect with the relatively steeper supply curve than MB2 curve in market 2 is greater than 
MM1 dominance effect with the relatively steeper MB1 curve than the supply curves in 
market 1.39   
In Figure V-9e, MM is dominating but it presents another exceptional case in the 
sense that MM overall net benefits decline gradually in a stable way but SM net benefit 
jumps up and down irregularly. This reflects a very special characteristic of a SM supply 
curve. The SM supply curve is very different from FB and MM supply curves which are 
continuous smooth lines. Each SM participant compares the squared market prices 
ratio 221 )/( pp  to the cost function slope parameter ratio )/( 21 ii αα  to minimize their 
costs and k firms participate in market 1 out of n firms. Hence, the slope of the SM 
                                            
39
 Recall that indexes 2 and 1 in SM2 and MM1 denote market 2 and 1. SM2 dominance 
effect is a degree that the single market case in market 2 is dominant compared to the 
multiple market case in market 2. MM1 dominance effect is defined likewise. 
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supply curve becomes flatter as one more firm participates supplying more in that 
market. The supply curve slopes of MM1 and SM1 are numerically expressed as 
∑
=
n
i
i
1
2ˆ/1 α and ∑
=
k
i
i
1
2ˆ/1 α respectively, so that the slope of the SM1 supply curve is always 
greater than those of the FB1 and MM1 supply curves because ∑∑
==
>
k
i
i
n
i
i
1
2
1
2 ˆˆ αα . We can 
draw the SM supply curve (SMS) as is shown in Figure V-9f.  
The dotted horizontal lines between the positively sloped segments of SMS1 
indicate that the marginal firm is indifferent between two markets on which market to 
enter into. Total SM supply curve (TSMS1) is defined as the SM1 supplies transacted in 
market 1 plus supplies of complementary abatements by the market 2 participants. If one 
more firm participates in market 1, one less firm participates in market 2 and the 
complementary abatements produced by market 2 participants will decrease. Hence, the 
TSMS1 will get closer to SM1 as the number of participants in market 1 increase. The 
initial abatement price of SM1 is determined at the point where the vertical second-best 
social cap (A1**) crosses SMS1 and then adjusted. At this price level of P1SM, TSMS1 
supplies include the complementary abatements produced by the market 2 participants, 
which determines the size of welfare loss. 
Under these irregular SMS and TSMS, the slope, location and difference of each 
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SMS and TSMS segment are uncertain so that it is very difficult to locate it in a 
graphical setting and to compare its welfare loss to those of the FB and MM cases. 
Because of these discontinuous shifts in the supply, it is possible for the SM net benefits 
to jump up or down as the MB1 curve becomes steeper and touches a steeper segment of 
SMS1 and TSMS1, in which participants of market 1 decrease. Dominance between SM1 
and MM1 depends on the slope and location and difference of each SMS1 and TSMS1 
segment at the market price as well as the relative slopes of the MB1 and MM1 supply 
curve. Overall dominance of SM and MM in two markets becomes more complicated 
when the dominance of SM2 and MM2 in market 2 is considered simultaneously along 
with that of SM1 and MM1.  
 
 
Figure V-9f. Marginal Benefit (MB) & single market supply (SMS1 & TSMS1) 
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Changes of the intercepts of Marginal Benefit (MB) curves: jΩ  
We now take a look at the intercept of the MB curve, jΩ . Figures below
40
 
present a variety of patterns that were identified in the simulation analysis. When 1Ω  
increases beginning from an initially chosen random number between 0.1 and 10, the 
intercept of MB1 curve moves to the right so that net benefits of FB, MM and SM will 
increase. However, as the intercept parameter increases, the difference between net 
benefits of FB and MM or SM tend to increase because *1A increases relatively faster 
than **1A does due to the steeper agency’s misperceived supply curve to set the second 
best cap than the slope of AS1FB and AS1MM and the difference between *1A and **1A gets 
larger.41 
As we discussed above, it is not possible to judge based on theory whether the 
MM or SM is preferred. However, we could expect that net benefits of MM and SM will 
                                            
40
 The first point in Figure V-10c and the first four points in Figure V-10e violate the 
price positivity condition. 
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the former is strictly greater than the latter under the parameter conditions we maintain. 
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increase and those differences may not be big since the slopes of MB and supply curves 
stay the same. The simulation graphs show this expectation except for Figure V-10e. 
Depending on the SM supply curves, say, SMS1 and TSMS1, which correspond to 
increasing **1A as MB1 curve is expanded to the right, MM dominates (Figure V-10a and 
Figure V-10b) or SM dominates (Figure V-10c and Figure V-10d). These figures are 
consistent with our expectation regardless of MM or SM dominance in the sense that the 
net benefits of MM and SM are being traced on the similar track. The relative 
performance of MM and SM is not much affected. 
Figure V-10e is an exceptional case. SM net benefit is increasing and maximized, 
and then it begins to decrease and the differences of net benefits between MM and SM 
increase. This would be caused by changes of SM participants in both of market 1 and 2 
during the course of choosing one market for firms to join. SM1 participants would face 
a flatter SMS1 segment and SM2 participants would encounter a steeper SMS2 segment 
when MB1 curve is expanded and MM dominates. Hence, an increase in the intercept of 
the marginal benefit curve in one of the two markets can lead to a change as to which 
policy is preferred when the number of each market participants change. 
The simulation analysis, therefore, generally indicates that for the most part, 
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changes in the intercept of the marginal benefit curve do not affect the relative 
performance of the MM or SM programs. Only if the number of SM participants of 
market 1 and 2 changes and firms face steeper or flatter segments of their supply curves 
as a result do we find that the intercept changes are important to determining which 
policy might be preferred.  
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Figure V-10a. Net benefits change with a demand intercept parameter changing 1 
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Figure V-10b. Net benefits change with demand intercept parameters changing 2 
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Figure V-10c. Net benefits Change with a demand intercept parameter changing 3 
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Figure V-10d. Net benefits change with demand intercept parameters changing 4 
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Figure V-10e. Net benefits change with a demand intercept parameter changing 5 
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Changes of the supply curve parameter: ijα
42
 
We next consider the effect of changes in 2iα , the supply curve parameter in 
market 2. Changes in the parameter affect all of the slopes and intercepts of the supply 
curves of FB, MM and SM in both markets.43 The agency’s misperceived supply curve 
of market 2 also is affected. However, the agency’s misperceived supply curve of market 
1 remains the same so that the second best cap, **1A , still does not change even 
after 2iα increases. These supply side changes become much more complicated than the 
case of the demand side where only one of the MB curve parameters in one or both 
market (s) changed.  
In market 1, increasing 2iα  results in decreasing 2ˆ iα and increasing slopes of 
FB1 and MM1 supply curves.44 The intercepts of FB1 and MM1 supply curves increase.45  
                                            
42
 The first point in each of Figure V-11a, Figure V-11b and Figure V-11c violates the 
positive price conditions. 
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 Note that every slope and intercept parameter of the supply curves have the 
2iα element except for the agency’s misperceived supply curve of market 1. 
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Thus, increase of 2iα leads to increasing the slope of the supply curve of market 1 steeper.  
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The supply curves in market 2 move in the same direction as those in market 1. The 
supply curves shift to the left in both markets with the slopes getting steeper and the 
intercepts increasing, and the FB and MM net benefits decrease. The simulation results 
show that the FB and MM net benefits decrease as 2iα increases as are expected. The net 
benefit of SM is also expected to decrease but the simulation does not show this in a 
unilateral way. Only Figure V-11a shows this continually decreasing trend of the net 
benefit. 
This is due to the uncertainty of the SM supply curves again. The lower segments 
of the SM supply curve shifts less in magnitude than its corresponding upper segments 
do as a result of 2iα  increase because the supply curve is drawn differently 
accumulated in each segment of it as the number of participants in a market increase. 
Further, there can be any change of indifference region or interval where participation in 
market 1 or 2 is identical between each positively sloped supply curve. The SM supply 
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2iα increases, 2ˆ iα  decreases and iγˆ increases so that the intercept increases. In other 
words, the supply decreases at a given price, 1p .  
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curves do not shift simply to the left after 2iα  increases but can cross the previous 
supply curves before changes. Therefore, if SM1 equilibrium is realized on the lower 
segment of the SM1 supply curve in market 1, its net benefit may decrease or increase or 
even unchanged. But on the upper segment, cost increasing effect can be distinct due to 
the accumulated adding up effect of 2iα increase to the slope and intercept components.  
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Figure V-11a. Net benefits change with a supply slope parameter changing 1 
 
If participants in market 1 increase as 2iα increases for the cost function slope 
parameter ratio )/( 21 ii αα decreases relative to any squared market prices ratio 221 )/( pp , 
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firms participating in market 1 will face the upper segment of SM1 supply curve and its 
cost increasing effect can be distinctive. But in market 2 where participants decrease, 
cost effect is uncertain on the lower segment but it is expected that cost will not change 
much compared to market 1. Hence, SM net benefit can decrease eventually in the 
overall markets as in Figure V-11c and Figure V-11d. Changes of SM supply curve 
segments in magnitude do matter as well as the slope and location and difference of each 
SMS and TSMS segment do. But it is still uncertain that the SM net benefit will increase 
or decrease. It is observed that the SM net benefits in Figure V-11b show increasing 
trend different from those in the other graphs. But this is the case of changes in both of 
1iα and 2iα  and the scale of those parameters are small compared to other simulation 
cases. 
As for dominance between MM and SM, the simple theoretical model presented 
earlier suggests that as the slope of the supply curve or MC curve increases, there is a 
tendency for the welfare cost of the allowing multiple markets to increase and for the 
welfare cost of allowing participation in only a single-market to decline. Hence, as the 
slope of the supply curve increases, there is a tendency for SM to dominate. And this is 
confirmed in the numerical analysis. Every graph below except for Figure V-11d shows 
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that SM dominates or moves to approach MM as the slopes of the supply curves get 
steeper when 2iα increases to a certain level. The advantage of SM almost catches up 
with that of MM in Figure V-11c, and the catch-up effect is distinctive in Figure V-11b as 
two parameters 1iα and 2iα change simultaneously. 
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Figure V-11b. Net benefits change with supply slope parameters changing 2 
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Figure V-11c. Net benefits change with a supply slope parameter changing 3 
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Figure V-11d. Net benefits change with a supply slope parameter changing 4 
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In Figure V-11e, this hypothesis could be effective over the two different regions 
as 2iα increases. The characteristic of this graph is that the SM net benefit falls 
discontinuously at some levels of 2iα due to the discontinuous nature of the SM market 
noted above. However, the net benefit of the SM case increases again and moves to 
approach the MM case. As the number of participants increase, the relative magnitude of 
these discontinuous shifts would decline, meaning that eventually the SM case could 
dominate for steeper supply curves. 
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Figure V-11e. Net benefits change with a supply slope parameter changing 5 
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We could say that the effect of the slope change is clear in the supply side as it 
was in the demand side. This is confirmed in the simulation even in the case where 
abrupt and discontinuous SM net benefits are realized. We have seen this sensitivity of 
the effect of the slope change compared to that of the intercept change in the demand 
side case which was shown in the previous two sections: the relative performance of 
MM and SM was not much affected as the intercept parameter of the marginal benefit 
curve, jΩ , changed. However, the effect of the slope parameter change of the marginal 
benefit curve, jθ , was more distinct.  
In the supply side, the intercept change will deepen the effect of the slope change 
in magnitude so that overall changes will be amplified unlike the demand side case 
where only the intercept changes. This will be true especially when firms face the 
discontinuous SM supply curves that have many uncertainties in their shapes. 
If both slopes are changed simultaneously it holds that the SM approach becomes 
more attractive. In fact, in virtually every simulation in which both slopes were changed 
simultaneously from 10% to 200% of the randomly chosen base value, the MM case was 
preferred for the flat supply curves and the SM case was preferred for the steep supply 
curves. 
  254 
Changes of the supply curve parameter: iγ  
Increase in “absolute” value of iγ 46 decreases the slopes of supply curves and 
shift them outward to the right with the intercepts moving downward in both markets.47  
This is the reverse case of increase in 2iα which resulted in shifting the supply curves 
inward to the left. But the second best caps in both markets remain the same as before 
the parameter changes since the agency’s misperceived supply curves are unchanged, 
and each individual firm’s decision rule48 is not affected either. In case 2iα increase, 
only the second best cap of market 1 ( **1A ) did not change. This unchanging 
characteristic of the second best caps in both markets is unique unlike the changes of any 
other parameter which affected the second best cap at least in one of both markets. 
Net benefits of FB and MM will increase due to the cost reduction effects as the 
                                            
46
 Note that iγ , negative numbers, are chosen to decrease in “real” value but increase in 
“absolute” value for comparative analysis. 
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supply curves move to the right. But the simulation shows that the cost reduction effects 
are not big as the net benefits of FB and MM increase slowly. This implies that the first 
best caps are not much affected by the changes in iγ . Net benefit changes in FB and MM 
as the absolute value of iγ  increases are less than those as 2iα increases when those 
simulation graphs are compared. Impact of changes in iγ  is less than that of changes 
in 2iα . 
But SM net benefit shows a significant trend and several possibilities of MM and 
SM relationship are shown in the graphs: SM net benefit (NB) increases very slowly and 
MM absolutely dominates (Figure V-12a). This is the representative case of many 
simulations; MM dominates but net benefit differences between MM and SM decrease 
(Figure V-12b); SM net benefits increase fast and SM switches to dominate (Figure V-
12c); MM dominates and SM net benefit decreases (Figure V-12d). 
Many graphs show SM net benefit increases but it is still uncertain that SM net 
benefit will increase or decrease as is shown in Figure V-12d and in the case of changes 
in 2iα , implying the dynamic characteristic of the SM case. However, unlike any other 
parameter change that results in the slope change, the discontinuous SM net benefit 
trends are not found in this simulation.  
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Figure V-12a. Net benefits change with a supply parameter changing 6 
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Figure V-12b. Net benefits change with a supply parameter changing 7 
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Figure V-12c. Net benefits change with a supply parameter changing 8 
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Figure V-12d. Net benefits change with a supply parameter changing 9 (i=20) 
  258 
The SM net benefit was not discontinuous in case of the 1Ω change but it caused 
only the intercept change without changing the slopes, having led to not altering the 
relative performance of SM and MM for most parts. Hence, not surprisingly, the slope 
does matter, while the intercept does not. Regarding the slope parameter changes, some 
characteristics could be pointed out as the absolute value of iγ  increases. 
First, the change in iγ  is symmetrical and systematic in both markets in the 
sense that it affects the slopes and intercepts of the supply curves of both markets 
simultaneously, but does not affect the agency’s misperceived supply curves at all in 
both markets. In contrast, changes in 2iα  influenced the slopes and intercepts of the 
supply curves of both markets as well as just one of the agency’s misperceived supply 
curves. The parameter 1θ change resulted in the slope change of the MB curve in market 
1 only. Second, as a result of unchanging misperceived supply curves the second best 
caps do not change in both markets and the first best caps don’t seem to be much 
affected. Finally, the parameter iγ  and its change do not affect each individual firm’s 
decision rule as is different from change in 2iα . 
Therefore, resultant changes take place in a symmetrical and systematic way so 
that total effects of iγ  change seem to be rather predictable and stable in overall markets 
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in that SM net benefit is realized as a smooth continuous curve even though we still have 
uncertainty that it will increase or not.  
MM will dominate as the slopes of the supply curves decrease. MM dominance 
is also attributed to the fact that the relative cost reduction effect of MM will be greater 
than that of SM. The simulation analysis confirms our hypothesis in most of those 
figures. Some figures also suggest overall or partial MM dominance.  
Figure V-12d shows another feature. The implication discussed so far comes 
from the result of the simulation when there are ten firms. The implication is more 
supported when we ran simulations with a larger number of firms. This is shown in 
Figure V-12d which is run with twenty firms (i=20) and the last point violates the 
positive price conditions. The values of the MM net benefits change very slowly under 
the iγ  simulations. As the total number of participating firms increase in both markets, 
the markets are neutralized against the effects of iγ changes and uncertainty becomes 
reduced. And MM dominance becomes distinctive due to its cost reduction effect 
compared to SM. 
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Changes of the second-best cap relative to the first-best cap: ( )*** / jj AA  
Finally, we are ready to investigate the effect of changes of the relative second 
best cap to the first best cap (“relative cap ratio” hereinafter). Regarding the cap changes, 
economists and policy makers will be interested in how an isolated decision on the social 
cap level of any environmental abatement product without considering its joint 
abatement product and the resultant discrepancy between the first best and the second 
best cap will influence the dominance of MM or SM over the other.  
For this analysis, the first best cap is set fixed, and only the second best cap 
increases ranging the relative cap ratio, ( )*** / jj AA , from 0.1 to maximum 2.0 with a 0.2 
unit scale interval. The first best and the second best cap coincide when the ratio is equal 
to 1. The possibility that the second best cap is mistakenly set up more than twice the 
first best cap is not assumed in this analysis. 
The FB net benefits do not change since the FB cap is fixed when ( )*** / jj AA  
increases. MM net benefit is maximized when the second best cap coincides with the 
first best cap while SM net benefit is maximized generally between 60% and 80% of the 
relative cap ratio. 
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Every figure49 is rather smooth and continuous as it was in the case of iγ  
changes. Both cases of simulation have in common that one of the first and second best 
caps does not change: only the first best cap increased when the absolute value of iγ  
increased with the relative (second best) cap ratio decreasing, while only the second best 
cap increases with the relative cap ratio increasing in the cap analysis here. The relative 
cap ratio is maintained stable in the sense that the ratio increases or decreases 
monotonically unlike any other parameter changes. Also, individual firm’s decision rules 
do not change too in these two cases.  
Every graph shows that MM moves to dominate, including an overall dominance 
case in Figure V-13c. MM generally dominates when the second best cap increases 
farther than the first best cap especially all two second best caps increase at the same 
time. SM sometimes gives out even negative net benefits. In the case of excessive cap, 
MM plays a role of hedging risks. MM induces more flexible market system that absorbs 
some shock of the excessive second best cap to the first best cap by composing a 
portfolio and diversifying those affluent abatement products in the multiple markets.  
                                            
49
 The first points in Figure V-13a and Figure V-13c violate the price positivity 
condition. 
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Reversely, SM can be advantageous when the second best cap is less than the 
first best cap as is very usual in case the complementary “free” abatement products are 
considered. It can be efficient that more abatement products should be sold in more 
markets. The figures show the dominance of SM when the second best cap is about 60% 
to 80% less than the first best cap (Figure V-13a and Figure V-13b). Particularly looking 
at the maximum net benefits in Figure V-13d and Figure V-13e, the SM can achieve the 
same net benefits as the MM with a lower cap. It is inferred that the SM approach would 
be safer to opt for if the second best cap is set less than the first best cap. 
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Figure V-13a. Net benefits change with a cap ratio changing 1 
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Figure V-13b. Net benefits change with a cap ratio changing 2 
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Figure V-13c. Net benefits change with a cap ratio changing 3 
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Figure V-13d. Net benefits change with cap ratios changing 4 
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Figure V-13e. Net benefits change with cap ratios changing 5 
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5.4. Conclusion 
We have seen that the question of whether firms should be allowed to sell credits 
in multiple markets is not as straightforward as might typically be assumed. If caps are 
set optimally, then it is clear that double-dipping provides optimal incentives and will 
lead to the first-best outcome (at least in the deterministic setting with a perfectly 
functioning market that we assume). However, policies are frequently handled in a rather 
piecemeal fashion; global warming goals are separate from nutrient criteria, which are 
separate from wetlands requirements. If caps are set in this piecemeal fashion, then to 
the extent that any optimization criteria is used to set the caps, it will probably be done 
where the marginal benefit of abatement equals its marginal cost, without taking into 
account how the various policies interact.   
If abatement targets are set using this second-best criterion, then it is no longer 
automatic that allowing multiple markets is appropriate. As we show graphically, there 
are situations where the welfare loss can be lower without multiple markets than they are 
with multiple markets. It is not always efficient to allow double-dipping. In particular, 
we find it interesting that as the marginal benefit curve becomes flat, relative advantage 
of double-dipping falls.  
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The intuition which motivated this research still holds: the slope does matter and 
the simulation analysis supports this finding. We assumed that a firm does not have any 
legal responsibility or it has abundant initial distribution of license enough to not reduce 
emission. One point source firm was assumed to exist as a price taker, being so cost 
inefficient that it demands all abatement credits produced by the nonpoint source firms. 
First what matters is not independent slopes of MB and MC or supply curves but 
relative slopes between MB and supply curves. When the slope parameters of the MB 
curve increase in absolute values and the MB curve becomes relatively steeper than 
supply curves, MM tends to dominate due to the welfare loss reduction caused by 
steeper MB curves. However, counter-examples are abundant. It is not clear that MM 
dominates when only one slope parameter of MB curves increases. One reason is that 
SM can dominate for example in market 2 with a pretty flat MB2 and steep supply 
curves in market 2 and this surpasses whole other MM dominance effects in entire 
markets. This may happen at any time due to random number generating characteristics 
of the simulation. This relative slope analysis is all applied to the changes of other 
parameters as discussed above. 
Generally, SM tends to dominate when the slope parameter of the supply curves 
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increases, especially when their intercepts increase simultaneously with the slopes. We 
see that the intercept change will deepen the slope change effect in magnitude as was 
seen in the supply side parameter change, ijα . Only an intercept change alone does not 
tend to much affect the relative performance of MM and SM as a whole as seen in the 
case of 1Ω  changes. SM eventually dominates or moves to dominate MM even when 
the SM net benefits fall discontinuously at some level of ijα . However, it must be noted 
that even intercept changes can be important to determining which policy might be 
preferred when the number of SM participating firms change. 
When the second best cap increases, MM moves to dominate as the second best 
cap reaches the first best cap although there is some exception. MM is better than SM in 
the case of excessive cap farther than the socially efficient cap level. It can be efficient 
that more abatements should be sold in more markets. On the contrary, SM is more 
advantageous or safer than MM when the cap is less than the socially efficient cap level, 
which will be more often the case because of positive complementary relationship 
between abatements. SM even achieves the same net benefits as MM does with a lower 
cap. Less abatements should be sold in less markets. 
Second, net benefits of FB and MM always shows a consistent tendency but the 
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net benefit of SM does not. SM supply curves, SMS and TSMS, have discontinuous and 
uncertain nature with segments of different slopes and locations based on the number of 
participating firms in that market. This discontinuity makes SM net benefit changed all 
of a sudden and shows some irregular net benefit pattern. As a result, the number of 
participating firms in the markets matter on if MM or SM dominates. Dominance 
between SM1 and MM1 depends on the slope and location and difference of each SMS1 
and TSMS1 segment at the market price as well as the relative slopes of the MB1 and 
MM1 supply curve.  
But the SM net benefit curves are smooth and continuous in the simulation cases 
when iγ or the relative cap ratio changes: only the first best or second best cap changes 
and an individual firm’s decision rule does not change. The changes of both caps can 
cause an amplified uncertainty of the markets. If comparing changes of iγ to those of ijα , 
the impact of iγ changes with both of the second best cap and firm’s decision rules 
unchanged is less than that of ijα changes which affect the changes of the first and second 
best caps and decision rules. 
With keeping these in mind, we find that the conditions for double dipping or 
MM from the social efficiency point of view are: (1) the abatement cap is clearly and 
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reasonably set at the level that would be thought very close to the first best cap. This 
means that the environmental agency needs to know information on targeting pollutants 
and their technologically complementary interactions between abatements; (2) it will be 
safer to adopt SM if the second best cap is (perceived to be, due to the lack of 
complementarity information,) less than the first best cap.  
Hence, we believe that it may be inappropriate to allow double dipping in the 
provision of greenhouse-gas credits because in diminishing this global externality, the 
marginal benefit of the sequestration on any one acre is likely to be essentially constant 
over a very large range.  
The case of instream water flows in rivers and streams is another issue that 
deserves to be noted. They function to protect water quality and preserve recreational use 
value of water for water-based activities, and help to generate wetlands without 
additional costs. Allowing double dipping in this case is possibly more efficient as long 
as the marginal benefit curve for the instream water flows levels is steeper than their MC 
or supply curves.  
The limitation of our analysis starts from the fact that the slope and location of 
discontinuous SM supply curves are not well identified and this made the analytical and 
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graphical analysis pretty difficult. In the future research, more investigation on the 
conditions of welfare changes is needed with the simulation results. Table V-1 presents 
an extensive list of market-based environmental commodities.  
 
Table V-1. Range of Environmental Credits in Use or under Consideration  
Environmental goods Currency Regulatory Driver 
Wetland Acres Federal & State 
Stream Linear feet Federal & State 
Buffer Acres State 
Habitat Species/habitat acreage Federal & State 
Forest Acres State 
Carbon/Greenhouse Gas Tons of CO2 emissions State & (possibly) Federal  
Nutrients Pounds State 
Miscellaneous water quality Pounds Federal & State 
Stormwater Acres of pervious cover Federal & State 
Renewable energy Renewable energy credits State 
Water rights Acre-feet of water State 
Aquifer recharge Acres of pervious cover State 
Development rights Development or density units County 
Source: Based on George Kelly, Environmental Banc & Exchange. Presentation to the 
EPRI Environmental Sector Council, Sept. 10-12, 2003  
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CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Water quantity trading refers to water markets and Interbasin Water Transfers 
(IBT) where water is conveyed from one set of users to another with money exchanged. 
Water quantity trading affects flows/inflows and their quality in the source and 
destination basins so that economic and environmental characteristics are at issue. This 
dissertation examines water quantity issues in a water trading context from wetter to 
dryer regions of Texas under without and with minimum requirements of freshwater 
inflows. We focus on welfare gain, water demand and environmental flows and 
complementary relationship among multiple environmental commodities.   
This chapter is organized around five items: (1) Analysis and implications of 
implementing IBT projects; (2) Analysis of implementing minimum requirements of 
freshwater inflows to bays and estuaries (FWIB) and policy alternatives; (3) Conditions 
for efficient multiple markets; (4) Implications for environmental commodities in the 
presence of multiple markets; (5) Limitations and tasks for future research. 
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6.1. Interbasin Water Transfers (IBT): Water Quantity Issue 
In Chapter II, a modeling framework TEXRIVERSIM was presented that was 
developed to examine the economic, hydrological and environmental effects of IBT 
projects across 21 Texas river basins. The model maximizes annualized expected net 
benefit of water use by the nonagricultural and agricultural sectors plus assigned value of 
freshwater inflows. It encompasses nine climate states of nature with hydrological 
factors such as precipitation, evaporation losses and return flows being considered. The 
model contains sets of constraints on agricultural land and water use, total water use by 
source and sector, demand curve convexity, freshwater inflows, hydrological water flow 
balance, reservoir and IBT capacity, etc 
The model is a two stage stochastic programming with recourse: the crop mix 
and IBT construction decision is made in the first stage independent of the state of 
nature; then water availability and yields are decided in the second stage by the state of 
nature with water transfer and crop acres realized. In modeling this, we introduced 
climate-driven water demand and supply. 
Chapter III reports the results of the model application. Three IBT projects were 
optimally chosen: Luce Bayou IBT (Trinity–San Jacinto), Cypress Basin IBT (Cypress–
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Trinity), LCRA-SAWS (Colorado–San Antonio). IBT projects relocate water to increase 
economic use efficiency. The annualized gain of implementing these IBT projects 
amounts to $203 million. However, the model reveals that the agricultural sector does 
not materially gain from IBT. The municipal sector gain accrues 37.5% ($76 million) of 
the IBT gains, achieving more gains in dry states of nature where the climate-driven 
demand shifting factor coefficient is high. The industrial sector accommodates 62.5% 
($127 million) of the gain. Implementing IBT projects reduces the freshwater inflows in 
seven major basins of the Gulf of Mexico, but they increase in the IBT destination basins, 
San Jacinto and Guadsan.  
After IBT projects are implemented, water use increases in the IBT destination 
basins, but instream water flows and freshwater inflows decrease mainly in the IBT 
source basins, though positive or negative deviations exist by basin.  
 
6.2. Recommendations on Freshwater Inflows to Bays and Estuaries (FWIB) 
In Chapter IV, our analysis focused on the economic, hydrological and 
environmental effects of imposing minimum requirements on freshwater inflows to bays 
and estuaries as defined by TPWD and TWDB in the seven basins of Texas. We 
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examined the changes in welfare gains, interactions and conflicts between water use and 
environmental flows according to the different freshwater inflows constraints along with 
the IBT implementation. 
We developed simulation results for the imposition of two types of the inflow 
constraints. First, the inflow constraints were imposed for each state of nature (FWIB-
SON). However, these constraints satisfied the recommendations only in the three basins, 
Guadsan, Nueces and San Jacinto. It was impossible to satisfy the constraints in the 
ColLavaca and Neches River basins almost in every state of nature in every month. The 
SanioNues and Trinity River basins could meet them on average but not in some states 
of nature, depending on the month.  
The finding that the base set of the state of nature constraints can not be satisfied 
has important policy implications. Thus, we examined an alternative form of the inflow 
constraints (FWIB-Avg) to meet the requirements on average. There are three reasons 
behind this alternative constraint specification. First, the state of nature constraints are 
simply impossible when average constraints cannot be satisfied. Satisfaction of the 
average constraints is a required condition for the satisfaction of the state of nature 
constraints.  
  275 
Second, when there are large variations of inflow levels depending on water 
supply levels, it is harder to meet the recommendations in some states of nature, and 
accordingly, the recommended inflow levels should be lowered.  
Third, even if the state of nature constraints were possible, it would be costly to 
set the recommended inflow levels in each and every state of nature because of 
opportunity costs and searching costs to find the comprehensive inflow level table. And 
inflow levels for each and every state must be readjusted even under small changes in 
the model assumption, e.g., groundwater demand portion. 
The FWIB recommendations could be met on average feasibly in five basins 
adding SanioNues and Trinity. To make the model feasible, the minimum requirements 
of freshwater inflow levels in the ColLavaca and Neches River basin were reduced to 
1.5% and 80% of the originally recommended inflow levels, lowering the inflow levels 
by 98.5% and 20% of them in the two basins, respectively.  
This suggests the need for policy changes by TPWD and TWDB. Several 
options are possible. (1) The recommended inflow levels could be lowered for the 
ColLavaca and Neches River basins. This merits study by ecologists. (2) The next option 
is extended interbasin management. In the case of ColLavaca, the FWIB recommended 
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inflow levels are too far above the optimal levels so that freshwater inflows should be 
managed in the extended interbasin of ColLavaca and Colorado, and this should be 
implemented with the first policy option, lowering the recommended inflow levels. 
Freshwater inflows in Neches can be managed in the extended interbasin of Neches-
Sabine if lowering the recommended levels is not possible. Extended basin-wide 
management of inflows are especially important when multiple inflows-out control 
points to bays and estuaries exist and their aggregated inflows must be comprehensively 
regulated, as in the case of Trinity. (3) Appropriate storage of the seasonal freshwater 
surpluses can make up for the shortages in conjunction with the second policy option. In 
the extended interbasin of ColLavaca and Colorado, the seasonal freshwater surpluses 
from February to May can compensate for the shortages from June to September if the 
seasonal storage is feasible. The strategy of seasonal management must be implemented 
along with yearly management to be prepared for water shortages in consecutive dry 
years/states of nature. 
(4) Another option is to relax the recommended inflow levels based on 
percentage ranges as shown in the Tennant Method which suggests eight seasonally 
different levels of water flow recommendations. (5) The last option is to reevaluate the 
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economic, biological and chemical standard of the FWIB recommendations, not merely 
lowering the inflow levels. There should be some compromise between economics and 
ecology/environment when freshwater inflow levels are reevaluated and enforced. 
Under the average constraints after lowering the recommended inflow levels in 
ColLavaca and Neches, FWIB-NB from the FWIB recommendations without the IBT 
projects was -$211 million. The total loss was -$8 million when FWIB-NB (-$211 
million) and IBT-NB (+$203) are both considered. The welfare loss from the FWIB 
recommendations was greatly relived by the IBT-induced water use efficiency. 
The same three IBT projects were chosen with the IBT implementation and the 
FWIB average constraints. The results show that the FWIB provisions decrease water 
use and net benefits. Overall, in terms of the total gain after the IBT implementation and 
FWIB average constraints, the IBT destination basins contributed to increasing water use 
and also freshwater inflows unlike the IBT-only scenario, while the IBT source basins 
contributed to decreasing instream flows. In the IBT destination basins Guadsan and San 
Jacinto, water use, instream flows and freshwater inflows all increased due to sufficient 
injection of water. The FWIB recommendations served to protect freshwater inflows: the 
Neches River basin has contributed to strong decrease in water use but also to increase in 
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instream flows and freshwater inflows. 
The Colorado, Lavaca, Brazos and San Jacinto River basins are interconnected 
with the FWIB and IBT. The FWIB recommendations reinforced the IBT gain effect 
more in the simultaneous FWIB average constraints and IBT scenario than in the IBT-
only scenario. Water use and flows are interacting with those in the IBT and FWIB 
neighboring basins.  
 
6.3. Conditions for Efficient Multiple Markets 
Chapter V, presents an essay on market conditions for multiple environmental 
commodity markets (multiple markets or MM) to work best in a socially efficient 
manner when those environmental commodities are jointly produced and traded in such 
cases as freshwater inflows, instream flows and wet lands.  
Starting and extending analytically from Montgomery (1972), we found that 
double dipping is efficient in the first-best economy. However, in the second-best setting, 
the results are mixed and double dipping may not be as socially optimal as might 
typically be assumed. We did the simulation analysis on this second-best setting, 
assuming the quadratic social benefit function and firms’ cost functions with interaction 
  279 
terms of two jointly produced environmental commodities. We also assumed that a firm 
has abundant initial distribution of licenses with ten nonpoint source firms and one price-
taking point source firm who demands all abatement credits.  
The relative slopes of Marginal Benefit (MB) and Marginal Cost (MC) or supply 
curves matter on if multiple markets (MM or double dipping) or single market (SM) is 
preferred. When the slope parameters of MB curve increase in absolute values and the 
MB curve becomes relatively steeper than supply curves, MM tends to dominate due to 
the welfare loss reduction caused by steeper MB curves although counter-examples are 
abundant.  
We see that the intercept change can deepen the slope change effect in 
magnitude. Even intercept changes can be important to determining which policy might 
be preferred when the number of SM participating firms change.  
When the second-best cap increases, MM moves to dominate as the second-best 
cap reaches the first-best cap though there is some exception: more abatements should be 
sold in more markets. On the contrary, SM is more advantageous or safer than MM when 
the cap is less than the socially efficient cap level: less abatements should be sold in less 
markets. 
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Due to the discontinuous nature of SM supply curves, the number of 
participating firms in the markets could matter on if MM or SM dominates.  
Finally, the conditions for double dipping or MM from the social efficiency 
point of view are: (1) the abatement cap is clearly and reasonably set up at the level that 
would be thought very close to the first-best cap. This means that the environmental 
agency should have information on the technologically complementary interactions 
between abatements; (2) it will be safer to adopt SM if the second-best cap is (perceived 
to be, due to the lack of complementarity information,) less than the first-best cap.  
 
6.4. Implications for Environmental Commodities in Multiple Markets 
The analyses of freshwater inflows and the potential for multiple markets are 
actually interrelated. Freshwater inflows to bays/estuaries and instream water flows in 
rivers/streams could become new environmental commodities that may be traded in the 
markets. Environmental flows function to protect water quality and preserve recreational 
use value of water for water-based activities, and help to generate wetlands without 
additional costs. There are some cases when MM is preferred when caps are 
suboptimally set. 
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First, allowing double dipping or MM in this environmental flow case is 
possibly more efficient if the marginal benefit of the freshwater inflows or instream 
flows is steep or inelastic. On the contrary, MM may not be efficient in the case of 
greenhouse gas credits where the marginal benefit of the sequestration on any one acre is 
likely to be essentially constant over a very large range. However, what matters are the 
relative, not absolute, slopes of demand (benefit) and supply curves matter. 
Second, if we introduce the climate-driven demand shifting factor to these 
environmental flows and demand for the flows increases, then intercept change could 
deepen the efficiency of MM along with the inelastic demand curve.  
Third, the second-best cap, biologically and ecologically acceptable minimum 
requirements for environmental flows, will generally tend to be set higher in reality than 
the economically optimal flow levels which will be the first-best cap. This might be due 
to political or bureaucratic responsibility. In case the second-best cap is set higher than 
the optimal flows levels, our analysis says that MM will be preferred. 
It should be noted that if the IBT gain in water use (IBT-U) dominated the FWIB 
loss in water use (FWIB-U) as was generally seen in our analysis, then water use would 
increase but the optimal environmental flows provided would decrease. The caps should 
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be adjusted as well but this will not be an easy task for environmental water agencies to 
accomplish, as it is a timely procedure. 
 
6.5. Limitations and Tasks for Future Research 
There are some limitations and tasks for future research in our analyses. First, 
the groundwater component is not introduced in our model. This will restrict 
comprehensive understanding on changes of welfare, water demand and (in) flows. 
Integration of a hydrological groundwater component into the current surface water 
model will be a future task.  
Another issue for future research is the reexamination of the definitions of 
environmental flows to meet the goal of economics and environment. This would 
become a real issue when we enlarge our project scope and vision to cover all 
environmental flows, including instream flows.  
One more issue is that more exact information must be gathered on IBT water 
in- and out-points and field-based analysis should be carried out in the geographically 
and IBT-FWIB interconnected river basins. The junior water rights status of water 
transferred needs to be incorporated in the future model for more concise understanding 
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of water use and flows in these basins.  
In the chapter regarding double dipping, the limitation of our analysis starts 
from the fact that the slope and location of the discontinuous single market supply 
curves are not well identified. This made the analytical and graphical analyses quite 
difficult. More investigation on the conditions of welfare changes is needed with the 
simulation results. 
Our study is believed to be the first attempt to introduce environmental flow 
factors in order to evaluate comprehensive economic, hydrological and environmental 
effects of the FWIB and IBT implementation across Texas. We suggested new policy 
alternatives feasible for better use and preservation of water and for efficient 
environmental commodity markets.  
Future research is also needed on FWIB inflow constraints addressing the 
infeasibility finding in chapter IV specifically looking at whether the environmental flow 
levels need to be redefined to accommodate drought and seasonality. This would require 
an interdisciplinary study involving economics, hydrology, ecology and environment 
factors.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
Symbol Type Description 
AGWATERUSE Variable Ag water use 
ARTDIVERSIONQ Variable Artificial variable (infeasibility) 
ARTFLOWBALANCE Variable Artificial flow to make model feasible 
COLLECTCITY Variable Diversions to a city from a diverters place 
COLLECTINDUSTRY Variable Diversions to a county from a diverters place 
CROPACRES Variable Harvested acres by crop 
CROPMIX Variable Crop mix use 
DIVERSIONQ Variable Amount diverted by each river location 
DIVERTERUSE Variable Water use by diverter and by sector 
ESCAPETOBAY Variable Water flow out of the river basins to a bay 
FLOW Variable Flow from upstream or to downstream 
INDMINDIVERTERUSE Variable Non stepwise industry/mining use by county 
INDMINDIVERTERUSEs Variable Stepwise industry and mining use by county 
MUNDIVERTERUSE Variable Non Stepwise municipal use by CITY 
MUNDIVERTERUSEs Variable Stepwise municipal use by CITY 
NETBENEFIT Variable Net Benefit of Water Transfer 
OUTTOBAY Variable Escapement to the ocean 
RIVERINTBBASINTRAN Variable Interbasin Transfer from River to River 
RIVERINTBBASINTRANConstruction Variable Whether or not construct River IBT 
STOREADD Variable Reservoir Storage additions 
STOREWITH Variable Reservoir Storage withdrawals 
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USERINTBBASINTRAN Variable Interbasin Transfer from River to user 
USERINTBBASINTRANConstruction Variable Whether or not construct USER IBT 
USERINTBBASINTRANsce Variable Interbasin Transfer from River to user by sector 
AGDIVERSIONID Equation All agricultural diversion identity 
AGLAND Equation Agricultural land 
AGWATERUSEBAL Equation Ag water use balance 
CITYDIVERSIONID Equation Major municipal city identity 
CROPBALANCE Equation Crop balance 
DIVERSIONQMAX Equation Maximum diversion allowed by sector 
FLOWBALANCE Equation Flow balance 
FLOWOUTTOBAY Equation Outflow to bay and estuary 
IBTConfigurationConstraint Equation Number of IBT can be built 
INDCOUNTYDIVERSION Equation Major industrial county identity 
INDCOUNTYDIVERSIONmax Equation Major industrial county identity 
INDDIVERSIONCONVEX Equation Sets sum of steps equal to one by county 
INDDIVERSIONID Equation All industrial diversion identity 
MIXBALANCE Equation Land in mix balance 
MUNDIVERSIONCONVEX Equation Sets sum of steps equal to one by CITY 
MUNDIVERSIONID Equation All municipal diversion identity 
MUNDIVERTERUSELIMIT Equation Limit on quantities without demand curves 
NONCONSUSEMAX Equation non consumptive use balance 
OBJ Equation Objective function 
OTHERDIVERSIONIDENTITY Equation All other type diversion identity 
QUANTITYDIVERSION Equation Balance on quantity diverted 
RECDIVERSIONIDENTITY Equation All recreational diversion identity 
  291 
RIVERINTBBASINTRANConstraint Equation Annual Capacity of RIBT 
STOREBALANCE Equation Reservoir Storage balance 
STORECAPACITY1 Equation Reservoir Storage capacity 
STORECAPACITY2 Equation Reservoir Storage capacity 
UIBTbalance Equation Sum of IBTs equal total IBTs 
USERINTBBASINTRANConstraint Equation Annual Capacity of UIBT 
availagland Parameter Available irrigated planted acres 
CityDemanddata Parameter Parameters for Demand functions 
cropdata Parameter Agricultural crop budget data 
Evaporationloss Parameter Evaporation loss (%) of reservoir storage 
IndMinDemanddata Parameter Industry/mining water use 
inflow Parameter flows between two control points 
InterBasinTranCapacity Parameter IBTs annual Capacity 
InterBasinTranCost Parameter Interbasin transfer fixed/drawing cost 
mixdata Parameter Harvested acres 
Muncitydemand Parameter Computing demand data  
Muncitydemand2 Parameter Computing demand data for costs  
newagwatercost Parameter Agriculture water price by county 
Newwateruse Parameter Actual nonagricultural water use 
prob Parameter Probability of the states 
QINC Parameter Separable quantity increments 
reservoircapacity Parameter Normal storage capacity of reservoirs  
RFpercent Parameter Return flow percentage by type 
upperdiversionQ Parameter Maximum permitted diversion 
wttobay Parameter Weight on flow out to bay 
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Activemix Set Counties with active crop mix data 
availmixdata Set Year when the mix data is available 
City Set Covered municipal cities in Texas  
conssector Set consumptive use sectors 
county Set List of counties in Texas 
Countytouse Set Agricultural counties with agricultural diverters 
crop Set Crop names covered in the model 
destbasin Set Aliased with river basins 
destbasins Set Aliased with river basins 
destplace Set Aliased with river location 
downriver Set Aliased with river location 
IBT Set interbasin transfers with data 
Indminmapping Set Mapping of riverplace, industry/mining county 
Indminmapping1 Set Mapping of riverplace, industry/mining county 
InterBasinTranName Set a set containing all the UIBT and RIBT names 
InterBasinTranOpt Set Choice of IBT 
interbasintranrivertoriver Set RIBT names (river to river) 
interbasintranrivertouser Set UIBT names (river to user) 
irrigstatus Set Irrigation status 
isagther2 Set Agricultural county and river basins 
isagthere Set Agricultural county and river mapping 
Mappingall6 Set Mapping of basins, place, county/sector 
Mappingall7 Set Mapping of riverplace and sector 
Mappingcity Set Mapping of riverplace and major cities 
Mappingcity1 Set Mapping of riverplace and major cities 
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month Set The months included in the model 
mriverflowlink Set New river flow links between primary locations 
mriverplace Set Major active river places with full data 
nonconssector Set non consumptive use sectors 
onriver Set Set telling where river points are located 
reservoir Set River locations of reservoirs on rivers 
RInterBasinTran Set Connection points for Inter Basin Transfer 
riverbasins Set Basin names in Texas covered in the model 
riverlocation Set Primary control points in each riverbasin 
riverplace Set Aliased with river location 
SAMEAS Set Set Element Comparison Without Checking 
sector Set Type of water use 
sector1 Set Small type of use set 
sourcebasin Set Aliased with river basins 
sourcebasins Set Aliased with river basins 
sourceplace Set Aliased with river location 
state Set Nine states of nature 
steps Set Restricted set of steps for testing 
UInterBasinTran Set IBT directly diverted in destination 
Upriver Set Aliased with river location 
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APPENDIX B 
 
 Assuming that the F (⋅) is strictly convex, the firm and planner’s problems are 
convex programming problems so that the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are necessary and 
sufficient conditions for an optimum. The Lagrangian of the firm’s minimization 
problem is  
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The price vector will be a market clearing if the following conditions are 
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ijij ∀≤−∑
=
,0)()...5B.(
1
0*
,  
jllp
n
i
ijijj ∀=


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

−∑
=
,0)()...6B.(
1
0**
. 
The social planner’s cost minimum is the vector of eij* that solves the following 
problem: 
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The Lagrangian for this minimization problem is  
( ) ∑ ∑ ∑
= = =
−−=
n
i
m
j
n
i
ijijjimiimnm elueeFuueeL
1 1 1
0
1111 )(),...,(,...,,,...,  
),...,( **1 imi ee for all i is a social cost minimum if and only if there exists 
0),...,( ****1 ≥muu such that the following Kuhn-Tucker conditions for all i and j are: 
0]),...,([,0]),...,()...[8B.( ******1'********1' =+≥+ jimiijijjimiij ueeFeueeF  
0)(,0)...9.B(
1
**0**
1
**0
=−≥− ∑∑
==
n
i
ijjj
n
i
ijj eluel  
Proof of lemma 1 
Let **** , jij ue  be optimum choices for the planner’s problem, satisfying equations 
(8) and (9), for some total load limit, Lj0, j=1,…,m.  Let **** ,,, ijijijj luep  be the satisfying 
the optimum conditions for the market equilibrium, equations (2) through (6).  
If we substitute **** , jij ue  into (2) instead of ** , ijij ue , the equation (2) becomes 
equivalent to equation (8) so that **** , jij ue  satisfy the equation (2). 
Equation (3) is satisfied for all i and j if ., ****** jijjj uuup ==  
Equation (4) is also satisfied for all i and j because ****** , ijijijij eeel == . 
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Equation (5) becomes 0)(
1
0** ≤−∑
=
n
i
ijijij leh since
***
ijij el = . This is immediately equivalent 
to the left equation of (9) since we defined ∑
=
=
n
i
ijj ll
1
00
. 
Equation (6) is equivalent to the right equation of (9) since 
∑
=
===
n
i
ijjijijjj llelup
1
00******
,, . 
The social cost minimum, **** , jij ue , satisfy the market equilibrium generated from 
the individual firm’s optimization problem given the market price. 
Since this is satisfied for an arbitrary load limit, Lj0, it holds for any feasible limit. 
Proof of lemma 2 
Now, let’s define the solution of (8) and (9) as ****** , ijijjj eepu == . If we substitute 
the solution ** , ijj ep  into (8) and (9) instead of **** , ijj eu  respectively and this solution 
satisfies the equation (8) and (9), then the lemma 2 is proved. 
By substitution, the left side of equation (8) becomes 0]),...,([ ***1' ≥+ jimiij peeF , 
which is shown from the left side of equation (2) because ** ijj up ≥  from the left side of 
equation (3). 
As for the right side of equation (8), if ,** ijj up >  then, 0* =ijl  from the equation 
(3) and 0* =ije from the left side of equation (4), which, in turn, satisfy the right side of 
equation (8) by substituting 0* =ije instead of **ije . If ,** ijj up =  combined with 
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******
, ijijjj eepu == , the right side of equation (8) becomes equivalent to the right side of 
equation (2). 
The left side of equation of (9) is achieved by *** ijij ee = : Let’s sum the left side of 
equation (4) over i, and add this with equation (5) after changing its sign to be positive. 
We can obtain 0
1
*0 ≥−∑
=
n
i
ijj el  with the definition of ∑
=
=
n
i
ijj ll
1
00
, which is equivalent to 
(9) when we replace *** ijij ee =  in (9). 
As for the right side of equation (9), if ,** ijij el >  then, 0* =iju  from the equation 
(4) and 0* =jp  from equation (3). Therefore, the right side of (9) is satisfied since 
***
jj pu = . If
**
ijij el = , equation (9) becomes the same as (6) when *** jj pu = .  
Proof of lemma 3 
Equations (2) – (4) do not depend on ),...( 001 imi ll . Equation (5) only depends 
on ),...( 001 mll , but not on ),...( 001 imi ll . 
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The following must be satisfied 
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For the first inequality holds,  
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1
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1
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−
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γ
α
α
γ
 since 
22 ii ee ≥ . Finally, 0,0because0 121
2 <>≤− iiiii γαααγ .  
But if 0then,0 2121
2
===− FFiii ααγ where the cost is minimized with the 
maximum emission levels that achieve a firm’s profit maximization without any 
restriction on emission levels. We do not need to consider this here. Therefore, it is 
satisfied that 021
2 <− iii ααγ . 
For the second inequality holds, 011 ≥ie   
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The firm’s supply function becomes 12121 ˆ,ˆ papa iiii γα −== if the firm sells in 
market 1, and 212,21 ˆˆ papa iiii αγ =−=  if the firm sells in market 2. Let’s substitute these 
values in the cost function.   
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As derived in the body of the chapter, the following equations are used in the 
simulation model.  
Cost and benefit function 
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The second best case 
Abatement cap of the second best case  
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Multiple market (MM) in the second best case   
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Single market (SM) in the second best case  
Prices are set up at the interval 
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Abatements of a non-point source firm i (=1…n) under the condition that 202 ˆii el ≥ , 
1
0
1 ˆii el ≥ are 
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i papa 12121 ˆˆ,ˆˆ γα −== If a firm participates in market 1 
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i papa 21221 ˆˆˆ,ˆˆˆ αγ =−=  If a firm participates in market 2 
Abatements of a point source firm t (=n+1…m) are 
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Aggregate supplies or Total SM Supplies (TSMSj) are comprised of market supplies for 
the abatement j in the market j (SMSj) plus complementary byproduct abatements for the 
abatement j in the other market. 
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